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ABSTRACT

My project examines the communicative constitution of environment: how we mediate
environment in discursive practice, and arrange chaotic and complex timeplaces into organized
relationships of agents and objects which act and are acted upon. Climate scholars across
disciplines are calling for a paradigm shift in how we understand, study, inhabit, and relate to
Earth’s varied environments. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how communication practices do
the work of constituting the environment as we know it, and therefore conclude with the hopeful
suggestion that these same practices can be used to do the work of a paradigm shift — that is, we
can (re)arrange our relationships and ways of relating in ways that generate genuine transformation
in the world.
This project weaves together transdisciplinary threads of scholarship to contextualize our
understanding of environment within institutionalized practices which authorize particular means
of mediating experience, including critical legal geography, sociolegal studies, science and
technology studies, organizational studies, climate science, and meteorology, to name a few. I
connect these varied fields through the application of a meta-constitutive framework of
communication (e.g., Craig, 1999; Cooren, 2014) in which I understand communication to be the
means by which we mediate our experiences in the world. I employ a multimodal, mediated
approach to discourse analysis to analyze what strategies and resources participants use in
interaction to mediate and make sense of their environment and to consider the implications of
various actions for the beings, objects, and environments involved. I adopt a critical stance from
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which I pursue a critical agenda I have chosen to call the Terrestrial project: the need to generate
new ways of arranging and relating within our environment to better account for the agency,
materiality, and needs of those other beings and materials trying to inhabit the Earth alongside us.
The Terrestrial project does not call for a paradigm shift, but rather it makes space for us as scholars
and Earth-bound beings to do the messy, conflicting, frustrating, and promising work of changing
our practices.
In my analytical chapters, I offer three case demonstrations of what scholarship in the
Terrestrial project might look like, making a point to examine a variety of data types (mediational
modes) across contexts. Because there is already considerable research on human-animal
relationships, I focus on three broad, non-living (in the organic sense of carbon-based life)
environmental phenomena: land, weather, and climate. In the chapter on land, I examine legal texts
and consider how legal discourse shapes and is shaped by the material conditions of our
environment; the chapter on weather considers how a hurricane is constituted through social media
posts and images; the climate chapter analyzes spoken discourse, attending to the ways in which
speakers at a professional conference give meaning to the term “climate change” through practices
of identification and categorization.

vi

INTRODUCTION

When I visit my family in Southern West Virginia, I am always reminded of the contingent
relationship of humans to their environment — for every house clinging to the side of a mountain,
there is another that has washed away. In the hollers of West Virginia, people must contend with
a geography of steep mountains, crumbling sedimentary rock faces, and the constant leaking of
water downward into streams which rapidly transform into swift rivers after even moderate rains.
Roads curve across mountainsides, with fallen rocks often scattered along narrow shoulders and
orange cones or patched-up asphalt marking where the road has quite literally crumbled away.
Along creek banks are the moldering remains of entire towns washed away after repeated flooding.
Human existence here is tenuous, and it is tempting to fall back upon folk sayings about the power
of nature compared to our own foolhardiness.
What the environment of Southern West Virginia makes abundantly clear is the mutually
constitutive relationship between humans and their environments. Once one of the most prosperous
regions in the United States — Bramwell, a town in Mercer County West Virginia was once home
to the most millionaires per capita in the country — Southern West Virginia owes its boom, and
more recent decline, of human occupancy to the coal industry. In this way, coal made human
civilization even as people remade the environment to suit the needs of coal mining. Coal camps,
settlements clustered around coal mines, developed into towns with businesses, schools, and
municipal governments. More recently, legislation and local ordinances have prohibited new
construction along creek sides due to severe and repeated flooding. The precarious and contingent
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nature of life in Southern West Virginia illustrates how both the built and “natural” environment
bears upon the lives of its human occupants, exercising what I argue is nothing less than its own
agency.
Still, there has been a tendency to investigate the human impact upon the environment
rather than the environment’s impact on humans. Rogers (1998) elaborates:
We are very willing to talk about how discourse affects nature, but what about how nature
affects discourse, and therefore, us? The importance of humans’ material existence — our
existence as both political and natural beings — is mystified when nature is positioned as
passive or irrelevant in critical communication theory. (p. 247)
In the more than twenty years since Rogers’ call for a transhuman, materialist theory of
communication, I argue that we have not yet empirically examined the agency of the material
environment, to dismantle dichotomies such as subject/object, symbolic/material, and
human/nature which scholars have shown to be anthropocentric and harmful to all inhabitants
within a given environment (Barnett, 2018).
Rogers’ (1998) critique of constitutive theories of communication seems misplaced — the
problem is not constitutive theories, but their confusion with social construction. Constitutive
theories of communication go further than social construction claims that humans create their
world in relations of discourse (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1999). They do so by
taking an orientation which decenters humans as the origin of action and meaning (Deetz, 2003),
by acknowledging the mutually constitutive nature of our existence; we make and are made by the
multitude of forces and entities with which we are entangled (Barad, 2007; Condit, 2005; Kuhn et
al., 2017). Constitutive theories carry new interpretations of agency, materiality, relationality, and
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authority, and may be the key to radically transforming our understanding of environmental
phenomena. However, there are few empirical studies to illustrate what this might look like.
A Constitutive Communication Orientation
This project contributes to the transdisciplinary literature on environment, such as critical
legal geography, science and technology studies, and climate science. I examine data from
environmental phenomena by way of a constitutive theory of communication. Drawing on the
sociocultural tradition of communication theory (Craig, 1999), I understand communication as
discursive practice. Though discourse is traditionally defined as “language used in social
interaction” (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 2), I consider a broader definition which accommodates
analysis of hybrid agency and sociomateriality. I am drawn to the possibilities enabled by Hajer
and Versteeg’s (2005) definition of discourse “as an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and
reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (p. 175). By this definition, participants in
discourse are not limited to humans, and discursive resources are not limited to symbol systems,
though humans and linguistic communication feature prominently in discursive practice (Norris &
Jones, 2005). A theory of communication as discursive practice accounts for the ways in which
agents mobilize material and semiotic resources (Cooren, 2004; Jones, 2016). It does not assume
that all things are of discursive origin, but rather that things are realized — they are made real, as
matter made to matter — through discursive practice.
In orienting to communication as discursive practice, I draw from the transdisciplinary
work on practice theory (Hui et al., 2017). Ortner (1984) was among the first to identify an
emerging “practice theory,” noticing a growing interest in the scholarly literature of the 1970s and
‘80s concerned with “practice, praxis, action, interaction, activity, experience, and performance”
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(p. 144). Practice theory approaches developed out of the philosophical work of Wittgenstein and
Heidegger (Hui et al., 2017), as well as interpretations of Marxist ideology which reconcile its
compatibility with that of Weber, challenging the materialist/idealist divide. Early influential
contributions include Wittgenstein’s description of the social as a complex of practices (Schatzki,
2000), and Gidden’s (1984) assertion that “social practices ordered across space and time” are the
primary concern of the social sciences (p. 2). A practice orientation is one which acknowledges
that any event is a bundle of doings, and practice theorists are interested in the embodiment,
embeddedness, transformation, constellation, and political implications of identifiable patterns of
doings.
Practice theorists have made a number of observations about the social and the material
which are particularly relevant to my orientation to communication as discursive practice. The
centrality of humans varies from the more traditional human-centered practice theories to what
Gherardi (2017) considers “posthumanist practice theory” (p. 39). Posthumanist practice theory
sets aside the classic definition of practices as arrays of (largely) human activities (Schatzki, 2005),
in favor of an understanding of practices as “a mode, relatively stable in time and socially
recognized, of ordering heterogenous items into a coherent set” (Gherardi, 2006, p. 35). Gherardi
(2017) summarizes the difference thusly:
While a humanist approach to practice assumes the centrality of humans as sites of
embodied understandings and then proceeds to analysis of humans and their practices, a
posthumanist approach instead interrogates how all the elements within a practice hold
together and acquire agency in being entangled. (p. 50)
Sociomateriality recognizes the inseparability of meaning and matter within a practice (Barad,
2007; Gherardi, 2017; Kuhn et al., 2017), as well as the enmeshment of matter in social life (Shove,
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2017). For environmental phenomena, sociomateriality suggests the artificiality of the boundary
between nature and culture. Gherardi (2017) identifies the challenge of generating “appropriate
methodologies for the empirical study” of sociomateriality in practice (p. 41).
Communication is uniquely positioned to weave together these discipline-bounded threads,
demonstrating the “viscous porosity” (Gherardi, 2017, p. 47) of an entangled, relational ontology:
though disciplines may vary in their tolerance of transdisciplinary interactions, enacting various
degrees of resistance, the boundaries of disciplines are indeed permeable, and theoretical concepts
fluid. The disciplinary narrative of communication being inherently transdisciplinary, as informed
by a multitude of diverse theoretical trajectories (Craig, 1999), provides a firm foundation for
communication studies which weave together various theories and analytical methodologies for
examining communication phenomena. I weave together the transdisciplinary theoretical
influences on this study in the following sections, but for now the important point is this: discursive
practices constitute sociomaterial phenomena (patterns, structures, environments, cultures, etc.),
and in turn, sociomaterial phenomena constitute discursive practices.
Environment is a sociomaterial phenomenon — a meshwork1 of various social and material
relationships. In addition to being a discursive accomplishment, environment is a hybrid
achievement; its meaning and apparent stability is performed by a multitude of agents, not all of
them human (Coole & Frost, 2010; Cooren et al., 2005). I focus on three environmental phenomena
— land, weather, and climate — to empirically demonstrate how they are, in both their micro
(interactionally situated) and macro (institutionally authorized) discursive manifestations, hybrid

1

I use the term “meshwork” rather than “network” because of Ingold’s (2008) argument that “the network metaphor
logically entails that the elements connected (whether people or objects) are distinguished from the lines of their
connection” (p. 1805). Instead, he discusses experience as “a trail of movement or growth” which is tangled and
wound with other trails which “constitute the texture of the land.” In this way, life is performed in a “relational field”;
“it is a field not of connectable points but of interwoven lines, not a network but a meshwork.”
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practices. Most basically, “land” refers to Earth’s solid surface. “Weather,” according to the
National Snow and Ice Data Center (2019), is “the day-to-day state of the atmosphere (temperature,
humidity, precipitation, cloudiness, visibility, and wind) and its short-term variation in minutes to
weeks.” In other words, weather is what is happening now, whereas climate is “the weather of a
place averaged over a period of time, often 30 years.” Land, weather, and climate are each
sociomaterial phenomena. They are constituted in discourse through a hybrid agency in which
bodies, identities, texts, organizations, institutions, or other sociomaterial presences
simultaneously act and react, obscuring the process and implications of their constitution as such.
To guide my research, I ask the following questions:
RQ1: How might communication theory account for agency beyond that of human actors?
RQ2: What sort of empirical analyses might illuminate the ways in which land, weather,
and climate are hybrid practices?
RQ3: What are the implications of our current practices of constituting environment?
Positioning
To position this project firmly within the field of communication, I draw upon Craig’s
(1999, 2007, 2015) constitutive metamodel of communication2. Craig’s (1999) constitutive
metamodel of communication presents a coherent field of communication informed by seven
theoretical traditions: rhetorical, semiotic, phenomenological, cybernetic, sociopsychological,
sociocultural, and critical. The constitutive metamodel is informed by several principles of first-
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See also Cooren’s (2014) application of the ventriloqual metaphor to Craig’s constitutive meta-model. A ventriloqual
interpretation of the metamodel brings attention to the way in which people, ideas, and things are both made to act
and make us react. What is more, the speaking through and for to which the ventriloqual metaphor attends is
consequential — what is done will be to the benefit of some and the detriment of others. Though this dissertation is
not a project within the scope of ventriloqual theory, the notions of mobilizing resources in interaction to negotiate
authority has much to offer the empirical analysis of communication data.
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order constitutive models3 including the recognition that “communication itself is the primary,
constitutive social process” that explains other phenomena, the mutually constitutive relationship
between communication and culture, and the practical and political implications of communication
(p. 126). Craig argues for a pragmatic interpretation of the constitutive metamodel, which
understands “models of communication as different ways of constituting the communication
process symbolically for particular purposes” (p. 127). In other words, no model of communication
can be dismissed a priori.
In response to Craig’s (1999) recommendation that communication scholars “should show
an awareness of relevant traditions of communication theory” (p. 153), I locate my own research
as stemming from the rhetorical, sociocultural, and critical traditions. From the rhetorical tradition,
I understand communication as strategic action; from the sociocultural tradition, I recognize that
social order is “created, realized, sustained, and transformed in microlevel interaction processes”
(p. 144); from the critical tradition, I am drawn to reflexively investigate the political aspects of
communication, or how communication processes are necessarily tied to dynamics of authority,
access, and power. Since, as Craig points out, “any mode of communication theory can take a
reflexive, critical turn and so produce a hybrid variety” (p. 148) such as critical rhetoric or critical
discourse analysis, I will now discuss what I see as the two most important theoretical trajectories
to my orientation as a communication researcher: rhetorical theory and discourse studies.
Rhetoric, said to have originated in Ancient Greece, is concerned with persuasion, or the
ability to change one’s circumstances or achieve a desired goal through communication (Herrick,
2015). Karen Tracy (2016) describes a rhetorical worldview as one which assumes the contingency
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A first-order model of communication is “a perspective on communication that highlights certain aspects of the
process,” whereas a second-order model, or metamodel, is “a perspective on models that highlights certain aspects of
models” (Craig, 1999, p. 127). Craig cautions against conflating the two, since not all of the theoretical traditions
share a first-order constitutive orientation.
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and strategy of social life. In other words, experience is not fixed or predetermined; it is realized
through the strategic actions of social actors who seek to “advance aims…they value and thwart
those with whom they disagree” (p. 361). A rhetorical research agenda, then, is one that identifies
the consequences of particular communicative choices.
Early studies and treatises of rhetoric were concerned principally with oration and formal
public address, but over time scholars have broadened considerably what counts as rhetoric and
rhetorical texts (Lucaites & Condit, 1999). In addition to public address, scholars have used
rhetorical theories and methods to analyze landscapes (Clarke, 2004), architecture (Blair et al.,
1991; Hattenhauer, 1984), visual images (Foss, 2004), musical structure (Cloud & Feyh, 2015),
maps (Senda-Cook, 2013), roads (Wood, 2010), and urban spaces (Topinka, 2012). Recently,
scholars have pushed the boundaries of where rhetorical analysis is located, developing rhetorical
field methods which examine everyday life in situ (Middleton et al., 2011; Pezzullo & Onís, 2018).
Most importantly, rhetorical perspectives share an understanding of communication as action,
which is to say that rhetorical utterances alter reality as it is known and experienced (Bitzer, 1968;
Burke, 1966; Peeples, 2015).
A rhetorical worldview is compatible with discursive, constitutive understandings of
experience and meaning making (Jones, 2016; Tracy, 2016). For example, the Greek Sophist
Gorgias is known for his three-part argument on existence, knowledge, and communication, which
is as follows: “(1) Nothing exists; (2) If anything did exist, we could not know it; (3) If we could
know that something existed, we would not be able to communicate it to anyone else” (Herrick,
2015, p. 38). Though many scholars have interpreted this as skeptical philosophy or nihilism, it
can also be read as an argument about communication and its centrality to experience and sensemaking — in other words, everything resides in communication.
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This is a helpful perspective for a communication scholar because it dismisses any search
for “ontological origins that explain social action” (Kuhn et al., 2017, p. 33) and instead guides
attention to action itself, as this is where sociomaterial life is realized (Norris & Jones, 2005). That
action can be conceptualized as discursive practice. Discourse is the synthesis of the various
resources that agents use in interaction to organize, perform, and materialize their worlds.
Spanning disciplinary boundaries, scholars in fields such as sociolinguistics, applied linguistics,
ethnography of communication, education, English and rhetorical composition, social psychology,
anthropology, and sociology have contributed significantly to discourse studies (Jones, 2016).
More recently, communication scholars have made significant theoretical and practical
contributions to the field, especially in advancing discourse as making matter matter, as well as
how power and authority are discursive, hybrid accomplishments (Bartesaghi, 2014; Bencherki,
Bourgoin, et al., 2019; Bencherki, Cooren, et al., 2019; Cooren et al., 2013).
Chapter Overview
I begin this project by explaining how I orient to communication and communication
research. After firmly positioning this project as a communication project, I move to a discussion
of the historical and ongoing discursive traditions we use to characterize environments and position
ourselves within (or apart from) them; this discussion moves from a general overview to specific
discussions of the historical practices of constituting land, weather, and climate to prepare for the
three analytical chapters which follow. I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of the
contributions this project makes to the communication and transdisciplinary literature on
environment.
In Chapter One, I provide my theoretical positioning and explain what I mean by a
constitutive theory of communication as discursive practice. I discuss the characteristics of
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communication which are most important to the analytical project of this dissertation. These
characteristics — sociomaterial, relational, situated, a hybrid accomplishment, bound up with
authority — describe what communication is and what communication does. After this theoretical
positioning, I give an overview of my chosen method, discourse analysis, and introduce and
explain the significance of the data I have chosen.
In Chapter Two, I turn to the literature on environmental discourse. This discussion attends
to environment generally at first, touching on important themes in the transdisciplinary literature.
I present the prominent positions relating to environment — wilderness, the sublime, preservation,
conservation, ecology, environmental justice, and climate — with consideration of how each of
these positions remains relevant to our current practices. I then present important critiques of these
positions and define what I mean by environment. Following this, I present specific discussions of
historical practices regarding land, weather, and climate to provide context for the analytical
chapters which follow. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of what I call the Terrestrial project
— my nickname for the type of research we need to pursue in order to generate new ways of
arranging and relating within our environment that account for the agency and materiality of those
other beings and materials trying to inhabit the Earth alongside us.
Chapter Three is the first of the three analytical chapters and considers how legal texts are
important agents in the constitution of land as manageable property. I attend to the case of Bears
Ears National Monument to demonstrate how legal language and intertextual relationships among
legal texts perpetuate the view of land as a commodity. Though President Obama’s proclamation
establishing Bears Ears National Monument gives some glimpses of what a less anthropocentric,
capitalist orientation to land might look like, it is ultimately bound by the practices of legal
discourse and the necessity of demonstrating its authority and legitimacy as an active textual agent.
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I argue that each time land is designated anew in legal discourse, it is materialized as such,
drastically changing how we might relate to and interact with that land.
In Chapter Four, I turn from land to sky, examining how we constitute weather in
communication. Taking a relational stance which acknowledges the agency of the physical
hurricane itself, I consider what might be gained from understanding the practices of hurricane
prediction as an interaction, a conversation so to speak, with the hurricane. I analyze the case of
Hurricane Dorian and Sharpiegate — the incident that occurred in early September, 2019 and
sparked public debate over the production of weather when President Trump displayed a forecast
map altered with Sharpie — to demonstrate how practices of observation are used to materialize
the storm as a participant in discourse, therefore facilitating our interactions with it.
In Chapter 5, I consider the constitution of climate. Unlike land and weather which each
have a definite physicality which can be seen and felt, climate is an abstract phenomenon which
can only be experienced in discourse. I analyze transcripts from a one-day public climate
conference, “Science, Strategies and Solutions: Addressing Climate Change in Tampa Bay,” held
in downtown Tampa and featuring a variety of speakers representing scientific, political, and
practical orientations. I demonstrate how “climate change” functioned as a shell term for the
participants and show how participants provided the meaning of “climate change” through
membership categorization. I propose that climate is still a valuable concept, but as an organizing
term which is used by participants to traverse social boundaries and align in the pursuit of a
common interest. To conclude, I consider how the shell function of climate may be useful in
generating novel relationships and further the Terrestrial project.
The final chapter considers the Terrestrial project, drawing insights from my empirical
analyses to define that project and consider what future contributions to it might entail. I especially
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consider my findings in light of my goal of demonstrating the Earth’s sociomaterial agency and
resisting anthropocentric tendencies. If we truly wish to resist anthropocentrism and account for
materiality in our analyses of environmental phenomena, we must reject the tendency to privilege
nature-made materiality over human-made materiality — in fact, we must reject that there is a
difference between nature-made and human-made materiality entirely. Instead, we must
acknowledge that everything is sociomaterial and every experience is mediated, and that
untangling the relational meshwork to identify causation or origin is not only a hopeless task, but
a vain one. Identifying relational entanglements is an important task, but the goal should be to
understand how something unfolds in interaction, rather than trying to retroactively construct a
sequence of causation.
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CHAPTER ONE:
COMMUNICATION AS DISCURSIVE PRACTICE

The multidisciplinary origins of discourse studies provide a rich theoretical foundation for
understanding how everyday interaction accomplishes the social organizing and ordering of an
increasingly neoliberal4, globalized world. Recent research has helped situate the work of
discourse studies firmly within the communication discipline (e.g., Tracy & Mirivel, 2009). To
elaborate on what it means to conceptualize communication as discursive practice, I have
identified five characteristics of discourse which explain how it functions and why it is significant.
Discourse can be characterized as constitutive, relational, situated, a hybrid accomplishment, and
tied to the politics of authority. In the following sections, I describe the significance and
implications of each of these features and functions of discourse. I then discuss how a multimodal,
mediated approach to discourse analysis provides a means for analyzing my data.
Discourse as Constitutive
The first feature of discourse I will discuss is that discourse constitutes the sociomaterial
world as it is experienced. To clarify, saying discourse is constitutive is not synonymous with
saying discourse constructs social reality. While constitutive discourse was able to grow out of

4

Mumby and Kuhn (2019) describe neoliberalism as a “hegemonic discourse,” meaning it “is a dominant way of
thinking and talking about the world and our relationship to it” (p. 151). Neoliberalism began as an economic
philosophy which called for the maximization of individual freedoms, the protection of private ownership, and a free
market unencumbered by government regulation. This economic philosophy is reflected in the policies developed in
the 1980s under the leadership of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom.
Since then, neoliberalism has worked itself into nearly all areas of social life, applying the logic of the market as “the
principle through which human beings are both governed and govern themselves” (p. 152).
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social construction with the linguistic turn of the 1930s, it does more to de-center the human
subject as the “origin of perspective (Deetz, 2003, p. 422). As Coole and Frost (2010) caution,
social construction often re-centers human agency, perhaps due to the metaphor of “construction”
which implies the presence of an agent doing the construction. Since construction is an organized,
intentional, and highly planned activity, it implies cognitively aware human subjects who think
before they act upon an environment — reinforcing the subject/object dualism. Since it is this very
dualism which has allowed for much of humanity’s exploitation of its environment, it is important
for critical scholars to resolve this false dichotomy.
Matter, and an analytical focus on materializing “forces, energies, and intensities,” is a
more fruitful approach to addressing the problem of the subject/object dualism (Coole & Frost,
2010, p. 13). Collectively, the scholarship considering matter and materialization is called new
materialism, and its proponents seek to reconfigure our understanding of matter, experience, and
existence. New materialist scholars adopt an ontology in which matter possesses “its own modes
of self-transformation, self-organization, and directedness,” rather than Cartesian or Newtonian
accounts of matter as “passive or inert” (p. 10). In other words, it is an ontology of becoming rather
than being (Coole, 2013). Advances in physics, biology, and ecology make it impossible to see
matter as organized, stable, and predictable — instead, theories of complexity and randomness
blur the boundaries of existence and non-existence, natural and unnatural, and indeed, subject and
object.
In order to address the subject/object dualism, it is necessary to blur the distinction between
the social and the material (Coole & Frost, 2010; Kuhn et al., 2017). The material and the social
are co-occurrent in the constitution of experience (Barad, 2007; Gherardi, 2017) — it is impossible
to distinguish between them because everything, even social phenomena and abstractions, “must
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be materialized to matter” (Kuhn et al., 2017, p. 35). For anything to exist, it must take on a material
dimension. This is to say that it must be performed by bodies, which are always in relation to other
bodies, material presences, and spatiotemporal contexts. To be real is to be matter with
significance; not social or material, but sociomaterial.
If everything must be materialized to matter, and nothing exists outside of communication,
then discourse is not just the study of symbolic interaction — it is the study of how a world
becomes in interaction. The modes we use to communicate experience actually constitute that
experience (Mehan, 1996). To adapt Burke’s (1966) metaphor of the terministic screen, any given
mode of representation is a reflection, selection, and deflection of particular discursive worlds.
Since each mode of representation necessarily deflects alternatives, it is inevitable that conflicts
“waged in and through discourse attempt to capture or dominate modes of representation” (Mehan,
1996, p. 253). Mehan refers to this “competition over the meaning of ambiguous events, people,
and objects in the world” as the “politics of representation” (p. 253). How we represent a particular
discursive event has consequences for how we act toward it and relate to the world. In this next
section, I discuss the relational characteristic of discourse and its implications for sociomateriality.
Discourse as Relational
Discourse constitutes the world as we know it, materializing sociomaterial phenomena in
communication, but it is also constituted by the sociomaterial phenomena. In this sense, discourse
is relational, because discursive practice is always in relation to some other discourse, agent, social
context, material presence, or history. An emphasis on relationality requires redefining existence,
reality, and causality (Kuhn et al., 2017). In this section I expand upon my discussion of discourse
as constitutive, explaining a relational ontology and its implications for discursive theory.
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Ontologically and epistemologically relationality, like new materialism, offers a way of
repairing the divide between the social and the material, making radical claims about the very
nature of existence. Existence becomes through interaction, or rather, entities come to exist
through “ever-unfolding contact” (Kuhn et al., 2017, p. 31). Here again, the theory is influenced
by advances in physics, since even “solid” matter becomes such through the energetic arrangement
of and exchange between particles and energy fields, and the observer effect shows how interaction
with matter produces observable changes that cannot be explained by human perception alone
(Barad, 2007). To be in existence, then, is to be in relation, where relationality is contingent,
dynamic, and nonlinear.
Communication, most concisely, is a process of relating, the product of which is a dynamic
web of relationships (Condit, 2005). Relationality suggests that this web of relationships is the
very nature of existence: “every thing that exists is in itself nothing more than a
particularly…constituted set of relationships,” and “there are no clear boundaries, no thing that
has a discrete existence separate from the web of relationships of all to all” (p. 5). Condit describes
sociomaterial phenomena as “aggregations of matter/energy,” seeking to avoid the human
tendency to draw discrete boundaries of thing-ness (p. 5). Ingold (2008) uses the term
“entanglement” to make a similar point, saying “every organism — indeed, every thing — is itself
an entanglement, a tissue of knots whose constituent strands, as they become tied up with other
strands, in other bundles, make up the meshwork” of existence (p. 1806). Whether aggregate or
entanglement, relationality acknowledges the dynamic, fluid, and inherently related characteristic
of all sociomaterial phenomena.
An understanding of existence as relational suggests that reality is the realization of one or
more possibilities out of infinite others (Kuhn et al., 2017). Existence is contingent upon
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relationality, and relationality indicates a complex assemblage of ongoing performances by
sociomaterial agents that range from microscopic waves and particles, to mesoscopic bodies, to
macroscopic organizations, planets, solar systems, and so on. As Condit (2005) notes, “within each
level of relationship is embedded another” (p. 6). With such complex assemblages of agents in
relation, it is necessary to adopt an understanding of the real as multiple, both in the sense of plural
realities, which are co-occurrent, and multiple possible realities, some of which may or may not
be realized.
If reality is always already multiple rather than singular, it follows that relationality
challenges linear notions of causality, in which actions are preceded by causes and followed by
consequences (Kuhn et al., 2017). Instead, a relational ontology presents causality as simultaneous,
indeterminate, and organic. It also removes any concern of intentionality from causality, since
intention as a theoretical concept is decidedly anthropocentric (cognitive) and irrelevant in a
sensibility concerned with action, constitution, and materialization. Rather than consciously aware
agents who think before they act, relationality presents an assemblage of agents, actions, and
relations which are co-occurrent. The distinction between cause and effect is blurred and revealed
to be a human-imposed order upon a chaotic and complex universe. A relational ontology does not
present causality as happening because of something else, but as happening in relation with
something else. A rethinking of causality is ultimately a rethinking of time and space, which I
discuss in more detail as it applies to the situated characteristic of discourse.
Discourse as Situated
The implications of relationality are that discursive practice is always situated within
relational assemblages of agency and action which can never be reduced to their component parts
or reproduced in exactly the same way. Discursive practice cannot be uprooted from the
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sociomaterial contexts, spatiotemporal orientations, bodies, and performances through which it
comes to exist (Norris & Jones, 2005). In the earlier section on relationality, I discussed the need
for a nonlinear orientation to causality, which is ultimately a reorientation to time. In this section,
I discuss the second aspect of what I refer to as spatiotemporal orientation: the need for new
orientations to space.
According to Latour (2018), the instability of our situation on the planet necessitates a new
understanding of space. The Paris Climate Agreement marked a collective understanding that the
earth cannot play host to every county’s unlimited development, and that loss of land to climate
change is inevitable, meaning we are “all in migration toward territories yet to be rediscovered and
reoccupied” (p. 5). Latour terms the new reality ushered in by COP 21 the New Climatic Regime,
and it includes a new political entity, Earth, which has the power to act, and more importantly
react, to human action. Faced with the inevitability of land loss and the emergent strength of
Earth’s reactions to human occupation, Latour asks the poignant question, “how do we occupy a
land if it is this land itself that is occupying us?” (p. 41). In other words, space is more than context
or location — it is dynamic, agential, and entrained5 within cycles of action spanning the cellular
level to the cosmic level.
I understand space as a “product of interrelations,” the multiplicity (and simultaneity) of
possible spatial orientations, and a necessarily unfinished process (Massey, 2005, p. 9). Massey
states that “space is the dimension that presents us with the existence of ‘the other’…And it
presents us with the most fundamental of political questions, which is, how are we going to live

5

I draw upon Scollon’s (2005) use of entrainment to explain the relationship between actions (mediated discourse)
and cycles (particular orientations to time and materiality; the rhythms imposed by various biological, geo-semiotic,
and material “pace-makers” (p. 24)). The “periodicity of the cycle sets constraints on actions that can be taken within
that cycle,” and any moment is further complicated by which cycle the analyst is orienting, as they exist in layered
simultaneity (p. 25). This is similar to Lefebvre’s (2004) pronouncement that the analyst’s body serves as a sort of
metronome, or a rhythmic marker which we use to orient to time and space. Space, as well as time, is relational.
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together?” (as cited in Edmonds & Warburton, 2016/2017). Agents orient to space in particular
ways according to the affordances and constraints of the discursive resources they are able to
access and mobilize in interaction (Jones, 2005). Scollon (2005) describes three types of spatial
considerations which constrain action: bounded spaces, permeable spaces, and unbounded spaces.
Bounded spaces are those which enclose the field of action completely; permeable spaces are those
which allow the field of action somewhat outside the space; and unbounded spaces are those which
lack boundaries or are “functionally unbounded,” meaning action may “take place without undue
consideration of boundaries” (p. 27). To say that space constrains action is to say space itself has
agency — it constitutes, and is constituted in, discourse.
We must always negotiate an orientation, or a particular way of relating, toward/with space.
The resources agents use to orient spatially are material as well as discursive, including linguistic
resources, such as deixis (i.e., “here,” “far”), pronouns which distinguish bodies from other
material presences, socio-linguistic resources, such as spatial metaphors (i.e., “chatrooms,”
“cyberspace”), and political resources, such as channels of access (i.e., Internet speed, data caps).
In positioning themselves, participants perform repetitions of past interactions that are always
unique (Warren, 2008), “for each another next first time” (Garfinkel, 1996, p. 10). Below, I
elaborate on discourse as a hybrid accomplishment, and then discuss the connection of discourse
to authorship.
Discourse as Hybrid Accomplishment
So far, I have considered how communication is the becoming of a particular world out of
infinite co-occurent possible worlds through a reconfiguration of matter, causality, and space. I
drew upon Latour (2018) and Massey (2005) to suggest that space is not only dynamic, multiple,
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simultaneous, and entrained with spatiotemporal rhythms, but agential. In this section, I further
develop agency as a hybrid accomplishment, rather than a purely human or material characteristic.
As Norris and Jones (2005) suggest, the first question to ask is: “What are the actions that
are being taken here?” (p. 9). The next question to ask is: Which agents are related to that action?
In other words, which sociomaterial presences are constituting, constituted by, or implicated
through discourse? Just as I have complicated materiality, causality, and space, I now seek to
complicate agency. Agency, too, is multiple and co-occurrent, and not limited to human actors
(Parish & Hall, 2020). The capacity to act is also the capacity to interpret, and as Parish and Hall
point out, “we interpret salient details of actions as indexical of certain sorts of agents” just as we
interpret the salient details of agents as indexical of the actions we can expect, demand, or request
of them6 (p. 2). Agency in practice, then, is not only concerned with action but also with the
meanings assigned to actions.
I capture the multiplicity of agency with the phrase hybrid accomplishment; other scholars
have developed different terms such as hybridity and ventriloquism (Cooren, 2004; Cooren et al.,
2013). Everyday interactions involved various sociomaterial actors performing a hybrid agency
that itself becomes the origin of action (Cooren, 2004). A starting place of action-with-agency
highlights how actors perform stability by standardizing and repeating practices over time and in
relation with other agents. One way of conceiving the relationship between agents-in-action is by
a ventriloqual approach.
A ventriloqual approach uses the metaphor of the ventriloquist to explain how nonhumans
can act with agency without threatening the agency of human actors (Cooren et al., 2013). Cooren
(2012) observes how agency oscillates between a ventriloquist and his dummy, sometimes leading

6

This same sentiment is expressed through the notion of category-bound activity (see Schegloff, 2007).
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an audience to “wonder who is the ventriloquist and who is the dummy” (p. 5). The ventriloquist
manipulates and animates the dummy, and the dummy in turn animates the ventriloquist as he
responds to the dummy’s actions. Ventriloquism as an approach to interaction accounts for how
humans and nonhumans act through and upon each other, maintaining individual agency as well
as contributing to the hybrid agency mentioned above. Take, for example, the role of written texts
within an organization. Texts and human agents are relational participants in organizing; human
agents are needed to create texts, which then act upon those human agents by constraining or
allowing for particular future actions (Smith, 2001). We create and animate texts, just as texts
create and animate us (Cooren, 2004).
I hesitate to adopt the ventriloqual approach entirely because its human-centric metaphor
risks reifying the human-nonhuman dichotomy, simultaneously privileging speaking and
language. Opposing “human” and “nonhuman” is most simply a problem of equivalency —
“human” is a much more discrete category than “nonhuman” (Kuhn et al., 2017). “Nonhuman” is
far more expansive. Is it animals, rocks, planets, universes, elements? If the latter, a new problem
arises: How can the matter which constitutes the human body be reduced, through scientific
observation and theorizing, to nonhuman matter? Within environmental discourses, this dualism
is even more troubling because of the historical ways in which it has allowed humans to exploit
those grouped into the nonhuman category. If humanness is the standard by which all matter is
categorized, then anything that fails to meet the requirements of humanness is inherently inferior
and deemed unable (or undeserving) to act (Coole & Frost, 2010). As I have already argued, in
order to fully include the range of agents and actions which comprise discursive practice, we must
adopt a broader understanding of discourse which moves beyond simply spoken or written
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language. Gestures, sounds, landscapes, buildings, and objects are also communicative,
contributing meaning to discursive events (Burke, 1966; Norris & Jones, 2005).
Orienting toward action and agency as originating with humans leaves one blind to the
sociomaterial complexity of any event. Latour (2018) argues it has blinded us to the presence of
Earth itself as a stakeholder and political actor, preventing meaningful political transformation.
When discourse is seen as a hybrid accomplishment, a relational convergence of agency and action,
the criteria for agency is not humanness, intention, or materiality. Agency is simply the ability to
mobilize, or be mobilized by, sociomaterial resources in any given situation. First, one must
identify the action (what is being accomplished) and then one may begin to interrogate what
agential resources are being synthesized in order to do the accomplishing. Further complicating
agency is the notion of authority, which I discuss in the next section.
Discourse and Authority
If agency concerns who or what is doing the everyday, authority concerns who or what
determines how the everyday should be interpreted. In orienting to authority, I find it helpful to
acknowledge that “authority” and “author” share the same Latin root (auctor) (Taylor & Van
Every, 2000). This is significant because “it means that whoever or whatever is explicitly or
implicitly positioned as a figure of authority will also be staged as authoring what is asserted or
put forward” (Cooren, 2010, p. 108, emphases in original). In other words, when discussing
authority, I am discussing authorship and the politics of representation (Mehan, 1996). Accepting
the premise that to be involved in discourse is to be involved in the competition for authorship
necessitates an understanding of authority as an asymmetry — dynamic and uneven. Though
authority is often treated as an abstraction, interaction scholars have shown authority can be
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analyzed as an observable, interactional accomplishment (e.g., Bartesaghi, 2009; Bencherki,
Cooren, et al., 2019; Fairclough, 2010; Krippendorff, 1995).
Bencherki and Bourgoin et al. (2019) define authority as concerning “the ability of things
to act and the meaning of those actions,” and propose what they call a “transductive approach” to
account for the way in which “action is carried around through people, artefacts, and other entities”
(p. 85). In other words, a transductive approach to authority is one that is oriented to action, so that
meaning is not dependent upon human or linguistic action alone. Rather, to enact authority,
something need only “contribute to a more complex system of action that provides them with
meaning by forming their context” (p. 85). This is similar to Latour’s (2018) call to shift from a
system of production to a system of engendering. The system of production gave rise to
globalization, modernization, and a preoccupation with individual human freedoms. In contrast,
the system of engendering is one that first assumes dependence, and from this starting point sets
out to engender (become; constitute) all terrestrials7, and then cultivate attachments among them.
Authority, within a transductive approach, can be enacted by a multiplicity of sociomaterial agents,
and is dependent upon complex systems of action in which meaning is observable as what is done.
Bartesaghi et al. (2019) call attention to the sociomateriality of authority by attending to
the way in which participants in spoken discourse mobilize contexts in order to determine what is
at stake. Authority here refers to who determines the context — or the moral stakes, set of
normative practices, present objects and bodies, or presentified absences8 — of a given

7

Latour (2018) presents terrestrials as an alternative way of referring to the agents who populate, constitute, and are
constituted by the Critical Zone. He says, “It is perhaps time, in order to stress this point, to stop speaking about
humans and to refer instead to terrestrials (the Earthbound) …Saying “We are earthbound, we are terrestrials amid
terrestrials,” does not lead to the same politics as saying “We are humans in nature”” (p. 86).
8
Presentification refers to the way in which extra-local, or dislocal, agents are made present by texts and participants
in interaction, and come to act upon the situation (Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009). By presentified absences I also
mean those elements which are “supposedly absent, non-apparent, implicit, or transient — such as ideologies, cultural
background, or past experiences” (Bartesaghi et al., 2019, p. 18).
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interactional episode. Drawing upon my earlier argument about discourse as constituting
experience, in authorizing context, agents determine in which world the discourse is operating. For
example, in denying climate change, Latour (2018) argues Trump is declaring the United States as
belonging to a world in which humans are the ultimate and only agents. Given Earth’s ability to
react — an ability which we have termed climate change — belonging to such a world is risky,
because without acknowledging the agency of Earth, there is no possibility of forging new
attachments to it. The world occupied by climate deniers is not the same world occupied by
ecologists, but we all must find somewhere to land on the planet we physically occupy.
Competition for authority over the broader context, for the very world in which we find ourselves,
inevitably ensues.
Earlier, I have called this the politics of representation (Mehan, 1996). Perhaps more fitting,
though, would be to refer to the politics of authorization, or the competition to author what counts
as real out of the multitude of possible realizations. If discourse is not only linguistic interaction
perpetuated by human agents, then it is not really a matter of representing experience, as much as
authoring, and authorizing, experience. Authority is always in flux, but through apparent
repetitions a given representation of experience is (re)authorized, and therefore solidified, making
it more and more difficult to refute. Consider, the opposing poles of Global and Local which Latour
(2018) presents as opposing worlds, each moving farther and farther from the other, so that
proponents of either world are increasingly unable to interact due to the incommensurability of
these two authorizations of experience. To say that discourse is bound up in the politics of
authorization is to arrive at what I argue should be the fundamental concern of communication:
who gets to decide (out of the many possibilities) the world in which we are operating, and how
are those decisions made and enacted? Latour’s (2018) New Climatic Regime can now be
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understood as the urgent need to constitute a new world, a new authorization of experience oriented
not to the Global or Local, but toward a new pole, the Terrestrial. Any representation of experience
that constitutes most of its inhabitants as objects rather than agents will not be able to generate
lasting transformation; it is only by acknowledging the agency of Earth that there is any potential
for growth and change.
Method and Data: A Multimodal, Mediated Approach to Discourse Analysis
Broadly, discourse analysis assumes that language can be analyzed at varying levels of
detail, from the “level of the phoneme/morpheme, the word, the clause, or the sentence” to the
level of the text, and that language “ought to be analyzed not as an abstract set or rules, but as a
tool for social action” (Bhatia et al., 2008, p. 1). These two assumptions are often described as the
“language as text” and “language in use” orientations to discourse. More recently, discourse
analysis has come to acknowledge language as but one mode out of many possible discursive
modes — what Iedema (2003) calls the “multi-semiotic nature” of communication (p. 50; see also,
Blommaert, 2013; Ledin & Machin, 2019; Kress, 2012; Norris, 2004; Van Leeuwen, 2011).
Discourse analysis emerged out of linguistics in the mid-20th century, but quickly crossed
disciplinary boundaries and gained followings in psychology, sociology, anthropology,
communication, philosophy, organizational studies, education, socio-political studies, legal
studies, marketing and advertising, and more (Bhatia et al., 2008). These transdisciplinary
trajectories have led to the development of several approaches to discourse analysis which guide
analysts’ focus in particular ways. This study employs discourse analysis in the broader sense, but
I do draw from and synthesize multimodal discourse analysis (MMDA) and Mediated Discourse
Analysis (MDA). In this section, I explicate my synthetic approach.
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First, MMDA and MDA decenter the linguistic mode (Bhatia et al., 2008; Iedema, 2003).
By orienting to discourse in this way, I argue that any one mode of communication — such as
speech, written texts, nonverbal behaviors, spatial arrangement, non-linguistic sounds, smells, or
other means of conveying meaning — is but a part of the complex of interactions that make up
discourse (Kress, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2011). While linguistic communication is often a good
indication that something is happening and therefore a productive place to begin analysis, analysis
must not stop there. The second useful concept of multimodality is the idea of “logics and
affordances of modes” (Kress, 2012, p. 38). Certain modes offer particular affordances to
interaction, as well as constrain the possibilities of interaction due to their very natures. For
example, written texts offer authors an aesthetic capacity for spatial arrangement that spoken
communication does not. As such, it is always important to interrogate the implications of our
choices, asking what participants make salient by drawing upon particular modes. As van Leeuwen
(2011) astutely observes, “even when two modes can realize the same meaning, each will add its
own overtones and resonances” (p. 673). Communication is inherently multimodal (Iedema, 2003),
which is to say that within any communicative event there are multiple modes simultaneously
contributing to the texture of the discourse; a discourse analysis concerned with multimodality
should attend to how they are related in the realization of meaning.
Any one mode specifically, and discourse more broadly, is significant because of what it
does and what is done through it; in other words, discourse is significant because it is mediational.
Broadening what counts as discursive practice and who counts as participants in discourse calls
for a unit of analysis other than language (as text and/or in use). I draw on MDA to reorient to
action as the starting point of analysis (Norris & Jones, 2005). In other words, I use MDA’s focus
on action as the unit of analysis to develop a set of (somewhat sequential) questions to guide my
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analysis: (1) What is being done here? (2) Who or what is involved in this doing? (3) How are they
accomplishing this doing (or not)? MDA holds that there is no unmediated access to the world; to
understand how something is mediated and by what means is to understand how something is
constituted in the moment of interaction.
Below, I introduce the data I have chosen for analysis, and explain why I chose these data.
The data analyzed in this dissertation were not considered human subjects research by the
University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB) since all of the data chosen are
publicly available. Therefore, this project did not require IRB oversight. Per the IRB’s instruction,
however, any identifying information in the spoken data transcripts (e.g., names, exact titles) was
omitted or changed to protect privacy.
Land: Analyzing Legal Texts
My interest in the legal constitution of public land in the United States was what first
inspired this project. I was especially interested in the historical practices of constituting land as
property, and the ways in which legal texts remain relevant and perpetuate 19th century ideas about
land, dwelling, and property. At the time I was beginning to write the proposal for this project in
early 2019, the federal government was undergoing a shutdown — during the shutdown, federal
public lands remained accessible to the public, but were unstaffed, leading to vandalism and
pollution and causing irreversible damage to historically and scientifically important environments
(Wernick, 2019). As a result, there were many public conversations in the news media, on social
media, and among environmental advocacy groups about the role of public lands, acceptable
behavior within them, and how we ought to negotiate accountability in relation to accessing and
maintaining public lands. From these conversations I began to notice that public land is a very
particular type of institutionally authorized land, mediated significantly by legal texts which define
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what counts as “public land,” how a given area may become “public land,” and who is responsible
for participating in the making and managing of an area designated to be “public land.”
Legal texts are highly intertextual, linking back to texts from the earliest days of this nation,
recontextualizing the 19th century ideologies which those early texts espouse into our 21st century
texts and practices. This intertextuality is most clear in the practices of designating a national
monument via presidential proclamation, as established by the Antiquities Act of 1906. When
designating a national monument, accountability and authority are made explicit through an
enacting clause which names both the source of authority authorizing the action and the agent
accountable for it. Because of this, the process transforms an environment, and thus our
relationship to it, with relatively little justification beyond this explicit statement of authority and
accountability. As such, the legal status of an environment is subject to rapid change depending
on the agenda of the acting president.
In recent years, this rapid creation and transformation of land has been most evident (and
most contentious) in the case of Bears Ears National Monument in Southern Utah. Bears Ears
National Monument is a result of “the first successful Native American-led campaign for a national
monument in U.S. history” (Grand Canyon Trust, n.d.), and Obama’s proclamation establishing
Bears Ears is the first to mandate collaborative management of a national monument with tribal
nations (Wilkinson, 2018). Bears Ears is also significant because Trump’s proclamation modifying
Bears Ears National Monument (along with his proclamation modifying Grand Staircase Escalante
National Monument, signed and announced at the same time) is the largest reversal of national
monument protections in U.S. history (Gonzales et al., 2017). I chose to look at the three texts
responsible for authorizing, creating, and transforming an area of federally owned and managed
land in Southern Utah into Bears Ears National Monument: The Antiquities Act of 1906, Barack
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Obama’s Presidential Proclamation Establishing Bears Ears National Monument, and Donald
Trump’s Presidential Proclamation Modifying Bears Ears National Monument. Obama’s and
Trump’s proclamations both concern the same land and were issued only one year apart, indicating
that the transformation of Bears Ears, and our possibilities for relating to it, are fundamentally
discursive. In my analysis, I focus on moments of intertextuality to understand how authority and
accountability are negotiated by mobilizing (speaking for and/or through) voices in the text, to
recontextualize Ravotas and Berkenkotter’s (1998) phrase. In addition to demonstrating how legal
texts mediate our encounters with environments, I also consider the critical implications of legal
texts to shape (and be shaped by) our relationships and actions with/in an environment.
Weather: Analyzing a Hurricane’s Presence on Twitter
Later in 2019, the U.S. experienced another environmental controversy which brought
explicit attention to our practices of representing (mediating, constituting) the weather — in
particular, a hurricane. The case of Hurricane Dorian and Sharpiegate provide an opportunity to
understand how visuality is integral to the constitution of a hurricane on social media. Visual texts
paired with linguistic accounts of viewing draw upon accepted practices of looking and seeing
which authorize a particular account of what is seen as a claim to what is real (Jones, 2020;
Mirzoeff, 2011). Our interaction with Dorian is mediated by our visual representations of Dorian
which we interpret as directly corresponding to the physical storm actually out there — accepted
practices such as the two-dimensional, birds-eye-view logic of cartography (Hsu, 2014), trusted
viewers such as satellites (Parks, 2001), and assumptions about the objectivity of the material
world (Sontag, 2001) mediate our interaction with Dorian by lending authority to these visual
materializations — and thus we position our responses to these visual iterations of Dorian as being
in response to Dorian, the storm itself.

29

Though Sharpiegate was discussed widely in the media and in public discourse, I have
chosen to focus on the three tweets which were most often cited as being the core events of the
controversy, as well as two relevant tweets from Trump before the start of the controversy and
responding to its emergence. The five tweets are as follows:
1. Donald Trump’s August 31, 2019 tweet (Figure 4) which begins, “I am monitoring
Hurricane Dorian and receiving frequent briefings and updates.”
2. Donald Trump’s September 1, 2019 tweet (Figure 5) which started the controversy and
begins, “In addition to Florida – South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, and
Alabama, will most likely be hit (much) harder than anticipated.”
3. National Weather Service Birmingham’s September 1, 2019 tweet (Figure 6) which
begins, “Alabama will NOT see any impacts from #Dorian.”
4. The White House’s September 4, 2019 tweet (Figure 7) of a clip from an Oval Office
press briefing captioned “President @realDonaldTrump gives an update on Hurricane
#Dorian.”
5. Donald Trump’s September 4, 2019 tweet (Figure 8) of a spaghetti model which begins
“This was the originally projected path of the Hurricane in its early stages.”
Twitter offers multimodal means of mediating an utterance which are not available in, say, legal
texts or spoken discourse (Squires, 2015); retweets, @mentions, hashtags, and the inclusion of
images in addition to text offer significant opportunities for recontextualization — quite literally
linking readers via a hyperlink function to other speakers, contexts, or discourses. My analysis
considers how these varied mediational means enable speakers to constitute collective viewing
experiences across spatiotemporal boundaries by authorizing an account of what is seen as the
account of what is.
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Climate: Analyzing the Spoken Discourse of a Professional Conference
In addition to being interested in how we constitute environmental phenomena at the
national level, I wanted to examine how we do so in localized settings. One such opportunity arose
as I was preparing my proposal, the “Science, Strategies, and Solutions: Addressing Climate
Change in Tampa Bay” public conference, sponsored by the USF STEM Collaborative and held
in downtown Tampa November 1, 2019. The data from that conference were rich enough to have
inspired their own dissertation, so I made the decision to initially focus on those moments when
participants explicitly mentioned “climate change” in an effort to understand what that term meant
to them. My analysis attends closely to speakers’ utterances to identify the discursive strategies
they use to construct coherent, professional narratives of climate change.
I argue that the phrase “climate change” is functionally a shell (e.g., Schmid, 2018; Smith,
2005) — a semantically empty vehicle for mediating action which must itself be mediated by some
other discursive resource which provides meaning and context. For the participants, practices of
membership categorization (see Schegloff, 2007) fill in the meaning of climate change by
positioning participants as members of professional identity categories concerned with climate
change. In addition to the mediational means employed in spoken discourse, I also consider how
the format of the conference itself mediates what climate change comes to mean, both in the
broader sense of a professional conference and in the more specific sense of imposing three
predetermined identity categories: elected officials, scientist researchers, and government and
private practitioners.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have described my understanding of communication as discursive
practice, what discourse does, and why an understanding of communication as discursive practice
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productively explains the plurality and simultaneity of agency and action. I explained my approach
to the analysis of discursive data as informed by multimodality and mediation and previewed the
data I analyze and my rationale for selecting them. As a study on the communicative constitution
of environment, it is important to contextualize my research not only within the communication
literature as I have in this initial chapter, but also within the vast literature on environment and
environmental studies. In the following chapter I review scholarly approaches to studying and
constituting the environment. I then consider what might be gained through an inclusive theory of
environmental phenomena as hybrid accomplishments in empirical analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO:
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE

Since the 1960s, “the environment” has become an increasingly prominent subject of
scholarly research, social organizing, news coverage, and political debate (Hansen, 2011). In the
Western world, “the environment” is the dominant term for what is often considered “the natural
world” (Milstein, 2009), and as Hochman (1997) points out, it has “increasingly come to mean a
nature tangibly important only to human health or livelihood” (p. 88). Within the field of
communication, environmental critiques first emerged from the rhetorical tradition in the 1980s
(Milstein, 2009; Oravec, 1984), and environmental communication has since developed into its
own subfield with divisions in the National and International Communication Associations, and
the creation of the Environmental Communication journal in 2007. Most importantly, to adapt a
phrase of Hulme’s (2017), there can be no unmediated access to environment. There is not a
distinct physical and social environment, but rather a sociomaterial environment that comes to
matter through discursive practice. Environment, in short, is constituted in communication. In this
chapter, I discuss our historical relationship with and popular ways of constituting environment in
the United States. I then provide discussions specific to the environmental phenomena I consider
in the analytical chapters: land, weather, and climate.
Constituting Environment
Most environmental communication scholars agree that environmental communication is
foremost concerned with the relational dynamic between humans and their environments
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(Milstein, 2009). Pezzullo and Cox (2018), in their introductory text to environmental
communication, define it as “the pragmatic and constitutive modes of expression — the naming,
shaping, orienting, and negotiating — of our ecological relationships in the world, including those
with nonhuman systems, elements, and species” (p. 13). Emerging in the 1980s, environmental
communication is part of an ongoing struggle (because we make it one) to position ourselves
relationally in a coherent and structured universe. I say that we make it a struggle because it is
through discourse that we materialize relationships and more consequentially, evaluate the
meaning and moral quality of particular relationships. Several identifiable traditions of relating to
the Earth include wilderness, the sublime, preservation, conservation, ecology, environmental
justice, and climate.
Wilderness
The concept of wilderness originates from the Judaeo-Christian and Greco-Roman
traditions. The term itself developed from the Anglo-Saxon “wilddeoren,” which referred to places
“where ‘deoren’ or beasts existed beyond the boundaries of cultivation” (Garrard, 2012, p.67).
After eating the apple, Adam and Eve are banished from Eden into the wilderness. Wilderness,
then, represented all that is evil, untamed, violent, unpredictable, inhospitable, and uncivilized.
The wilderness was, quite literally, the dark, and civilization, the light. This is not to suggest,
however, that interactions with wilderness were not desirable or valuable — as Garrard points out,
“early Christian hermits went to the deserts” where they experienced spiritual revelation, so “the
Judaeo-Christian conception of wilderness, then, combines connotations of trial and danger with
freedom, redemption, and purity, meanings that, in varying degrees, it still has” (p. 68).
Importantly, this orientation positions humans in opposition with wilderness — humans are

34

morally called to tame, and therefore make useful, the wilderness, but the wilderness resists
relentlessly. This struggle, of course, relies on the differentiation of humans from wilderness.
The Sublime
By the mid-19th century, humans had tamed much of the wilderness and the majority of
Americans lived in urban settings. Thus “removed from the day-to-day hardships of living in rural
areas” (Pezzullo & Cox, 2017, p. 31), people were more inclined to view the wilderness as a place
of retreat. The writings of Henry David Thoreau championed the sublime quality of wild nature,
equating the awe that some experienced in wild spaces to a spiritual encounter; to be in the
wilderness was to be in the presence of God. At the same time, the growth of mass production and
construction of large-scale infrastructure, such as telegraph lines and railroads, was leading to the
widespread destruction of forests, mountains, and waterways. After being elevated by Thoreau and
the romantic movement for its aesthetic and spiritual value, the wilderness became something we
might lose, and that loss would be to our detriment (Moscovici et al., 2015).
More unique to the United States’ environmental origin story was the sense that the
American wildernesses were our national treasures (Pezzullo & Cox, 2017), the equivalent of what
ancient ruins, castles, monuments, and cathedrals were for Europe. This nationalistic orientation
to the American landscape found expression in the art of the Hudson River School and the writings
of Thomas Cole. It was revived with the “See America First” tourism campaign, initiated by the
railroads and later appropriated by the automobile industry in the early twentieth century. This
nationalistic relationship to wilderness, as not only reflective but formative of the very character
of America, along with the impact of the 19th century philosophy of transcendentalism, made the
environment matter intrinsically, worthy of protection not only for the sake of its monetary value,
but for its own sake.
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Preservation
Inspired by the writings of Thoreau, John Muir is often credited as beginning the
preservation movement in the United States, leading some of the first environmental campaigns to
preserve the Yosemite Valley. Preservation sought to protect environments like “national
museums that attempt to keep the land as close as possible to the state that existed prior to North
America’s colonization” (Moscovici et al., 2015), with the key difference between the preserved
wildernesses and the wilderness before colonial invasion being the removal of humans. The
absence of human inhabitants was a key facet of the Congressional definition of wilderness used
in the Wilderness Act of 1964, and though many of the preserved wildernesses in the Midwest and
Western states were never settled by colonists or early Americans (and Native populations had
been removed from them long ago), national parks and forests along the East coast of the U.S.,
such as Shenandoah National Park, were often formed using eminent domain in the 1920s and 30s
to remove residents (often low-income, minority communities, who had inhabited the rural
environments for generations).
Preservationists advocated for the protection of America’s wildernesses so that generations
of Americans to come could experience the sublimity of them. Movements and organizations
dedicated to protecting America’s natural spaces quickly formed in the decades surrounding the
turn of the 20th century. Women’s groups, such as Laura White and the California Federation of
Women’s Clubs, played an important role in early preservation campaigns (West, 1992). Other
groups included the Sierra Club in 1892, the Audubon Society in 1905, the Save the Redwoods
League in 1918, the National Parks and Conservation Association in 1919, and later, the
Wilderness Society in 1930, and the National Wildlife Federation in 1936. Legislation such as the
Forest Reserve Act of 1891 and Antiquities Act of 1906 gave the president power to preserve land
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as forests and national monuments. Congress designated the first national park, Yellowstone
National Park, in 1872, and by the time the Organic Act forming the National Park Service was
passed in 1916, the Department of Interior oversaw 37 national parks, national monuments, and
reservations.
Conservation
As environments were set aside for preservation, a competing discourse emerged that
“promoted economic gain9 as the primary value to arbitrate contested environmental decisions”:
conservation (Pezzullo & Cox, 2017, p. 35). Whereas preservationist movements took their
underlying assumptions from the philosophy of transcendentalism, conservationism movements
were informed by a utilitarian moral philosophy which sought to manage the environment so as to
maximize the greatest good for the greatest number of Americans. The phrase “wise use” is widely
associated with the conservation movement, a sentiment which today exists in the multiple use
mandate of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. Conservationist ideals are most
commonly associated with Gifford Pinchot, fourth Chief of Theodore Roosevelt’s Division of
Forestry and the first head of the United States Forest Service.
The oppositional positioning of preservationism and conservationism is often attributed to
the public debate over the building of a dam in Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park.
Preservationists argued that damming the river and flooding the valley would result in permanent
destruction of a unique environment which, as part of a national park, deserved Congressional
protection. Conservationists argued that the need to supply water for residents justified the City of

9

Though Fourcade (2011) reminds us that “economic valuation processes are eminently contingent — on local
politics, time period, or social context” (p. 1724). Economic gain, and what is valuable as an economic resource, is
very much done in discourse and therefore entangled in sociomaterial, communicative practices of meaning and
mattering.
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San Francisco’s proposal for the dam. The debate, which began in 1901 with the initial dam
proposal, took place in Congress between 1908 and 1913, ending with the approval and
construction of the dam.
Ecology
Also emerging at the turn of the twentieth century is the discourse of ecology, a term coined
by the German artist and scientist Ernst Haeckel in 1904 to describe “the study of how an organism
relates with its exterior world” (Pezzullo & Cox, 2017, p. 35). Ecologists developed a scientific
approach to environment grounded in the observation of the relational dynamics of environments.
The concepts of adaptation and resilience10 come from the discourse of ecology, which concerns
itself with organisms and life cycles. By studying the relationships within an environment,
ecologists claimed to be able to elicit the needs of species and determine their thresholds for
adaptation, offering evidence-based approaches to preservation and conservation efforts.
Ecology also implicates humans as just another category of organism fighting to adapt and
thrive in their environment. Humans, as well as wildlife and landscapes, then, are vulnerable to
ecological degradation and exploitation. Thus, the ecological movement of the 1960s and 70s was
mediated by concerns about public health and toxicity was introduced as an important
environmental matter. Rachel Carson’s (1962) publication of Silent Spring sparked concern over
the

toxicity

of

pesticides

and

chemical

pollutants,

especially

the

chemical

Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, commonly known as DDT. Beginning in the 1940s, DDT was
used as an agricultural insecticide to control the mosquito population and lessen the spread of
insect-borne illnesses such as malaria and typhus. However, reports of it killing birds, fish, and

10

In the last decade, the ecological concepts of adaptation, and more significantly, of “resilience,” have become a
popular metaphor for describing any dynamic complex of relationships (e.g., organizations) not just environmental
systems (Aldunce et al., 2015; Fisichelli et al., 2016; Mitra, 2014; Mitra & Buzzanell, 2015).
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beneficial insects like pollinators, as well as evidence of the poisonous effect of pesticides on the
human body, led Carson to say of pesticides, “Can anyone believe it is possible to lay down such
a barrage of poisons on the surface of the earth without making it unfit for all life? They should
not be called “insecticides,” but “biocides.”” (p. 8).
Silent Spring alerted Americans to the widespread pollution of water and air, and the
poisonous possibilities of chemicals in our food. This triggered the modern environmental
movement, as advocates and policymakers moved to clean up the mess we had made of the
environment in the first half of the 20th century (Pezzullo & Cox, 2017). The 1970s saw a wave
of environmental policies, such as the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act,
the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the celebration of the first Earth Day. A
more radical interpretation of ecology, deep ecology, advocated the intrinsic value of the
environment beyond its usefulness to humans and argued the need for long-term global population
reduction in order to lessen the burden of humans on the planet (Garrard, 2012).
Another change in the 1960s drastically shifted our view of the environment — space
travel, satellites, and the first image of the Earth taken from space (Szerszynski & Urry, 2006). For
the first time, we were able to observe the planet as a whole. Seeing the Earth from so far away
shifted the scale of human existence to that of the Universe — the vastness of space and the size
of planetary objects served as reference points which made humans and our practices seem small.
The Earth could no longer be thought of as an endless cornucopia of resources because seeing it
against the black backdrop of space gave it clear boundaries. The focus of the environmental
movement shifted from protecting particular environments for preservation or conservation to
protecting the entire planet. This global orientation crystallized in 1988 when the United Nations
General Assembly formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Miller, 2004).
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Environmental Justice
The co-occurrence of the environmental movement with the second wave of feminism and
the civil rights movement led many to draw connections between the political and social
oppression experienced by minority groups and the burden of environmental pollution (Pezzullo
& Cox, 2017). For the first time America was confronting its legacy of environmental racism
(Bullard, 2000; UCC Commission for Racial Justice, 1987) — the phrase coined to describe how
land development decisions routinely located toxic and polluting infrastructure in or near
communities of color and low-income communities. This includes everything from landfills and
toxic waste sites to the construction of urban highways, and the lifespan of such infrastructure has
made this an enduring problem.
Another justice-oriented position, ecofeminism, emerged out of second wave feminism and
draws parallels between “the twin dominations of women and nature” (Warren, 1993, p. 253). The
term ecofeminism first appeared in 1974 in Françoise d’Eaubonne’s work that held patriarchal
systems of power responsible for environmental degradation (Howell, 1997; Warren, 1993). In the
English-speaking world, Carolyn Merchant’s (1980/1990) historical critique is an important
ecofeminist text. Ecofeminism finds commonalities between the dualisms of woman/man and
nature/human, and an ecofeminist ethic is one that values diversity and connection, since
interdependence and interrelatedness are vital to ecological survival (Garrard, 2012; Howell, 1997;
Swanson, 2015; Warren, 1993). As Merchant (1980/1990) argues, “If nature and women, Indians
and blacks are to be liberated from the strictures of this [androcentric] ideology, a radical critique
of the very categories nature and culture, as organizing concepts in all disciplines, must be
undertaken” (p. 144). In the effort to replace anthropocentric, androcentric, and racist
representations of nature, some ecofeminists — as well as deep ecologists — have presented the
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Earth as Gaia, the name of the ancient Greek Earth-goddess “to counter the inflection of the Earth
as a technologically and economically enframed globe” (Garrard, 2012, p. 199).
Critiquing Environmental Discourse
Debate about the nature/culture binary is at the heart of environmental communication
scholarship. Williams (1980) was among the first to conduct a systematic historical analysis of the
nature/culture binary, tracing the separation of humans from nature in philosophical and political
traditions in the Western world from ancient to modern times. Williams connects the development
of a singular “Nature” with the development of monotheistic, particularly Christian, religion. Once
nature was consolidated, abstracted, and personified into the singular Nature, it became easier for
humans to objectify and observe it. Williams notes that this was possible, in part, because of the
simultaneous abstraction of Man, which led to generalized ideas of Man’s ability (and perhaps
obligation) to intervene in natural processes. That intervention “depended on seeing nature quite
clearly, and even coldly as a set of objects, on which men could operate” (p. 76). Williams makes
a Marxist critique of the division of humans from nature, referencing Locke’s defense of private
property “based on the natural right of a man to that with which he has mixed his own labor,” since
“the very marks and stains of the mixing were in effect a definition of being propertyless” (p. 76).
For Williams, Locke’s argument about mixing human labor with the earth demonstrates the danger
of considering natural and social histories as being separate — the result is a dangerous
concealment of the bodies and environments which bear the burdens of development and progress.
While Williams draws connections with religion to explain the nature/culture divide,
Oravec (1984) turns to political ideology to account for the triumph of conservationism over
preservationism. According to Oravec’s analysis, conservationist arguments were more persuasive
because of the dominance of social progressivism in political discourse, an orientation which was
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decidedly anthropocentric. Preservationist arguments, in treating nature and humans as equally
worthy of protection, were “inherently contrary to the prevailing social system” which privileged
human needs. The triumph of conservationism over preservationism reinforces the nature/culture
divide by positioning human needs as at odds with and superior to the needs of the environment.
Cronon’s (1996) seminal essay “The Trouble with Wilderness” takes up the nature/culture
binary through an environmental history lens which exposes “wilderness” as a communicative
accomplishment, rather than an innate characteristic of particular environments. He argues:
There is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness. It is entirely a creation of the
culture that holds it dear, a product of the very history it seeks to deny… The flight from
history that is very nearly the core of wilderness represents the false hope of an escape
from responsibility, the illusion that we can somehow wipe clean the slate of our past and
return to the tabula rasa that supposedly existed before we began to leave our marks on the
world. (p. 16)
Cronon calls attention to the ways in which “wilderness” is more reflective of a culture’s values
than it is of that amorphous thing we so often call “nature.” The significance of Cronon’s argument
is to challenge the idea that there is an objective “nature” somewhere out there, free of human
intervention11.
Other scholars have sought to challenge the nature/culture binary by drawing connections
to related problematic binaries. As I already mentioned, the ecofeminist project seeks to identify
and dismantle harmful woman-nature connections, replacing an ethic of androcentric and
anthropocentric domination with one of care, inclusivity, and intrinsic worth (Howell, 1997;
Swanson, 2015; Warren, 1993). Another thread of scholarship has used the dichotomies of

11

See also, Harvey’s (1996) argument that “there is nothing unnatural about New York City” (p. 186, emphasis in
original).
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eater/eaten and predator/prey, both of which are particular iterations of the classic subject/object
dualism, as a means of getting at the nature/culture issue (e.g., Plumwood, 1995; Schutten, 2008;
Barnet, 2018).
Another means of getting at the nature/culture divide is through the notion of boundaries.
British anthropologist Tim Ingold (2008) states that most often, “environment” is “that which
surrounds the organism” (p. 1807). The problem with a definition that makes “environment”
synonymous with “surrounding” is that it necessitates boundaries, between the organism doing the
inhabiting, and the environment in which that inhabiting takes place. Environment, then, is
rendered as no more than setting — a backdrop upon which action takes place — itself devoid of
agency until populated by organisms. According to Ingold, the environment-as-surroundings
definition is possible because of the logic of inversion that has come to characterize our
understanding of the world:
Life, according to this logic, is reduced to an internal property of things that occupy the
world but do not properly inhabit it. A world that is occupied…is furnished with alreadyexisting things. But one that is inhabited is woven from the strands of their continual
coming-into-being. (p. 1797)
So, in drawing boundaries, effectively closing off beings from the entanglements which actually
make them, the logic of inversion presents a world where distinctions are not only made, but they
are required for the ordering of experience.
Latour (2018) expresses similar concerns, explicitly calling for “a period of unpacking in
order to refine the representation of the landscapes in which the geo-social struggles are situated,
before recomposing them” (p. 94). He argues that for most of human history, we have been on a
trajectory from the Local to the Global, where the Global is characterized by globalization,
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externalization, and a system of production. Globalization can refer to both “a tendency toward
multiplied viewpoints” and “a contradictory tendency toward a single vision…imposed on
everyone and spread everywhere” (p. 13). The single vision, which is not at all representative of
the variety of interests in the globe it purports to represent, favors an external view of the world.
In other words, “to know is to know from the outside” (p. 68), and preferably, one should seek to
know “from far away” (p. 66). Such an external understanding of the world gave rise to what
Latour calls the system of production. Rooted in mechanistic explanations, a division between
human actors and their resources, and individual human freedom, the system of production calls
for a science which understands the world from farther and farther away, seeing nature-as-universe
— a sort of telescopic understanding which can be traced from the subatomic building blocks of
matter, to the macroscopic arrangements of matter into solar systems, galaxies, and ultimately, the
universe. In this section I have discussed relevant critiques of environmental discourses, most
commonly on the basis of their anthropocentrism. In the following sections I provide more detailed
context from the literature for the analytical chapters on land, weather, and climate.
Land and the Mediation of Law
In Chapter 3, I consider how legal discourse materializes and mediates environments. The
fundamental assumptions underlying our orientation to land in the United States come from a
legacy of British governance, Enlightenment ideals, and capitalism (Graham, 2010; Maley,
1994/2013; Platt, 2014). From these traditions, we have inherited two ways of relating to land —
as power, and as property. In this section, I describe the historical origins of our relationship to
land and the underlying assumptions which continue to characterize our interactions with it.
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Land as Power: Feudalism and the Commons
Before the development of a land market in which land was assigned economic value, land
was principally valued for its direct connection to political participation (Graham, 2010). During
the feudal period, possessing land was an indication of identity and social status — any economic
value of the land was secondary, since land was held by and ultimately subject to the sovereign
power, the monarch or emperor (Graham, 2010; Platt, 2014). Possessing land meant entrance into
those discursive spaces in which governing took place. In other words, land supplied the
foundation of claims to authority.
Those who did not possess land in the Middle Ages, the peasants or commoners, benefited
from the commons — that land which was not viable for crops or grazing and was publicly
accessible (Graham, 2010; Platt, 2014). Under feudalism, there were three designations for land:
arable land (for crops), green commons (for grazing), or waste lands (Platt, 2014). Waste lands
included woods, wetlands, ponds, heathland, peatbogs, or other environments which were not
suited for cultivation (Groenman-Van Waateringe, 1996). Commoners were allowed to gather
resources for personal use from these communal spaces, collecting various fuel and fodder such
as firewood, peat, and vegetation like straw, fruit, and nuts. Though use of the commons was
sometimes governed by laws as to when gathering could take place, how much one could take,
and for what uses collection was permitted, the resulting relationship between people and the land
on which they dwelled was, in the short term, self-perpetuating and sustainable (Platt, 2014).
However, Moore (2002) notes that “the lord-peasant relation was fundamentally antagonistic to
long-run ecological sustainability” especially since population growth was encouraged to the
detriment of the commons, leading to a “feudal system of production [that] exhausted the soil,
which led to malnutrition” and contributed to the spread of disease (p. 304).
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Land as Property: Capitalism and Commodification
Feudalism was gradually replaced by the new emerging economic system: capitalism
(Graham, 2010). The commons, those public spaces which supplied the resource needs of
communities, became private property through legal seizure, enclosure12, and communal land use
practices were deemed illegal. Land became private property, defined by a relationship of owner
to object; humans were made distinct from their environments, and environments were reduced to
abstract arrangements of persons and things. Whereas the feudal system of land was locally based,
shaped by the particular geographies in which people dwelled, the capitalist system sees land as
an abstract commodity, “infinitely tradeable, limited neither spatially nor temporally” (p. 7).
As the value of land became objectified and globalized, so too did the laws which governed
the relationship between people and their property (Graham, 2010). This relationship is one of
abstract rights, in which an owner “possesses the right to, and over, a thing” (p. 38). The land is
all but irrelevant to this arrangement — modern property law is dephysicalized, meaning the value
of the land is not located in its materiality, but in its commodification. Property law thus developed
to protect “the standardized rights and wealth of the private realm independent of location” (p. 60).
The discourse of property law renders land placeless.
Public Lands Law
In the U.S., public land was initially synonymous with “public domain” land, and it
included all that land which, in the absence of private ownership, had defaulted to federal control
(BLM, 2018; n.d.; Sowards, 2017). In other words, it was that land which had not yet been given
over to improvement in the Lockean sense, either through sale, grant, or claim. Early land law
fostered improvement by creating processes for dispersing land to those who would improve it,

12

“Enclosure is the name given to the process of enclosing and appropriating land — hitherto worked and enjoyed by
a peasant community in common — usually with a hedge, fence, or other physical boundary” (Graham, 2010, p. 51).
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but by the mid-nineteenth century, it became apparent that hunters, squatters, and poachers were
taking advantage of public domain lands at the expense of the government (Knowlden, 2018).
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Congress began discussing how to address the issue of
land frauds, or “the illegal purchase or deceit in the homesteading of Federal land” (Williams,
2005; p.8). At the same time, resource depletion became a concern for the nation which previously
had enjoyed a veritable cornucopia of abundance (Britton-Purdy, 2018). As a result, Congress
passed the first piece of legislation with the purpose of protecting land from private improvement:
The Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which authorized the president to declare areas of forested public
domain land as public reservations. Under the authority of the Forest Reserve Act, presidents
designated millions of acres as forest reserves. The need to manage those reserves led to the
formation of the National Forest Commission in 1896, the predecessor of the United States
Department of Agriculture Forest Service.
The Antiquities Act of 1906 was another piece of public land legislation which sought to
address fraudulent land use, though instead of forests, it sought to protect objects of cultural or
scientific value (Knowlden, 2018). Pot hunting — the vandalism and theft of Indigenous
archeological sites and objects — was widespread. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
“large numbers of artifacts, such as pottery and tools, were being taken from prehistoric ruins and
sold to museums or private collectors” (p. 595). Those concerned cited the finite number of
artifacts and archeologists’ preference to study of those artifacts in their original environment to
lend the situation urgency and call for legislation which would protect prehistoric and historic sites.
After multiple competing bills were debated in the House and the Senate beginning in 1904, the
final legislation passed in 1906 and grants the president authority to declare areas of public land
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with historical or scientific significance, or upon which are situated objects of historical or
scientific value, as national monuments.
Both the Forest Reserve Act and Antiquities Act emerged out of an urgent need to protect
environmental resources, and this urgency explains why the Acts authorize the president to
designate public lands for protection, rather than Congress (Knowlden, 2018). Congressional
action was deemed too slow — lawmakers feared that if action was dependent upon the long
process of legislation in the House and the Senate, it would come too late. Historically, executive
orders and proclamations have been controversial, in large part because “the Constitution contains
no provision stating that the president has power” to issue them (Cooper, 1986, p, 236). Rather,
the practice stems from the precedent set by George Washington. Given that an executive order or
proclamation is unilaterally issued by the President, it is a much more efficient means of creating
and enacting administrative law than the legislative process of Congress. For this reason, executive
mandates are most common during times of emergency, when the need for swift action compels
the bypassing of legislative practice. Critics of executive mandates, however, fear that the practice
has become too widespread, enabling the president to circumvent vital democratic processes
(Cooper, 1986; Knowlden, 2018).
Many Western landowners saw these Acts as threats to their private property rights and
objected to the large size of reserves and monuments. For instance, after President Franklin D.
Roosevelt designated Jackson Hole National Monument in 1943, an amendment was added to the
Antiquities Act prohibiting the creation of national monuments in Wyoming except by
Congressional action. Presidential power to declare forest reserves was rescinded by the passage
of the Fulton Amendment13, an amendment to the 1907 annual agricultural appropriations bill,
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The Fulton Amendment also involved a change in terminology, changing “forest reserves” to “national forests”
(Williams, 2005).
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which “gave Congress alone the authority to establish reserves” (Williams, 2005, p. 25). Therefore,
the Antiquities Act is the only remaining legislation which gives the president unilateral power to
protect public lands.
Retaining Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
In the 20th Century, public land expanded from being synonymous with the public domain
to indicate land that was held in trust by the government to benefit the American people (Sowards,
2017). Additional legislation between 1916 and 1955 continued to provide for the sale or lease of
public land to states or private interests for the purposes of recreation, mineral and natural resource
extraction, settlement, and cultivation (BLM, n.d.). It was not until 1976, with the enactment of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the concurrent repeal of the
Homestead Act, that the primary purpose of public land shifted from land sales to land
preservation. The FLPMA sets the precedent of retaining public lands in federal ownership, to be
managed and sustained on behalf of the American people by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) (BLM, n.d.; BLM & Office of the Solicitor, 2001; PLF, 2014).
In addition to national monuments and national forests, public lands in the U.S. can take
the form of national parks, national wildlife refuges, national historic sites, national conservation
areas, wilderness areas, national memorials, national battlefields, national recreation areas, wild
and scenic rivers, national seashores and national lakeshores, and national trails (U.S. Department
of the Interior, 2016). Each designation carries implications for how that land is to be managed or
utilized, with some calling for absolute preservation of natural ecosystems, and others allowing
responsible conservation and use of natural resources. Management of these public lands fall to
the BLM, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service under the
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Department of the Interior, and the United States Forest Service under the Department of
Agriculture.
Weather and the Constitution of Hurricanes
In Chapter 4, I consider how scientific discourse and practices of observation materialize
and mediate hurricanes. According to Longshore (2008), “hurricane is the regional term given to
those mature tropical cyclones that originate over the North Atlantic Ocean” (p. 59). Tropical
cyclones occur elsewhere on the planet, notably over the North Pacific Ocean where they are called
typhoons, and over the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean where they are called
cyclones. Though hurricanes tend to occur less frequently than typhoons or cyclones, they can be
remarkably powerful and “some of the lowest barometric pressures14 ever recorded have been
observed in hurricanes” (p. 244). In the United States, “hurricane season” lasts from June through
November, though the most destructive storms tend to occur in September as this is when ocean
temperatures reach their peak. For the last six years, however, “named systems have formed in the
Atlantic prior to the official start of the season,” leading the National Hurricane Center to announce
in late February 2021 that it will issue Tropical Weather Outlooks beginning on May 15 (Allen,
2021).
Hurricanes are organized interactions of materials and forces marked not by their stability,
but by their dynamism. How we have understood and engaged with hurricanes has changed as our
discursive and technological resources have changed (Arffman, 2019). The term “hurricane” is
thought to have originated from indigenous cultures’ names for the god of wind or tempests;
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Barometric pressure is often referred to as atmospheric pressure, and “is the weight per unit area of the entire mass
of air above a certain point of Earth’s surface” (Longshore, 2008, p. 42). Barometric pressure is largely responsible
for the material processes of exchange and transformation which form and sustain a hurricane. As barometric pressure
drops, wind speeds intensify, so barometric pressure is often used to gauge the strength and potential danger of a
hurricane.
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huracan to the Taino people of Puerto Rico, hun-raken to the Mayans, and hyroacan to the Galibi
people of French Guiana (Longshore, 2008). Though we now consider hurricanes a natural
phenomenon, for early civilizations, they were supernatural, a tool of the gods.
Prior to modernization, humans had little to no way of predicting hurricanes, and so their
interaction with them was limited to the moments just before, as well as the experiences during,
and after, landfall. The invention of the telegraph in 1840 changed this, as it allowed atmospheric
activity to be communicated between locations, so that areas experiencing severe weather could
warn those toward which it was moving (Arffman, 2019; Williams, 2013). The instalment of
underwater telegraph cables in the 1890s added still more forecasting capabilities, since the
continental U.S. could receive weather information from island nations and outposts
Constituting Hurricanes in Scientific Discourse
In the 20th century, as we developed technologies such as radar and satellites for measuring
and observing atmospheric phenomena, hurricanes lost the fantastic connection to the supernatural
and instead became the domain of the “natural” sciences. A hurricane could now be defined as “a
warm core of low barometric pressure surrounded by winds that rotate in a counter-clockwise
direction” (Longshore, 2008, p. 243), and could be described using a technical vocabulary. In my
presentation of the scientific narrative of a hurricane’s development, I have italicized important
elements of this technical vocabulary to bring attention to how their reified constructs mediate our
encounter with any given storm. Hurricanes often begin as tropical waves, areas of low pressure
formed when dry air is carried westward across the deserts of northern Africa to the Atlantic where
it encounters warm ocean water15 (Longshore, 2008). The difference in temperature and moisture
content destabilizes the air mass; evaporation causes warm water vapor to rise and cool,
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“Tropical cyclones form only in tropical regions where the ocean is at least 80 degrees Fahrenheit for at least the
top 50 meters (about 165 feet) below the surface” (NOAA, n.d.).
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condensing into clouds and releasing heat energy which in turn warms the air, forming a convection
current that grows the cloud column higher and higher into a convective cell (Longshore, 2008;
NOAA, n.d.). Warm air continues to rise, cool, and fall, and the Coriolis effect — a result of the
rotation of the Earth on its axis — causes the rising air to curve to the right so that the clouds begin
a counter-clockwise rotation. At this point, the resulting thunderstorm is considered a tropical
disturbance, a status which grants the turbulent air mass increased attention since there is the
chance it will develop into a tropical depression.
Advection, a result of the uneven heating of air, pulls the cool, dense, descending air
horizontally across the bottom of the system, over the warm ocean surface, and to the opposite
side, where the now warm, light air is rapidly carried upward by convection currents (Longshore,
2008). As advection and convection continue and barometric pressure at the surface drops, the air
begins to move more rapidly, increasing wind strength and speed. Once winds reach between 25
and 38 miles-per-hour, the system is labeled a tropical depression. The system will continue to
grow as long as it remains over warm ocean waters and it does not encounter significant wind
shear, that is, external winds strong enough to disrupt it. Lighter external winds called steering
currents are beneficial to the system which “possesses only minimal means for self-propulsion”
and must rely on surrounding air masses “to determine what track it will follow during its lifespan”
(p. 380).
As wind speeds increase beyond 39 mph, the system becomes more organized and the eye
— the rotation point at the center of the storm in which barometric pressure is at its lowest, and
inside which rain and wind abruptly decrease — takes recognizable shape (NOAA, n.d.). When
this happens, the system is upgraded from a tropical depression to a tropical storm, and it is given
a name. Once wind speeds reach 74 mph, the system is at least 50,000 feet high and 125 miles
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across, and the eye is between five and 30 miles wide, the system is given hurricane status. The
hurricane is further classified using the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, a method developed
in the 1970s to classify the intensity of hurricanes based on their maximum sustained wind speed
(Schott et al., 2019).
In short, a hurricane’s social and material becoming cannot be separated. Each time the
system is re-classified as a tropical disturbance, depression, storm, and hurricane, it is positioned
as existing in and through a new set of relationships. This carries over, or recontextualizes (Linell,
1998), the institutions, identities, practices, metaphorical frameworks, and values implicated by
those relationships, so that the hurricane does not exist as an anomaly, but as part of established
processes we regard as being no more than what we ought to do in this type of situation.
Institutionalizing Hurricanes
By institutionalizing hurricanes, I am referring to the way in which a storm is brought into
being through organizational practices which authorize its existence, and it becomes the domain
of particular agencies tasked with interpreting and responding to the storm for the greater public.
In our talk about responding, it is worth noting the meaning of its related adjective, “responsive.”
Merriam-Webster (n.d.-b) gives the bland definition of “giving response: constituting a response”
as its first entry, but its second entry is evaluative: “quick to respond or react appropriately or
sympathetically.” To me, it seems that the first entry gives the meaning of the term, and the second
gives the rules of its application: To be considered “responsive,” one must respond correctly.
Responding, therefore, is a morally fraught activity.
In the United States, the Army Signal Corps, the branch of the U.S. Army formed to
specifically manage communication activity and technology, was the first agency officially tasked
with monitoring hurricane activity (Longshore, 2008). Hurricanes were considered a matter of
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defense, constituting them not as mere atmospheric phenomena worthy of scientific study, but as
threats to military operations and the American people. During the 20th century, the responsibility
for interpreting and monitoring hurricane activity largely shifted from military government
organizations to scientific government organizations, with the development of the Weather
Bureau. The relationship between military agencies and hurricanes is a continued legacy: the
Bureau obtained surplus radar supplies after the end of World War II; the earliest method of
systematically naming hurricanes utilized the phonetic alphabet and came about because of the
need to refer more precisely to storm activity threatening military operations in the Caribbean and
North Atlantic in World War II; and the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines each have their own
weather divisions which continue to fund weather prediction research and innovation (Wilson,
2017).
The transfer of the Weather Bureau from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to the
Department of Commerce in 1940 indicates another framing of the relationship between hurricanes
and the United States (NWS, n.d.) — the economic threat posed by the destruction of infrastructure
and disruption of consumer activity. Hurricane controversies in the early to mid-20th century often
centered around the accuracy and adequacy of Weather Bureau predictions and warnings,
culminating in a 1972 lawsuit between Panama City and the recently renamed National Weather
Service over lost tourism revenue due to unnecessary evacuations (Arffman, 2019). Throughout
the twentieth century, a variety of organizations, bureaus, and divisions were created to monitor
weather activity over the North Atlantic (NWS, n.d.) in order to protect economic capital and
infrastructure. For the past 50 years, the primary organizations responsible for hurricane reporting,
specifically the National Hurricane Center and National Weather Service, have been grouped
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under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, a relationship which characterizes hurricanes as ultimately being economic matters.
Meteorologists create the appearance of control over their environment by accounting for
a spatiotemporal relationship with storms, claiming to know the how, where, and why of its
existence, what it is at any given time, and what it will become days or even weeks before it does
so. If those claims are to be treated as fact, scientists must show “that proper procedures have been
used to establish it as objectively known” (Smith, 1978, p. 35). They accomplish this by updating
forecasts four times a day, every six hours, in order to locate their claims in something we might
nickname “real time” — that is, frequent updates offer evidence that the claims made therein are
recent enough to still be considered relevant descriptions of the situation. Armed with forecast
maps, satellite images, and real-time updates, state officials can act in advance of the hurricane’s
arrival.
However, any action taken in interaction with a hurricane, even if we make it appear to
precede the storm’s arrival over a particular location on the planet, is done in response. The
hurricane makes the first move, and we respond by crafting an account of action that might
generally be called doing hurricane preparedness. In other words, since we cannot control a
hurricane, the best we can do is be prepared, and preparedness requires cooperation by scientific
experts and state officials: scientific experts must provide the information which state officials will
use to make decisions and inform citizens of how they should act. Given how quickly hurricanes
can form, shift course, strengthen, and make landfall, preparedness depends on these roles being
fulfilled promptly and seamlessly — information must be clear so that decisions can be made,
communicated, and enacted quickly. If the production or interpretation of knowledge is delayed
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due to contradicting accounts, the appearance of control dissolves, threatening the legitimacy of
both scientific and political discourse, as well as the practices which comprise preparedness.
Public Responses to Hurricanes
According to Longshore (2008) our mainstream practices lend hurricanes “a somewhat
perverse persona” (p. 249): We refer to them by name, even assigning them gendered pronouns.
We can assign them character traits, such as in this headline from The Atlanta JournalConstitution: “Hurricane Dorian: Fickle storm continues to frustrate weather experts” (D’Angelo,
2019). In popular practice, we do not so much orient to hurricanes as scientific phenomena or
atmospheric entities, but rather as natural beings. We bring them to life by imbuing them with the
properties of other living beings, the most fundamental of which (from an American sensibility, at
least) is autonomy. We constitute a hurricane as an autonomous being by assigning it the attributes
of one. Consider this comment made by a South Florida County Commissioner and quoted in the
Tampa Bay Times: “Our best hope is that Dorian stays at sea, but hurricanes have minds of their
own. This particular one has been a cliffhanger” (Cohen, 2019). Here, introducing the presence of
a mind — a consciousness which is capable of deliberate thought and purposeful action — does
the discursive work of bringing it to life (in a way that is recognizable to us as being alive).
The advent of Social Networking Sites (SNS) such as Facebook and Twitter have changed
the way media content is created, interpreted, and disseminated, as ordinary people are now able
to add their own hurricane experiences to the public discourse. This is especially evident on
Twitter, where user-generated content circulates alongside official weather forecast information
from scientific and emergency management organizations. Given the public availability of Twitter
data, a number of studies examine how those data illustrate the real-time development of a
hurricane in the public discourse (Senkbeil et al., 2019). Though Hurricane Katrina is the most-
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studied hurricane in the literature (Arffman, 2019), many of the studies of hurricanes on SNS use
Twitter data from Hurricane Sandy, as this was one of the first major storms to play out on that
platform, resulting in nearly 20 million tweets (Shelton et al., 2014).
The majority of this research has the goal of improving how hurricane forecasts and
disaster preparedness are communicated to the general public in order to better disaster response
(Demuth et al., 2018; Lachlan, Spence, Lin, et al., 2014; Lachlan, Spence, Lin, Najarian, et al.,
2014; Shelton et al., 2014; Kryvasheyeu et al., 2016). As Lachlan, Spence, and Lin et al. (2014)
point out, SNS provide “both an opportunity and mechanism for members of the public to
participate in the crisis discussion” (p. 510), and this literature suggests that much of the
constituting of a hurricane takes place on SNS.
Scientific discourse and SNS provide a new vocabulary and variety of modal affordances
for mediating our encounters with and responses to hurricanes. To illustrate this shift, consider the
hurricane party. As Longshore (2008) explains:
Arising during the early 1900s, when unforecasted hurricane strikes “invited” terrified
coastal residents to gather hurriedly into “parties” for mutual defense, aid, and
commiseration, the tradition of the hurricane party has over time evolved into an
impromptu modern entertainment, a dramatic excuse for those people with ringside seats
to drink and dance their way through one of Earth’s most awesome meteorological events.
(p. 249)
Like most interaction with hurricanes prior to the 1950s, hurricane parties used to refer to those
gatherings that took place after a hurricane’s arrival. Now, they primarily refer to those gatherings
taking place before, or perhaps during, the hurricane’s unfolding. In other words, multimodal
developments in science and technology have afforded us new means of mediating hurricanes, and
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Figure 1: Hurricane Dorian “Hurri-cake.” Photos credited to Jessica Gouin. Tweet
reproduced with permission according to The Fair Use Doctrine of the Copyright Act of
1976 (17 U.S. Code §107).
ABC Action News [@abcactionnews]. (2019, August 29). Publix cake decorator creates
Hurricane Dorian cakes to bring smiles to shoppers’ faces [Tweet]. Twitter.
https://twitter.com/abcactionnews/status/1167279034025332736

as our relationship to them has transformed, the “hurricane party” has been resemiotized, taking
on new meanings and encompassing new creative practices. Additionally, preparation is now a
key part of the hurricane party, as individuals must ensure they have the adequate supplies,
including plenty of alcohol and a “hurri-cake” (Figure 1). These intricately decorated cakes are
possible because our practices make it matter long before we feel the physical forces of its winds
and rains, and our means of making it matter are not limited to the resources of scientific
convention.
Climate and the Moral Environment
In Chapter 6, I consider how “climate” and “climate change” are discursive resources for
organizing and evaluating the moral quality of our experiences in relation to our environment.
According to Hulme (2017), climate is “best understood as an idea which mediates the sensory
experience of ephemeral weather and the cultural ways of living which humans have developed to
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accommodate this experience” (p. 2). In other words, climate is done in and through
communication16. Most basically, climate can be described as the set of expectations humans have
for the weather where they live.
Globalizing Climate
Beginning in the 1960s and culminating with the convening of the IPCC in 1988, the
ontological status of climate shifted from a local to a global phenomenon. Miller (2004)
summarizes the shift thusly:
Based on computer models of the general circulation of the atmosphere, climate scientists
increasingly represented the Earth’s climate as an integrated global system. Conceptually,
this system not only represented the atmosphere as a single entity, but also linked
atmospheric dynamics and energetics to the world’s oceans, vegetation, glaciers, and ice
caps. Moreover, it was this entire system that was now viewed as at risk from human
emissions of greenhouse gases. The term climate had gone from signifying an aggregation
of local weather patterns to signifying an ontologically unitary whole capable of being
understood and managed on scales no smaller than the globe itself. (p. 54)
Computer models afford scientists a mediational means for describing environmental phenomena
and relationships on a planetary scale. Computer modeling is a modally dense (Norris, 2004)
means of mediating environment — a variety of data (e.g., precipitation rates, air and water
temperatures, wind patterns, carbon emissions, hospitalizations, etc.) are called upon to cohere
together, and scientists use a variety of discursive resources (e.g., charts, maps, graphs, tables, etc.)
to assemble those data into meaningful narratives we take to be climate narratives. The result is a
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Hulme (2017) locates “climate” in the mental imaginary, but this negates its materiality. Climate is communicatively
constituted, and like all communicative acts, takes on material aspects as it is enacted through talk, text, or other
means. It exists in its performances, in the talk, text, or other mediational means of communication, and not in some
abstract, morally laden mind-space.
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means of mediating environment which can only be grasped from far away or by amassing more
data than a single human could ever interpret. In other words, our practices of computer modeling
are significant because they have made climate a necessarily hybrid accomplishment.
The notion of a global climate warranted corresponding accounts that could be held to the
politics of authorization — if climate had remained a localized concept, there would be no need
for international oversight or accountability. Once the atmosphere is understood as a unitary whole,
however, intergovernmental action becomes necessary. Rather than all having our own pieces of
land and sky to govern, it turns out we are all sharing the sky and therefore must negotiate its
management.
As such, climate has become highly contested. If we orient to climate as a local concern, a
person dwelling in one locality cannot credibly claim to have knowledge about or interest in the
climate of another locality to which s/he has never been and does not interact; if we orient to
climate as a global concern, then conceivably everyone everywhere can make relevant claims
about climate. This is not to say that everyone everywhere has the same degree of competency and
access needed to make such a claim credibly. Making credible claims about climate largely
depends on whether a person succeeds in performing an identity category which provides the
resources for doing so — this is often a matter of degrees of enoughness (Blommaert & Varis,
2013).
Defining Climate
In order for climate to be a useful scientific concept, it must have an operational definition
which specifies how it is measured (Byers, 2011). The World Meteorological Organization (n.d.)
provides the most widely accepted definition, which is also presented verbatim in the IPCC online
glossary:
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Climate, sometimes understood as the “average weather,” is defined as the measurement
of the mean and variability of relevant quantities of certain variables (such as temperature,
precipitation or wind) over a period of time, ranging from months to thousands or millions
of years. The classical period is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO). Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical
description, of the climate system.
Such a definition points to an issue with climate as mediated by the modalities of science — it is
a nominalization. According to Smith (2001), nominalization eliminates “the textual presence of
people as subjects and agents while preserving the presence of what is done by people” (p. 166).
Though traditionally nominalization involves the conversion of verbs into noun phrases (e.g.,
“organize” to “organization”), the related verbs to climate, “climatize” and “acclimate,” do not
actually refer to the process of constituting climate, but rather to the process of responding to a
climate that is assumed to already be in place. To further paraphrase Smith, when we speak about
climate, we ordinarily do so without worrying much about how it exists. This is not true of
everyone who speaks about climate; worrying about how climate exists can in fact index a high
level of scientific expertise.
In this excerpt from an article in The Atlantic, for example, we are presented with the
popular usage of climate as an object. Here, climate is an attribute of the Earth, and given that it is
the object of a prepositional phrase, it is something to be acted upon, rather than something which
acts or is itself action.
During the entire half-billion-year Phanerozoic eon of animal life, CO2 has been the
primary driver of the Earth’s climate. And sometimes, when the planet has issued a truly
titanic slug of CO2 into the atmosphere, things have gone horribly wrong. (Brannen, 2021)
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It is not only in the popular press and social media that we see climate being nominalized17.
Consider the definition which Pezzullo and Cox (2018) provide in what is one of the leading
environmental communication textbooks: “Average atmosphere changes over a long time” (p.
345). In this definition, climate does not require a subject who makes observations and
measurements. Rather, atmosphere changes are assumed to happen of their own accord, and given
that they do so “over a long time,” human observation and measurement are of questionable
importance anyway due to our short lifespan. To put this another way, this definition assumes the
existence of meaningful patterns without the presence of a subject who is doing the work of
organizing phenomena into patterns and therefore assigning them meaning. From a sociomaterial
position, it also obscures the presence of the agents and forces who are doing the work of
atmospheric change and providing the subject with data to organize.
Indexical Function
Hulme (2017) refers to this usage of climate as object as the indexical function of climate,
because it is used to quickly index the types of beings, materials, and practices which might exist
within it. Take, for example, the Köppen Climate Classification System, originally developed at
the end of the 19th century, which organizes the world into five climate zones based on temperature,
precipitation, and vegetation growth (Arnfield, 2020). The five basic climate zones — A (tropical),
B (dry), C (temperate), D (continental), and E (polar) — are further distinguished by a second,
lower-case letter indicating the pattern of precipitation for the area. In the Köppen system, Tampa’s
climate is classified as “Cfa” which denotes a humid subtropical climate (Weatherbase, n.d.).
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It is worth acknowledging that, to borrow Goodwin’s (1994) wise wording, this chapter “makes extensive use of
the very same practices it is studying.” I also nominalize climate — in many ways it is so built into our practices of
doing climate that it cannot be entirely avoided. My goal in identifying climate’s nominalization is not to overhaul
our common usage of the term, but to point out how we use it to gloss over the practices which sustain it.
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Whereas now climate can index things like the probable economy, architecture, and
lifestyle of a given region, Hulme (2017) notes that in imperialist nations it was used to index the
moral worth of a given area and its inhabitants. The climate of Europe was positioned as the ideal
climate for the development of all things good and civilized; the humid tropical climate of the
Caribbean, in contrast, was problematic, and thought to foster all things bad in human health and
society. For early Americans living in the Eastern states, the desert climate of the American West
was lawless and cruel, and its inhabitants, both settlers and indigenous groups, were likewise
criminal and coarse. Climate, in addition to indicating the characteristics of an area, its inhabitants,
and their practices, was also blamed for them; in this way, climate’s indexical function is closely
related to its agential function (see also, Blaut, 1993, 1999).
Agential Function
The agential function of climate, in which climate is the source or cause of various physical
and cultural occurrences, is especially evident in our contemporary discourse, though it is typically
expressed as climate change. This is partly because our orientation to climate as a moral index has
shifted since the advent of air conditioning, antibiotics and vaccines, and modern irrigation and
genetically modified crops have allowed humans to make their climates more comfortable and
productive (Hulme, 2017). Because we have used technology to fit our climates to our needs and
desires for so long, the climate itself is no longer the problem — rather, it is the climate’s refusal
to remain constant which troubles us.
In everyday conversations, climate change is blamed for irregularities in day-to-day
weather conditions. Articles in popular science publications regularly blame climate change for
increases in the number and the severity of physical phenomena like wildfires (Gray, 2019),
tornados (Akpan, 2019), and hurricanes (Berardelli, 2019). Climate change is also positioned as a
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contributing cause of poverty (Khoday & Ali, 2018), war (O’Loughlin & Hendrix, 2019), and
shorter pregnancies (Kluger, 2019). While this is by no means a comprehensive list of the supposed
outcomes of climate change, what is significant is that climate, and more specifically climate
change, is cast as an agent capable of highly consequential action. These actions are generally in
opposition to the existing goals, practices, or values of the humans who must cope with climate.
In this sense, climate is not just an actor, but a threat which must be addressed.
Climate as Crisis
Since the early 2000s, the discourse of climate change has undergone what Paglia (2018)
refers to as “crisification” (p. 99). Take the following headlines I gathered from the first ten results
of a Google News search for “climate” in mid-February, 2021:
“Mountains, Ice and Climate Change: A Recipe for Disasters” (The New York Times)
“Five Things Biden Should Do to Tackle the Climate Emergency” (The Hill)
“The Scariest Thing about Climate Change Isn’t the Weather — It’s Us” (Fast Company)
“Himalayan Glacier Disaster Highlights Climate Change Risks” (New York Post)
Paglia describes the crisification of climate change as a process which “involved the mobilization
of scientific evidence and the invocation of climate crisis by advocates of decisive international
action against the urgent threat of climate change” (p. 99). Paglia traces the crisification of climate
change through the rhetoric of the early 2000s and to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) COP 15 conference in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. Put
simply, we have increasingly looked to science, and more specifically climate scientists, to provide
proof that temperatures are warming, ice is melting, and sea levels are rising so that we might
identify tipping points or critical thresholds — those proverbial straws which will break the
camel’s back and spark a chain reaction of irreversible catastrophes — and prevent them. Building
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upon a legacy of expert elicitation18, climate scientists have become such trusted voices that Walsh
(2015) argues they occupy a prophetic role in society. This is further mediated and amplified by
the urgency with which we desire their prophesy, the inaccessibility of the professional language
in which it is made, and the expectation that scientists can and must remain objective and
dispassionate (Cloud, 2020).
The Terrestrial Project
So far, I have explained what environment has often meant, and how it can no longer carry
those meanings. I have set aside the logic of inversion and vocabularies of inclusion or exclusion,
in favor of a view of bodies and materials as entangled in a meshwork of relations and practices.
Having arrived at the New Climatic Regime, at Earth’s agency and political authority, I now
consider some alternatives. To begin, I must do some positioning.
Given the logic of inversion, scholars have attempted to delineate our current period of
human activity from other spatiotemporal arrangements. Latour (2018) claims the period of
modernization is the Holocene, and the current period of Earth’s emphatic response is the
Anthropocene. Haraway (2016) argues for the Chthulucene, or “a kind of timeplace for learning
to stay with the trouble of living and dying in response-ability on a damaged earth” (p. 2). I wish,
however, to resist this urge to distinguish our current period within the scientistic terminology of
“cenes,” as it too confidently constitutes boundaries of exclusion, suggesting that some practices
have effectively ended, others have begun, and all of humanity is agreed upon this. I use Latour’s
(2018) term, the New Climatic Regime, to instead position this analysis within an atmosphere of
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Expert elicitation was the predominant approach in the U.S. for ascertaining climate futures in the 1950s, since
climate models were still in the early stages of development and could not offer projections for future scenarios
(Hulme, 2017). The United States government would consult climate scientists for their opinion on the future of the
climate and climate-related issues.
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transition — a becoming, in which a “new” authority is emerging and existing authorities must
find new ways of relating.
To what does “environment” refer, if not to surroundings? Latour (2018) offers an
explanation in which environment refers to the Critical Zone, or the habitable area of the earth,
approached from the sciences of nature-as-process which must “confront conflicts for each of the
agents that populate the zone and that have neither the privilege nor the possibility of remaining
uninterested” (p. 79). The Critical Zone is neither surface nor surrounding, but rather the
sociomaterial timeplace wherein terrestrials must generate ways of co-existing that are inherently
dependent and entangled. In other words, it is where life is lived, porous and deeply dependent.
Ingold (2008) calls this the “zone of entanglement,” saying “Within this tangle…beings grow or
‘issue forth’ along the lines of their relationships. This tangle is the texture of the world” (p. 1807).
The Critical Zone, or zone of entanglement, is characterized by the mixture and intermingling of
substances — there is not the hard ground as one boundary, and the ephemeral atmosphere on the
other, but rather a meshwork of relations, materials, bodies, and movement which are not
necessarily distinguishable, and certainly not containable.
If environment-as-surroundings is possible because of the logic of inversion and system of
production, then the Critical Zone is enabled by a system of engendering, built upon “the idea of
cultivating attachments, operations that are all the more difficult because animate beings…are
constantly overlapping, embedding themselves within one another” (Latour, 2018, p. 82). The
system of engendering is a system of becoming, interested in ways of binding but not in
boundaries, full of generative possibilities for confrontation or alliance. It acknowledges that land
and weather and climate are in many ways the same — textured aspects of the “weather world,”
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made discrete by a discourse which imagines hard surfaces, gaseous mediums, and conditions
independent of human action (Ingold, 2008, p. 1804).
The Critical Zone, the zone of entanglement, the weather world, the open world — these
are each entry points into what might be called the Terrestrial project. The Terrestrial project is the
most pressing concern for all those occupying the habitable spaces of the Earth. It requires the
dissolving of boundaries, the blurring of distinctions, the redistribution of agencies, the
intermingling of substances, the knotting of life paths — all of which begin in discourse. The
Terrestrial project, then, is a communication project, one in which we must “generate alternative
descriptions…from the bottom up, by investigation” (Latour, 2018, p. 94). In other words, the
Terrestrial project must begin with careful analysis of discourse to identify ways of representing
and constituting environment, unpack the implications of constituting environment in these ways,
and refine our ways of representing and constituting environment so that they are more open and
less preoccupied with categorization.
I am not alone in pursuing an understanding of environment as a sociomaterial, hybrid
accomplishment, but there is still plenty of room for improvement upon theory and empirical
analysis. A significant analysis worth mentioning is Dickinson’s (2016) study of communicative
encounters that took place as part of a K-12 state forest conservation education program. In her
analysis, Dickinson accounts for both human and other-than-human interventions which challenge
the ordered, submissive presentation of the forest by the forest service guides. Dickinson builds
upon Roger’s (1998) call for a transhuman materialist theory of environmental communication in
a way that generates valuable insight into how environments come to be ordered (and disordered)
through discursive encounters she calls interruptions (those interactions which challenge and
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disrupt the successful performance of the state forest service’s conservationist curriculum19).
However, there are two ways I think future research could build upon her analysis.
First, I question Dickinson’s (2016) choice to divide her analysis into those interruptions
made by humans, and those interruptions made by other-than-humans, since in the examples, it is
evident that interruptions are hybrid. For example, in her discussion of an interruption made by a
bird, the bird’s intrusion on the lesson was aided by the children’s calling attention to it. Dividing
the analysis in this way hindered a more complex unpacking of agential interactions and reinforces
the divide between humans and nature, or in Dickinson’s words, humans and other-than-humans.
To put it another way, bracketing interruptions done by humans from those done by other-thanhumans solidifies the difference of those two categories, and imposes an abstractive, constructed
distinction between those two processes. This is simply another iteration of the bracketing out of
nature to which Rogers (1998) so strongly objects, and I argue that what is needed is an approach
to analysis which accounts for the relationality of agents and simultaneity (and multiplicity) of
action in environmental phenomena.
Second, I wonder about the pragmatic implications of characterizing other-than-humans’
interruptions “as ‘speaking’” (p. 44). This argument is not unique to Dickinson’s essay and is
evident in much of the environmental communication literature which advocates for “listening” to
the “voices” of nature (Carbaugh, 1999). The problem, though, with using “speech” as a metaphor
for environmental agency is that it is a logocentric argument, in that it repositions language as the
central communicative mode, and in doing so it also repositions human means of knowing and
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Dickinson (2016) explains interruptions thusly: “Curriculum, field educators, and the forest service reinforce a
human-nature binary by depicting nature as organized, rational, and passive. Yet, visitors, students, rangers, and otherthan-humans expose, contradict and complicate these tightly constrained framings…“live” enactments of the
curriculum and the forests are greatly modified by a host of factors that result in the production of a curriculum and a
place that are conflicted. This enactment interrupts and challenges the curriculum’s and forest conservationism’s
framings and ultimately challenges the human-nature binary” (p. 39).
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mattering as the definitive means of knowing and mattering. In other words, an environmental
ethic which advocates for listening to the voices of nature is anthropocentric and inherently
reinforces the human/nature divide by judging nature’s communicativeness by human
communication standards. What is needed is not a movement from one side of the divide to the
other, but a broader understanding of communication which orients to action, or the sociomaterial
becoming of agents in relation.
I pursue the Terrestrial project in this dissertation by asking how a constitutive approach
to communication as discursive practice might enable empirical analyses which more fully account
for the range of relationships, interactions, and agents which do the work of constituting
environment. I should emphasize, the goal of the Terrestrial project is not to eliminate
anthropocentrism, but rather to constantly challenge our inherent anthropocentric bias in order to
generate creative approaches to inhabiting the Earth. Challenging our anthropocentric assumptions
is not an easy task, and the Terrestrial project is characterized by the radical acceptance of the
uncertainty and responsibility that comes with living in a relationally entangled world. It is defined
by asking the question “how might it be” rather than “what is,” and just as the environment emerges
out of infinite possible arrangements, there are a myriad of possible answers, none of them
inherently “right” or “wrong.” In responding to traditional dichotomies, the Terrestrial project
responds with a favorite phrase of my partner’s — “Por qué no los dos?” Why not both?
Conclusion
In this chapter, I gave an overview of the most prominent discourses historically used to
mediate environment in the U.S. — wilderness, the sublime, preservation, conservation, ecology,
environmental justice, and climate — as well as critiques of those discourses. I also gave a more
detailed context to prepare for the analyses of land, weather, and climate which follow in the next
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three chapters. To conclude, I presented my orientation to environment, which I have nicknamed
the Terrestrial project, and positioned this dissertation as emerging from that position. In the
following chapters, I analyze the range of agency and actions of Terrestrials as they constitute their
environment, beginning with land and a case illustration of how land is materialized and mediated
by legal texts.
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CHAPTER THREE:
LAND: THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL MONUMENT

Land is literally the ground under our feet, but how we encounter that land — its cultural
significance, historical context, and accompanying social practices — is fundamentally mediated
in discursive practice. Legal discourse, in particular, has constituted our relationship to land for
centuries. As Graham (2010) astutely observes, “what we see when we look at a landscape is a
series of legally prescribed land use practices in action,” not so much a landscape as a lawscape
(p. 1). In this chapter I consider how legal discourse, specifically legal texts, constitute land and
our possibilities for relating to and encountering it. I take the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the
presidential proclamations creating and modifying Bears Ears National Monument as a case
exemplifying the sociomateriality of land and the direct role legal texts have in the communicative
constitution of environments.
In this chapter, I argue that legal texts are significant agents in the constitution of
environment and land and demonstrate how they materialize landscapes in institutionally
sanctioned ways. To begin, I provide a brief discussion of legal language and texts, as well as the
recent material turn led by scholars in critical legal studies, sociolegal studies, and legal geography.
Following this, I present the history of Bears Ears National Monument before moving into
analysis. My analysis considers how the Antiquities Act and two presidential proclamations
(re)materialize land in particular ways, demonstrating that the communicative constitution of
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environment, even when conducted in the supposedly fixed and frozen legal register (Maley,
1994/2013), is never finished.
Legal Discourse and the Language of Law
Law has always relied on language, spoken and written, to order the social universe, and
though legal language is often considered its own distinct genre, it varies greatly depending upon
the context in which it is used (Maley, 1994/2013). Gibbons (1994/2013) divides legal discourse
into legal code and legal proceedings, echoing the cultural tradition of English common law where
law includes legislative texts as well as case law, judicial decisions which provide precedents for
interpreting statutes20. The great variation in legal discourse has prompted Maley (1994/2013) to
claim, “there is not one legal discourse but a set of related legal discourses” (p. 13). Trosborg
(1997) provides categories of legal language use, which each function as their own domain with
practices specialized for their particular purpose: the language of legal documents; the language
of the courtroom; the language of legal studies and textbooks; the language which lawyers use
amongst themselves and laypersons; and the language used to talk about the law in the popular
discourse. Communication in the courtroom is the most studied area of legal discourse, but a
considerable number of studies have considered legal texts, including wills, contracts, judicial
decisions, and legal statute (Trosborg, 1997).
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, influenced by the work of Austin (1962) and
Searle (1969), scholars began attending to legal discourse by studying the particularities of legal
language (Trosborg, 1997). Work in the 1970s was concerned with identifying and describing the
syntactic properties of legal language. In the 1980s there was a shift to the pragmatic aspects of
legal discourse and Halliday’s (1978; 1985) systemic functional linguistics; the concepts of field,
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Cao (2007) defines statute as “a document with the highest constitutional authority with legal effect within its
jurisdiction” (p. 77).
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tenor, and mode, became foundational to the literature theorizing legal discourse (Maley,
1994/2013; Trosborg, 1997). The idea that law is constituted through language was fairly
widespread by the 1990s (Gibbons, 1994/2013), and Habermas’ (1992/1996) discourse theory of
law became highly influential in the study of legal texts as speech acts. In the early twenty-first
century scholarship began considering how legal discourse shapes “the essential qualities of
individuals, groups, and communities” (Doremus, 2003, p. 300). More recently, studies of legal
discourse have taken the material turn (Graham et al., 2017).
Legal language is notorious for its syntactic complexity (Trosborg, 1997), but Maley
(1994/2013) claims that it “reached its heights, or depths, of verbosity or prolixity” in the
eighteenth century. The complexity of legal language is often attributed to the need for law to be
unambiguous (Franklin, 2016; Gellers, 2015; Maley, 1994/2013). Legislative language especially
must balance the tension of certainty and flexibility, using language that is specific enough to
facilitate clear interpretation, but general enough to remain relevant across particular settings and
through time (Maley, 1994/2013).
Beginning in the 1970s, the “plain language” movement has advocated for simplifying the
legal register to improve clarity and accessibility (Danet, 1980; plainlanguage.gov, n.d.), but the
legal traditions with the oldest origins, such as property, contract, and tort law, have retained the
use of archaic terms (Maley, 1994/2013). Revisions to U.S. Code for the purposes of improving
readability have been common, including in the case of the Antiquities Act. As Maley (1994/2013)
notes, not all revisions have been purely linguistic; the visual format or layout of statute has shifted
over the years from one continuous sentence to separate sections for the component clauses, each
identified by a number, letter, or title.
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Characteristics of the Legal Register
Legal language relies on static and abstract categories in order to apply a universal moral
evaluation of local experiences, constituting a social order which operates by the “articulation of
specific rules and regulations” across contexts (Gellers, 2015, p. 484). This “translation of
everyday categories into legal language” (Mertz, 1994) is constitutive — it materializes these
categories, as well as the possibilities for relating to and interacting with them, in discursive
practice. Legal debate often takes the form of competing interpretations of legal language, and
therefore discursive choices should be understood as highly strategic. Danet (1985) identifies the
following lexical and syntactical features which can be found across legal settings: technical terms;
common terms with an uncommon meaning; archaic words with Latin, French, and Old English
orgins; polysyllabic words; unusual prepositional phrases; doublets; formality; vagueness; overprecision; nominalizations; passives; conditionals; unusual anaphora; whiz deletion; prepositional
phrases; sentence length and complexity; unique determiners, like “such” and “shall”;
impersonality and the use of third person voice; negatives, especially double negatives; parallel
structures.
Though texts can act as powerful agents, they must either be imbued with authority by a
human author/reader or derive their authority from interactions with other texts or institutions —
as Smith (2005) would say, they must be activated in order to act. In the case of legal texts in
particular, intertextuality and (re)contextualization are key to preserving the authority of law, and
therefore the sovereignty of the state. Intertextuality accounts for the way in which texts carry
traces of prior texts, and (re)contextualization has to do with the appropriation of texts across
discursive contexts (Bartesaghi, 2015; Fairclough, 2010). Because legal authority must come from
some authoritative origin, legal texts are intertextually ordered both explicitly and implicitly, with
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all authority ultimately deriving from the supreme legal text — the Constitution — which
constitutes a government and prescribes the processes of governing (Cao, 2007). By intertextually
referencing a state constitution or earlier legal code, legal texts make claims to author “possible
renditions of the social world” (Bartesaghi, 2015, p. 1). In this way, intertextuality can be thought
of as “a process of legitimation in the discursive order of a culture” (p. 2).
Speech act theory has been especially important to studies of legal discourse (Shuy, 2015).
As Hancher (1976) points out, in developing the notion of performative speech acts, Austin (1962)
draws heavily upon examples from English common law. One aspect of legislative texts often
analyzed as a performative speech act is the enacting clause (Hancher, 1976; Maley, 1994/2013;
Shuy, 2015). This feature of legislative texts is inherited from the British legal tradition, and
appears in virtually the same format in the legal systems of the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand (Maley, 1994/2013). The enacting clause is the operative part of a legal text — it is an
explicit performative utterance which “identifies the authoritative agent of the legislative speech
act” (Hancher, 1976, p.254). In the United States, the enacting clause is established in 1 U.S. Code
§101 which states: “The enacting clause of all Acts of Congress shall be in the following form:
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled.””
The enacting clause is expressed in “the archaic jussive subjunctive form,” giving it a
tenseless quality “as if it were a perpetual, speaking command from the sovereign power to its
subjects” (Maley, 1994/2013, p. 20). Drawing upon Searle’s (1969) notion of illocutionary force,
Maley goes on to explain:
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In linguistic terms it has the indirect illocutionary force of certifying that the correct
participants and conditions accompany the saying of the speech act, at the same time as its
explicit force is a command that the contents of the statute become law. (p. 20)
Hancher positions the enacting clause as the basis of legislation, which must “show on its face the
authority by which it is adopted and promulgated” (p. 252). Following this explicit expression of
authority, the statute must then say what must be done (mandatory or directory rules) or say what
may be done (discretionary or permissive rules), identify the relevant agents to be involved, and
authorize particular actions under particular circumstances (Maley, 1994/2013). Deliberate
language choices and intertextual claims to authority enable law to realize a moral universe through
interrelated texts, providing a means to evaluate past actions and structure future ones. Specifically
addressing environmental law, Doremus states “we will never reach an environmental endpoint
that allows us to maintain a permanent set of policy choices,” so we must think of legal policy as
always unfolding, emerging out of what has come before, and shaping what future decisions and
actions are possible.
(Re)introducing Materiality into Law
Throughout the twentieth century, legal scholarship and pedagogy taught an abstract
interpretation of law, neglecting both the material contributions to and consequences of legal
discourse (Graham et al., 2017). In the last two decades, legal scholarship has emerged which
deliberately engages with sociomateriality, expanded concepts of agency, and the situatedness of
legal action (Delaney, 2015; 2017; Graham et al., 2017). In communication, Karen Tracy (e.g.,
2009; 2011a, b; 2016) has made significant contributions to the analysis of legal discourse, though
her work primarily considers spoken arguments and judges’ decisions. Outside of communication,
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new approaches to law, such as critical legal studies, socio-legal studies, and legal geography
developed in response to, and critique of, the tradition of legal positivism.
Critiquing Legal Positivism
According to Graham (2010), legal positivism “describes law and legal relations according
to the conventions of the genre of objectivity” (p. 15). Broadly speaking, it is an intellectual
tradition stemming from the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and
others (Gardner, 2001). Rather than addressing the local particularities of legal practice, legal
positivism is concerned with abstract rules, rights, and doctrines which operate the same across
contexts because they are considered apart from them. Legal positivism approaches law as science,
and legal discourse and scientific discourse share certain linguistic characteristics such as syntactic
complexity and the use of technical terms (Trosborg, 1997). As Graham (2010) puts it, “legal
positivism claims that law is science, devised methodically and practiced clinically” (p. 15).
Legal geography21 takes as its fundamental position the inseparability of law and space,
and studies seek “to reveal the ways in which law and geography are mutually constitutive and
world-making” (Graham et al., 2017, p. 497). Delaney (2015) summarizes the implication of legal
geography for our understanding of legal discourse in the following:
In short, in our world, there is nothing in the world of spaces, places, landscapes, and
environments that is not affected by the working of law: the inscription of rules and
regulations, the recognition or withholding of rights, and enactments of the privileges of
authority at all scales. (p. 99)

21

The literature on legal geography emerged as part of and in response to the publication of Blomley’s (1994) seminal
work, and the subsequent publication of the edited volume, The Legal Geographies Reader (Blomley et al., 2001).
For a more comprehensive review of variations within the emergent literature on legal geography, see Delaney’s
(2015; 2016; 2017) three-part literature review, and Jeffrey (2020).
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A legal geography approach considers the materiality of the environment and the bodies and
entities which populate it, and serious interpretations of this approach expand the scope of legal
discourse to include participants “throughout relational worlds, human as well as other-thanhuman” (Delaney, 2015, p. 99). Analyses attempt to account for the co-production of law, space,
and place.
Socio-legal studies challenges the anthropocentric legal positivist position by taking as its
premise “that law is socially produced” (Graham et al., 2017). Socio-legal studies traces its origins
to feminist theories which “brought corporeality into legal theory, in the process questioning the
idea of the natural body and the disembodied legal knower” (p. 487). The larger goal of the sociolegal literature is to challenge anthropocentric dualisms and “re-orient human-nonhuman
relationships so that the human is interconnected with, and part of, the environment rather than
separate from it” (p. 488). Sociomateriality has been a focus of this research, but this has largely
concentrated on the materiality of human practices and physical environments rather than
attending to the materiality of discourse itself.
A few recent studies have attempted to account for the materiality of legal discourse in
terms of texts and textual agency. There are two essays worth mentioning which consider the
material agency of legal texts. The first I will discuss is a study by Faulkner (2012) which examines
the performative functions of the Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products Regulation of the
European Union, drawing heavily on Austin (1962) and actor-network theory. Faulkner’s essay
includes valuable empirical analysis and discussion but makes a distinction between a legal “text”
compared to a legal “document” that betrays a narrow view of materiality and compartmentalizes
the performative aspects of legislation rather than presenting a unified account of textual agency.
The second essay I will mention is by Doll and Walby (2019); their essay presents Smith’s (2005)
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method of institutional ethnography as a method of inquiry appropriate for legal texts, providing a
review of the literature which has used institutional ethnography to examine various legal texts
and their involvement in various socio-legal processes.
The notion of law as communication is not new (see Van Hoecke, 2002), but if we are to
believe Delaney (2015) that law is related to virtually all aspects of our lived experiences and
environments, then we must provide empirical analyses which not only demonstrate how legal
discourse constitutes and is constituted by the sociomaterial world as we experience it, but also
critically consider the consequences of particular discursive choices and modes of representation.
In this way we can begin to make evidence-based recommendations for discursive choices which
might enact justice for all Terrestrials. In this section, I have provided a brief review of the
literature theorizing and analyzing legal discourse and text. I now turn to an empirical analysis of
the constitution of Bears Ears National Monument. I begin with an overview of the Bears Ears
controversy.
Bears Ears
The area of southern Utah within which the Bears Ears buttes are found has a long history
of human habitation, and “as many as 30 tribes have called the land their home at some point”
(Wilkinson, 2018, p. 321). Native tribes were forced out of the region beginning in the midnineteenth century, but five tribes retained their strong ties to the land, with the Diné (Navajo) and
Ute people especially frequenting the land “to collect herbs and medicine, forage for food (such as
piñon nuts), gather firewood for heating and ceremonial use, and to hunt game” (Bears Ears InterTribal Coalition, n.d.). In the early twenty-first century, the Diné people formed a nonprofit, Utah
Diné Bikéyah, to research the Bears Ears region, “developing cultural maps, conducting interviews
with elders and other tribal members, bringing in academic experts, and gathering other
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information to help them determine what the boundaries of a national monument or other protected
area should be” (Wilkinson, 2018, p. 323-324). They released a cultural map of the landscape in
2013, recommending 1.9 million acres for protection, and publicized it in Utah and Washington,
D.C.
Obama announced a desire to form national monuments which honored and protected sites
important to the history of under-represented and dispossessed peoples. Native groups saw an
opportunity to not only protect Bears Ears, but to create the first national monument to be
collaboratively managed with tribal entities (Wilkinson, 2018). Members of five tribes — the
Hopi, Zuni, Ute Mountain Ute, Diné, and Ute — met in July of 2015, forming the Bears Ears InterTribal Coalition with the goal of writing a comprehensive proposal to President Obama for the
proclamation of a Bears Ears National Monument. Throughout both the process and the produced
proposal, the Coalition endeavored to enact and impart Native values, a goal evident in the fairly
extensive collective drafting process and the poetic language and reverence for the environment in
the proposal. Five tribal leaders representing each of the five tribes in the Coalition presented the
final proposal at a press conference in Washington, D.C. on October 15, 2015.
The following July, Utah Representative Rob Bishop introduced a bill to the House entitled
“Utah Public Lands Initiative Act,” which would have protected some of the areas of Bears Ears,
designating several small wilderness areas and two national conservation areas, and opened others
to fossil fuel development, motorized recreation, and control of resources by the State of Utah
(Maffly, 2016). While this Bill was being debated in Congress, President Obama declined to
designate a Bears Ears national monument until the outcome of the bill was decided. The Utah
Public Lands Initiative Act passed in the House of Representatives, but later failed in the Senate.
After this failure of Congress to act, President Obama issued Proclamation 9558, A Proclamation
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for Bears Ears National Monument, on December 28, 2016, just before the end of his last term in
office. Though celebrated by Native and environmental groups, Bears Ears National Monument
was received unfavorably by Utah politicians and those in the fossil fuel industry, especially
because of its size. President Obama’s proclamation set aside approximately 1.35 million acres as
Bears Ears. Within his two terms as president, Obama reserved more land as national monuments
— 549 million acres — than any other president (Knowlden, 2018). When Donald Trump took
office in 2017, he ordered a review of all of these public lands, after which he began modifying
the size of monuments using the “smallest area” directive of the Antiquities Act to justify
enormous reductions of acreage; Trump shrunk “Bears Ears National Monument by 85 percent,
and Grand Staircase National Monument22 by almost half” (p. 606).
Following this modification, environmental advocacy organizations and Native groups
filed lawsuits against the Trump administration, arguing that the Antiquities Act authorizes the
president to create national monuments, but does not give the president authority to modify
existing national monuments. While the Antiquities Act does not explicitly provide for the
modification of national monuments, Knowlden (2018) points out that presidents have enlarged
and diminished the size of national monuments ever since Taft enlarged Natural Bridges National
Monument in 1908. Though presidents have at times significantly reduced the acreage of national
monuments, no president has ever eliminated a national monument entirely. Though presidential
authority under the Antiquities Act has been a subject of dispute since its inception, the Supreme
Court has only addressed presidential authority under the Act three times23, upholding the
president’s actions in each case. In February of 2020, the Interior Department announced plans to

22

Designated by President Bill Clinton in Proclamation 6920, Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument, September 18, 1996.
23
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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permit drilling, mining, and grazing in areas which had previously belonged to the Bears Ears and
Grand Staircase National Monuments (Kaplan & Eilperin, 2020).
The Antiquities Act of 1906
The American Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 U.S.C. 431-433), officially entitled “An Act for
the Preservation of American Antiquities,” constitutes a category of legally defined land, “national
monuments,” and provides the rules for applying that designation to materials and their locations.
It is relatively short, with only four sections. As legislative statute, it follows many of the
conventions identified in my discussion of legal language. The Act is part of the United States
Code24 — “the general and permanent laws of the United States, organized into titles based on
subject matter,” first published in 1926 “to address the need for an updated, authoritative, and
useful consolidation of Federal laws” (OLRC, n.d.). I have included the original Act as Appendix
A, and the revised and reenacted Act as Appendix B. For the purposes of analysis, I consider only
the first two sections, “Presidential Declaration” and “Reservation of Land,” which I have provided
in Excerpt 3.01 below:
Excerpt 3.1
1

(a) Presidential Declaration.-The President may, in the President's discretion,

2

declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric

3

structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated on

4

land owned or controlled by the Federal Government to be national monuments.

5

(b) Reservation of Land.-The President may reserve parcels of land as a part of

6

the national monuments. The limits of the parcels shall be confined to the smallest

24

The Code consists of 54 titles and five appendices. Since December of 2014, with the passage of Public Law 113287, Enactment of title 54-National Park Service and Related Programs, the revised text of the Antiquities Act was
repealed from U.S. Code title 16 Conservation, and reenacted in U.S. Code title 54 §320301 — National
Monuments (“Changes to the Historic Preservation Laws,” n.d.).
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7

area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be

8

protected.

Authorship and Authority in the Antiquities Act
As it currently appears in U.S. Code, the Act is a de-authored text (Fairclough, 2010;
McLean & Hoskin, 1998). That is, the traces of the Congressional author(s) who wrote the text are
erased, so the text seems to speak of its own inherent authority. As Cooren (2004) notes, deauthored texts “reduce the human actor to an intermediary, thereby reaffirming the existence of
the organization” or institution (p. 379). As part of U.S. Code, the Act is acting on behalf of the
Federal government; it speaks from the authoritative position of being law, and it is from this
position that the text is able to issue directives. Its position as U.S. Code also puts it into
relationship with the other laws25 contained therein, and from this relationship we can understand
this particular text as part of a series of similarly authoritative texts. Within the Code, especially
in its digital form online, the revised and reenacted Act is explicitly linked to its previous iterations.
Users can click a hyperlink under the heading “Statutes at Large” which brings up the image of
the 1906 Act included in Appendix A. That iteration begins with the standard enacting clause. This
intertextual linkage clarifies that, though de-authored in its current rendition in U.S. Code, the Act
is imbued with authority by Congress (which is in turn given authority by the Constitution), and
once activated as U.S. Code it speaks with its own force of law. In other words, the Act is a textual
agent.

25

“The U.S. Code is divided into two types of law: non-positive law and positive law. Non-positive laws are titles of
the U.S. Code where the title is an editorialized compilation of related statutes. These titles of the U.S. Code are not
themselves law. The U.S. Code itself says that the non-positive titles are only prima facie evidence of the law and that
the Statutes at Large are legal evidence of the law” (Wice, 2018). Notice that the language of “evidence of the law”
reinforces the idea of law as dealing in the abstract world of rights, rather than in the material world of texts, in a way
that seems determined to deny the agency of the texts which do not just provide evidence of the law, but do the work
of law.
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Now it is important to note that the method of retrieving this text mediates the authoritative
tone in which it is read. This is because, as a declarative speech act, the Act brings about “some
alternation in the status or condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact
that the declaration has been successfully performed” (Searle, 1975, p. 358). The Act can be
retrieved from multiple different institutional sources and exists in several material iterations, two
of which I have made available in the appendices of this document. Its presence in so many
institutional spaces demonstrates its success; the means by which the Act is mediated do much of
the work of imbuing the text with the voice of law.
Thusly imbued with the authority to act, the text uses its agency to confer authority (to
author) onto the President, placing the text in relation to that office and the body who occupies it
at the time of reading. This allows the Act to function on two levels: in the abstract sense, the
reference to the president can be understood as a reference to the office of the president, or rather
the Executive Branch of government as established by the Constitution; in the particular sense, the
reference to the president can be interpreted by a reader as pertaining to the individual performing
the duties of the office of the president at the time of reading. In the abstract sense, the local context
of the reading is irrelevant, giving the Act a timeless and placeless quality; in the particular sense,
the import of context by a reader authorizes particular actions within particular environments to
be done by particular persons.
As a declaration, the Act relies upon the conventions of an extra-linguistic institution,
which Searle (1975) defines as “a system of constitutive rules in addition to the constitutive rules
of language” (p. 359). That is, legal practice lends more than just an accepted vocabulary — it also
provides accepted patterns of interaction and identities which arrange people in asymmetries of
authority. Thus, mentioning the President in line 1 in relation to the phrase “declare by public

84

proclamation” in line 2 indicates an existing, legitimate procedure (presidential proclamation)
which must be performed by people who are particularly positioned to do so. There is a degree to
which the Act fulfills an expectation we hold of legal texts — to authorize particular behaviors
and provide a reference point by which we can evaluate the legitimacy of future acts. As Searle
puts it, “Institutions characteristically require illocutionary acts to be issued by authorities of
various kinds which have the force of declarations,” and this is especially true of the law (p. 360).
The Antiquities Act, though an important piece of law, is also encountered as yet another piece of
law. Its ordinariness mediates its authority; it is doing exactly what we expect law to do.
The Land as Property Paradigm in the Antiquities Act
Lines 2-4 exhibit a two-dimensional, cartographic approach to land-as-container, listing
the types of “objects” (line 3) to which the law can apply, thereby allowing the extension of
significance to the land on which they are “situated” (line 3). In other words, the land is a static
surface upon which objects of interest are located. It is made to matter merely to establish claims
to resources which are distinct from, yet dependent upon, it. The land is not valuable inherently,
and it need not be identified in any other way to be transformed into national monument land.
The land as property paradigm is strengthened in Section B of the Act, in lines 5-8.
Parcelization, “the fragmentation of land resources among multiple ownership units of diverse size
and function” (Platt, 2014, p. 68), is a hallmark of the capitalist land market. Referring to “parcels
of land” (line 5) evokes a container metaphor due to the secondary meaning of the term “parcel.”
Though it is primarily functioning in its commodified sense as some tradable quantity, it can also
be used as synonymous with “package,” as it is used in mail delivery contexts. In this sense, not
only is a “parcel of land” a container of resources, but it is also transferable. A parcel of land, then,
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creates the image of a neatly bounded landscape, to use the legal terms, alienable and excludable
property.
That the parcels reserved should be “confined to the smallest area possible” (line 6-7)
reinforces the value of land as a commodity, while simultaneously providing a guideline by which
to evaluate the president’s action. That this stipulation needed stating suggests an inherent value
in land as property, or rather as a bundle of resources. At the same time, it reinforces the
subordinate status of land in relation to landmarks and objects; the preservation of land is only
authorized in order to facilitate the protection of landmarks and objects. Read in the context of its
authoring, this section clearly echoes the fears of States and private landowners who worried about
abuse of the Act following the significant acreage reserved by presidents under the authority of
the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 (Knowlden, 2018). The Act does not specify an exact acreage, nor
does it provide for a process of determining the “smallest area possible,” and this ambiguity has
often been used to justify modifications to national monuments, as it was in the case of Bears Ears.
The lack of an author or authorizing body to determine the “proper care and management
of the objects to be protected” (lines 6-7) gives the “smallest area” declaration of the Act an
objective air — that is, in the absence of a speaker or standards, the proper care and management
of the objects is located in the objects themselves. It also assumes that proper care and management
can in fact be spatially confined, therefore implying that the objects the Act exists to protect are
nonliving and immobile.
Linguistic Fidelity
Because the purpose of the law is to designate “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” proclamations establishing national
monuments must do so using the same language, therefore rendering the environment as a two-
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dimensional container of things. In this way, the Act perpetuates its capitalist, anthropocentric
worldview of parcels and resources. Attempts to subvert this worldview could potentially
delegitimize national monument designations since the intertextual chain of authority (authorizing
particular actors to author) could be said to have been violated. This is because, as Gellers (2015)
notes, “the language of the law facilitates a competition over interpretations and discourse in legal
settings” (p. 484), so a presidential proclamation which traces its authority to the Antiquities Act
is only authoritative to the extent that its fidelity to the law can be defended in court. To put this
more simply, actions using the law must follow the law, literally adopting its same language and
values. To demonstrate this, I now turn to analysis of President Obama’s 2016 Proclamation for
the Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument.
Establishing the Bears Ears National Monument
Presidential proclamations, like U.S. Code, are primarily designed to be read. They are
activated through the performative act of signing them — a practice which is sometimes
photographed or recorded in a video format to distribute to the public across news and social
media. Obama’s proclamation was accompanied by an official statement summarizing its purpose
and relating it to the Gold Butte National Monument which was signed into being on the same day
(Obama, 2016). The attribution of accountability is made clear in a presidential proclamation since
it is only one author who is named in the enacting clause and whose signature is required in order
to activate the text. Presidential proclamations are not legislative statute26, so they are not as
constrained by the formulaic and frozen style used in statute like the Antiquities Act (Danet, 1985).

26

Congressional acts are preserved as texts in the U.S. Code, whereas presidential proclamations and executive orders
are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, the “codification of the general and permanent rules published in
the Federal Register by the departments and agencies of the Federal Government” (govinfo, 2020).
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This is evident in the first sentence of the Obama proclamation (3 C.F.R. 9558, 2016), the full text
of which is provided in Appendix C.
Excerpt 3.2:
1

Rising from the center of the southeastern Utah landscape and visible from every

2

direction are twin buttes so distinctive that in each of the native languages of the

3

region their name is the same: Hoon’Naqvut, Shash Jáa, Kwiyagatu Nukavachi,

4

Ansh An Lashokdiwe, or “Bears Ears.” For hundreds of generations, native

5

peoples lived in the surrounding deep Sandstone canyons, desert mesas, and

6

meadow mountaintops, which constitute one of the densest and most significant

7

cultural landscapes in the United States. Abundant rock art, ancient cliff

8

dwellings, ceremonial sites, and countless other artifacts provide an extraordinary

9

archaeological and cultural record that is important to us all, but most notably the

10

land is profoundly sacred to many Native American tribes, including the Ute

11

Mountain Ute Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray, Hopi

12

Nation, and Zuni Tribe.

Land as Visible
The first sentence echoes preservationist sensibilities which value the environment for its
inherent qualities, rather than its acquired worth as capital. In line 1, we are presented with an
action before we find out the subject doing that action — we do not find out until line 2 that it is
the “twin buttes” doing this “rising.” The use of “landscape” in line 1 indicates aesthetic value, as
that term derives from the genre of painting and photography of the same name which takes as its
subject some environmental scene, artistically composed (Graham, 2010). In lines 1-2, we are also
told this landscape features a landmark which is highly “visible” and “distinctive,” so much so that
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its name seems to be inherent. Most commonly, visibility is a prerequisite of the aesthetic
experience of a landscape (Louter, 2009), and an object is aesthetically interesting in large part
because it is distinguished from its background.
What is more, the text does not specify a viewer who is participating in doing visibility.
There are a few ways to interpret this: (1) the viewer is the speaker, Obama, or (2) the viewer is
any agent capable of seeing the twin buttes. The first interpretation is reasonable because the text
is a declaration, like the Antiquities Act, and by stating the twin buttes are visible, Obama makes
it so. His authority for doing so is mediated by his role as President and the established practices
of designating national monuments. The second interpretation is more interesting; by locating
visibility in the buttes themselves rather than in an interaction between a viewer and what is
viewed, the text constitutes the twin buttes as objectively visible to any agent capable of viewing,
not just human viewers. Read in this way, the twin buttes are as visible to humans as they are to
animals and satellites. That visibility and distinction are offered as explanations for the singular
name seems to constitute the twin buttes as entities with their own identity and existence apart
from, and beyond, their interactions with humans and their cultures — they have always been, and
will continue to be, Bears Ears.
Presences in the Text
Obama speaks for Americans — and potentially humanity if we accept the cultural
narratives of American exceptionalism (Gilmore & Rowling, 2019) — in line 9 when he asserts
the importance of the many artifacts “to us all”; this is not out of the ordinary for the President of
the United States, though, as we expect the person filling that role to act as “national
communicator” (Sparrow, 2008, p. 578). In lines 9-12, without context it seems that Obama is
speaking for the Native American tribes, but if we position the proclamation within the sequence
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of events in which Native American tribes presented their proposal for the creation of Bears Ears
National Monument to Obama, then we could instead interpret this as a moment of the Bears Ears
Inter-Tribal Coalition speaking through Obama and the proclamation. As further evidence that the
Inter-Tribal Coalition is speaking through the proclamation, there are passages of the proclamation
which are taken verbatim from the Inter-Tribal Coalition’s (2015) proposal to the president. The
longest and most significant of these passages are lines 121-125:
Excerpt 3.3:
121

From earth to sky, the region is unsurpassed in wonders. The star-filled nights and

122

natural quiet of the Bears Ears area transport visitors to an earlier eon. Against an

123

absolutely black night sky, our galaxy and other more distant leap into view. As

124

one of the most intact and least roaded areas in the contiguous United States,

125

Bears Ears has that rare and arresting quality of deafening silence.

There are many voices present in the text (to once again recontextualize Ravotas and
Berkenkotter’s (1998) wonderfully descriptive phrase), and Obama creates a world in which those
voices do not matter equally; what is most notable about the land is that it is “profoundly sacred”
to “many” (line 10) Native tribes. This is highly significant since the Antiquities Act was in large
part devised to protect Native artifacts for American interests, rather than for Native interests27.
Obama therefore rearranges the hierarchy of valid claims to the land, prioritizing Native interests
for what is arguably the first time since the Antiquities Act was passed (Wilkinson, 2018).

27

At the time the Antiquities Act was passed in the early 1900s, the U.S. Federal and State governments were still
pursuing an assimilationist policy toward relationships with Native groups. That policy, though not marked by the
same extent of physical violence which characterized U.S.-Native relations throughout the 19th century, still
subscribed to a “kill the Indian, spare the man” mentality (Churchill, 1997, p. 245); as Colwell-Chanthaphonh (2005)
noted of early-20th century assimilationist policies, “the underlying principles of cultural extermination remained —
the destruction of traditional Native American lifeways and worldviews.”
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In addition to the metaphorical voices of Americans and Native Americans, the
proclamation must maintain its intertextual linkages to statute in order to maintain its authority. In
other words, the proclamation must prove it is operating in the same world, reality, or as Latour
and Chakrabarty (2020) would say, on the same planet as the statute which authorizes the
president, and therefore the proclamation, to act. As such, the proclamation must prove Bears Ears
is valuable because it contains objects which are historically and scientifically significant. Whereas
the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition’s (2015) proposal places objects in scare quotes to
problematize the term — “Our discussion here is not intended to catalogue all the many ways that
this area holds significant geological, paleontological, archaeological, historical, cultural, and
biological “objects” within the meaning of the Antiquities Act” (p. 4-5) — the proclamation cannot
take such liberties, and must take seriously the task of naming objects, which it begins in line 5
with a list of types of environments, and continues in lines 7-8 with a list of artifacts. The
Antiquities Act first and foremost was designed to protect historical artifacts and sites, and the
wording of the Act itself lists objects of prehistoric and historical importance before those of
scientific importance. The proclamation therefore mirrors this sequencing, giving the history of
the site and listing archeological sites before compiling the ecological features of scientific
importance. The opening of the proclamation is dedicated to proving that Bears Ears qualifies for
protection under the Antiquities Act.
In the enacting clause (Excerpt 3.4), Obama speaks through U.S. Code and the Code speaks
through him. This mutual speaking through is evidenced by the use of verbatim phrases from the
Antiquities Act such as “lands owned or controlled by the Federal Government” in lines 233 and
the “smallest area compatible” clause in line 240. Obama calls on another textual agent to speak
for him in line 239 — an “accompanying map.” The accompanying map does not in fact
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accompany the proclamation in all of its iterations. When conducting a Google search, the top
search results lead to an Obama-era archived website where the proclamation is presented in the
body of a webpage as plain text without linking to any other repositories of official presidential
documents. It is only by going to the Federal Register webpage that one can access the
proclamation as a PDF file including the map (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Bears Ears National Monument Obama Proclamation Boundaries

Though the map key suggests the use of colors to demarcate boundaries and the agencies
responsible for a given area, it is presented in the Federal Register in black and white, making it
difficult to discern the boundaries which the enacting clause references. Interestingly, Obama tells
us the boundaries are “described” on the map, but as presented the map actually offers very little
description of boundaries because the shades of gray used to mark them are nearly
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indistinguishable. The presence of the map brings with it (i.e., recontextualizes) the logic of
cartography and its assumptions about the rendering of three-dimensional worlds into twodimensional texts. In this way, I must use my knowledge of maps to understand that a map is
assumed to be the result of complex geological surveying and therefore to correspond with some
physical location. The map is positioned to mediate the so-called “real” environment (by which I
mean the physical environment we assume is really out there somewhere) with the environment
created by the proclamation; the resources needed to interpret it are assumed to be provided by it
(e.g., the map’s key and scale, place names), and as such we orient to the map as a fact, independent
of the particular context in which it is encountered.
Mediating Accountability: Enacting the Proclamation
The enacting clause, the most overtly performative moment of the proclamation, begins at
line 230 and explicitly identifies the chain of agency and authority upon which the proclamation’s
claims rest. Of course, as Searle (1975) points out, all claims are performative, but in the
proclamation the claims up to the enacting clause are offered as reasons which support a particular
action, so there is a sense of arrival when we reach the moment in which that action is taken.
Excerpt 3.4:
230

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of

231

America, by the authority vested in me by section 320301 of title 54, United

232

States Code, hereby proclaim the objects identified above that are situated upon

233

lands and interests in lands owned or controlled by the Federal Government to be

234

the Bears Ears National Monument (monument) and, for the purpose of protecting

235

those objects, reserve as part thereof all lands and interests in lands owned or

236

controlled by the Federal Government within the boundaries described on the
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237

accompanying map, which is attached to and forms a part of this proclamation.

238

These reserved Federal lands and interests in lands encompass approximately 1.35

239

million acres. The boundaries described on the accompanying map are confined to

240

the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects

241

to be protected.

Formality as Mediational. The earlier description of Bears Ears and its attributes, though full of
technical terms, is written in a more simple, everyday register, but the enacting clause returns to
the high formality of the legal register, exhibiting many of the features identified by Danet (1980;
1985). For example, this section has longer sentences and more clauses, including prepositional
phrases strung one after another; this can be seen in lines 230-237 which are one sentence, joined
with two semi-colons and spread over three paragraphs. Other lexical and syntactic features
include a preference for formal language; archaic expressions like “hereby” (lines 232),“thereof”
(line 235), “hereunto” (line 365), and “the year of our Lord” (line 366); doublets such as “lands
and interests in lands” (lines 233, 235) and “owned or controlled” (lines 233, 235-236), whiz
deletion such as in line 239, “The boundaries [which are] described…”, and passive construction.
The beginning of the proclamation seems to resist the abstract, distanced, and objectified register
of law, but the enacting clause returns to it. This suggests that the use of the formal legal register
is essential to the practice of enacting things through legal texts. The formal style of the enacting
clause mediates our encounter with it, so that we hear it as belonging to that class of authoritative,
governing documents.
The enacting clause is set apart from the rest of the document using the visual cues of
capitalization and paragraph separation. This signifies to the reader that something is happening,
catching the eye on pages five and eight of the nine-page document.
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Excerpt 3.5:
365

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of

366

December, in the year of our Lord two thousand sixteen, and of the Independence

367

of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-first.

368

BARACK OBAMA

The signature, which begins at line 365, completes the enacting clause and activates the text — it
is Obama authorizing the action, and the text which carries it out. Without the signature, which is
also highly formal and follows an archaic formula, the text’s authority would be incomplete. To
become law, it must be signed into law. This is also the moment when the text’s polyvocal texture
is smoothed over. As we are finally in the presence of an identified author (“I, Barack Obama,”
line 220), we are led to interpret everything we have just read is also attributable to that same
speaker/author. Of course, what matters here is not locating the claims’ origins, but identifying
who is accountable to/for them. The document was likely penned by many hands (as the
intertextual moments I have already discussed demonstrate), but what matters is that Obama has
set his hand to it. In carrying out (or challenging) law, what matters is not who can be said to have
penned a document, but rather who can be praised or blamed for it — that is, authorship here
functions as an index of accountability.
Clear accountability makes the text subject to legal challenges, since it is easier to challenge
the authority of a single, named author than it is to challenge an ambiguous, unnamed body of
implied institutional authors. Perhaps this is why lines 212 to 214 in Excerpt 3.6 appeal to other
authoritative actors — “members of Congress, Secretaries of the Interior, State and tribal leaders,
and local conservationists” — for initiating the preservation of Bears Ears.
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Excerpt 3.6:
209

Protection of the Bears Ears area will preserve its cultural, prehistoric, and

210

historic legacy and maintain its diverse array of natural and scientific resources,

211

ensuring that the prehistoric, historic, and scientific values of this area remain for

212

the benefit of all Americans. The Bears Ears area has been proposed for

213

protection by members of Congress, Secretaries of the Interior, State and tribal

214

leaders, and local conservationists for at least 80 years. The area contains

215

numerous objects of historic and of scientific interest, and it provides world class

216

outdoor recreation opportunities, including rock climbing, hunting, hiking,

217

backpacking, canyoneering, whitewater rafting, mountain biking, and horseback

218

riding. Because visitors travel from near and far, these lands support a growing

219

travel and tourism sector that is a source of economic opportunity for the region.

This tempers Obama’s accountability: he is responsible for establishing the national monument,
but it was not solely his idea. In line 214, it also positions the preservation of Bears Ears as the
culmination of “at least 80 years” of political debate.
Accountability is especially significant when considering those claims which are not as
well-supported by the document itself, such as that made in lines 239 through 241 in Excerpt 3.4
which state “The boundaries described on the accompanying map are confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.” This is arguably
the most contentious claim in the document — it is this claim which Trump’s proclamation would
later use to justify the modification of Bears Ears — and it is also the least supported. The first
half of the proclamation establishes the presence of objects and areas worth preserving, proving
their worth by stretching “the temporal horizon of our imagination… underscoring the brevity of
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human existence in relation to earthly time” (Jasanoff, 2020, p. 343), but it does not explicitly
justify the size of the monument. In the next section I discuss how President Trump refutes this
claim, modifying the Bears Ears National Monument, and once again transforming that land via
legal text.
Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument
Trump’s proclamation (3 C.F.R. 9681, 2017) functions in much the same way as Obama’s,
relying on a formal enacting clause to accomplish its task, and conversing with other voices,
groups, materials, practices, and spaces in the legal discourse to ground its authority and reasoning.
The full transcript of the proclamation can be found in Appendix D. Since I have already discussed
elements of the legal constitution and transformation of land in relation to the Antiquities Act and
the Obama proclamation (e.g., formal language, an enacting clause, intertextual references to
authority, and the reliance upon a map), I do not discuss the Trump proclamation in as much detail.
It is significant because of the controversy of which it is a part; it is unexceptional as an example
of presidential proclamation.
Unlike the Obama proclamation, Trump’s proclamation is squarely rooted in the legal
language of property, objective and distanced. This difference is evident from the first paragraph,
which is all business, immediately referencing Proclamation 9558, the Obama proclamation
establishing Bears Ears, which it revises. That it is revised is not to suggest Proclamation 9558 has
disappeared or is no longer relevant — I only mean that its relevance is now in its relationship to
Proclamation 9681, the currently acting document, rather than the land itself. It is an ongoing texttext conversation which goes on whether or not it is read because, like the statutes contained in
U.S. Code, its publication in the Code of Federal Regulations activates it and positions it in the
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legal discourse as a text which ought to be read (that is, interpreted and implemented) under
applicable circumstances.
As I have already stated, the Antiquities Act does not provide presidential authority for the
modification of a national monument. Therefore, Trump’s proclamation must justify its existence
and identify the source of its authority. It does so by presenting itself as a correction. This happens
beginning in line 28:
Excerpt 3.7:
28

The Antiquities Act requires that any reservation of land as part of a monument be

29

confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of

30

the objects of historic or scientific interest to be protected. Determining the

31

appropriate protective area involves examination of a number of factors, including

32

the uniqueness and nature of the objects, the nature of the needed protection, and

33

the protection provided by other laws.

34

Some of the objects Proclamation 9558 identifies are not unique to the monument,

35

and some of the particular examples of these objects within the monument are not

36

of significant scientific or historic interest. Moreover, many of the objects

37

Proclamation 9558 identifies were not under threat of damage or destruction

38

before designation such that they required a reservation of land to protect them.

39

In fact, objects described in Proclamation 9558 were then — and still are —

40

subject to Federal protections under existing laws and agency management

41

designations.

Like the Obama proclamation, there is no speaker present in the early sections of the text, so the
claims read as being available to everyone and traceable to no one speaker. The first two
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paragraphs summarize the actions and purpose of the Obama proclamation and reduce the list of
objects of scientific and historic value which took multiple pages in the first iteration to a mere 17
lines. Excerpt 3.7 begins with the third paragraph of the proclamation. Lines 34-36 struck me with
how simply and effectively the text dismisses the multitude of detailed claims made by Obama.
By stating that the objects are “not unique” or of “scientific or historic interest,” Trump makes it
so. However, unlike Obama’s proclamation which integrated and mobilized voices in the text to
support his authority as president, Trump does not name any interests other than himself and the
government. Obama’s integration of multiple voices contributes to that aspect of credibility which
Aristotle called goodwill — that his proclamation appeals to the desires and practices of other
groups suggests that the actions which those appeals justify are taken for the benefit of those
groups. Trump demonstrates no such goodwill, and it is not clear in the proclamation who is meant
to benefit from the modification to Bears Ears.
This does not invalidate Trump’s proclamation, for all of the reasons pertaining to the
authority of the president, law, and declarative speech acts I have already discussed. Instead, we
must accept Trump’s rendering of the land (no matter how grudgingly), or risk questioning the
practices which enabled its existence and transformation in the first place. In this way, we hear
Trump’s proclamation as not only in conversation with Obama’s proclamation, but with every past
and future proclamation modifying an existing executive order. This is especially true of
proclamations modifying national monuments, since the Antiquities Act does not specifically
authorize modifications of national monuments; that authority comes from legal precedent —
literally the historical evaluations of legal practices. Any change in practice is a change in
precedence, and therefore in the resources legally available to presidents in the future.
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At line 82, the author of the proclamation, President Trump, makes his first appearance
with the pronoun “I.”
Excerpt 3.8:
79

Given the nature of the objects identified on the lands reserved by Proclamation

80

9558, the lack of a threat of damage or destruction to many of those objects, and

81

the protection for those objects already provided by existing law and governing

82

land-use plans, I find that the area of Federal land reserved in the Bears Ears

83

National Monument established by Proclamation 9558 is not confined to the

84

smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of those objects.

This is an important moment because it suggests that everything that came before might not have
been Trump, reinforcing the sense that the claims made in Excerpt 3.7 come from everyone and
no one. Beginning the sentence with a “given” clause makes it seem as if what follows is
objectively factual, so that Trump does not make his conclusion but discover it, telling us “I find,”
rather than the more accurate “I have decided.” He transforms his account into a factual account
by treating the claim made in lines 82-84 as “already there prior to and independently of” its being
found by him (Smith, 1978, p. 33). Trump does not have to be accountable for his conclusion
because he presents it as a discovery rather than a decision.
The practice of issuing executive orders enables a president to create, transform, and
modify environments rapidly and without much justification. Presidents use the Antiquities Act to
speak for and through them — Presidential authority is thus mediated by the role they fill and the
expectations and allowances of that role according to U.S. Code. It does not matter that Obama’s
proclamation is more poetic, inspiring, inclusive, or believable. The act of designating or
modifying a national monument is not dependent upon persuasion, recruiting support, or gaining
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trust; it is dependent only upon “the President’s discretion.” To exercise presidential discretion,
one need only be able to prove he is the president — this means that an environment’s legal status
as a national monument is as dynamic as the change in presidential administrations. Once an
environment’s legal status changes, our possibilities for interacting with that environment are also
altered.
Mediating Environment via Presidential Proclamation
The case of Bears Ears National Monument is far from over. On January 20, 2021, his first
day in office, President Joe Biden issued Executive Order 13990 on “Protecting Public Health and
the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis.” Section 3 of the order is
titled “Restoring National Monuments” (Figure 3). Executive Order 13990 has initiated the process
of restoring the national monuments which were modified during the Trump administration,
naming those who will be accountable in making the decision and the procedure by which it will
be made. It is very likely that Bears Ears will once again be modified through presidential
proclamation. We could expect such a proclamation, should it happen, to utilize many of the same
resources as I have discussed in this chapter: intertextual chains of authority, the conventional
formality of legal language, an enacting clause, and an accompanying map.
Though revised, the Obama proclamation is an exceptional one of its kind. It resists
anthropocentrism from the very first sentence which constitutes Bears Ears as an entity without
personifying, anthropomorphizing, or commodifying the environment of which it is made to be a
part. Constituting Bears Ears on the basis of its visibility is arguably anthropocentric to the extent
that looking, pointing, and naming will always be anthropocentric acts because they are mediated
by the human body, motivated by human interests, and designed to introduce ease and reduce
uncertainty in human practices. It constitutes the land as timeless — or at least, not subject to time
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Figure 3: “Restoring National Monuments” Clause, Executive Order 13990

on the scale of human lives. The twin buttes were, are, and will always be “rising from the center
of the southeastern Utah landscape and visible from every direction” (Excerpt 3.2, line 1),
regardless of who encounters them. Bears Ears is presented as both part of culture, specifically a
part of languages, and apart from it, transcending cultural boundaries and contexts. There is great
possibility, in this sentence, for relating to an environment differently — not only by changing its
legal status but by subverting the objectification and commodification perpetuated by legal
language.
Though there are many moments in which the Obama proclamation resists an
anthropocentric orientation, Excerpt 3.3 stands out as another exceptional moment. By quoting the
Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition, allowing them to speak through his proclamation, Obama
recontextualizes another set of values for being. Those values are not the mainstream American
values which favor activity, productivity, access, and self-sufficiency. In mainstream American
spaces, silence, when it is even allowed to occur, is an uncomfortable, revealing thing. But in line
122, the “natural quiet of the Bears Ears area,” is listed as an attribute of the land right in between

102

two paragraphs which list objects like “rock records,” “dinosaurs,” “highlands,” and “grasslands,”
seemingly placing it as yet another example of a thing which makes the land scientifically and
historically significant, and therefore worthy of our protection.
In addition to recontextualizing Native values by quoting the Coalition proposal, lines 121125 carry some interesting implications for future national monument designations — in particular,
the inclusion of the soundscape. Likening “that rare and arresting quality of deafening silence” to
“objects of historic or scientific interest” could open the possibility for including more evidence
and accounts of listening and hearing experiences. Given advances in technology and file sharing,
it is possible to imagine a future presidential proclamation which includes not only an
accompanying map but accompanying audio recordings. Imagining this possibility, I am led to
wonder whether multi-modal accompaniments of audio, video, or photographic materializations
of objects (I continue to use this language because it is the language of the Antiquities Act and the
world we have made out of it, and it has made out of us) may make it possible for us to objectify
(as in reify it as an object) ephemeral performances such as dances, songs, dialects, and more. Such
a development could make land matter differently.
Interrogating the “Smallest Area” Clause
There is a fundamental problem with the “smallest area compatible with the proper care
and management of the objects to be protected” provision: such a quantification of the infinite
relationships which make up the observable environment is bound to be incomplete and simplistic.
When it comes to ecological management, we often do not know about those species and processes
of which we are not directly a part; we only learn the extent of ecological entanglement after we
have disrupted it. A few cautionary tales include the Dust Bowl (Graham, 2010) and the subsequent
planting of kudzu across America (Finch, 2015), the damming, and more recently undamming, of

103

rivers (Nijhuis, 2015), and the homogenizing of roadside ecology due to the transportation and
dispersal of seeds and plant material from vehicle tires (Forman et al., 2003). It is only recently,
as a result of the global COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns — a period Rutz et al.
(2020) have called the anthropause — that human activity has slowed to such a degree that
scientists have been able to quantify the effect of humans on wildlife. The gist of the matter is this:
from our vantage point as humans, we can only know what we come to interact with, and our
attempts to quantify and define the relationships that perform an ecology will always fall short.
Conclusion
My purpose in this chapter has been to demonstrate how an environment can rapidly exist
and transform depending upon how it is materialized in legal texts. Legal texts which are currently
acting, meaning they have not yet been repealed or modified and are published in an official
compilation such as the U.S. Code or Code of Federal Regulations, are always acting — they are
engaged in text-text(-text-text-etc.) conversations which continue to reference, relate, and act
regardless of whether they are read because, as part of the institutionalized legal body, there is an
understanding that they ought to be read under certain circumstances. Though we bring legal texts
into being, their materiality rapidly extends beyond the texts and into the environments which they
materialize and mediate.
We write the law, the law writes (acts upon, affords and constrains) our possible futures,
we write those futures onto the land, the land pushes back (by providing circumstances which
challenge the applicability of law), and we write more law. Of course, this metaphor of writing
things on land limits land to an inert surface, so it is not ideal, but I have kept the verb the same to
try and convey the sentiment that these are not separate acts in a linear sequence; rather, they are
simultaneous and ongoing. What I have shown in my analysis of Bears Ears National Monument
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is that we are constantly re-orienting to land through the mediator of legal discourse — we
materialize and rematerialize environments by defining their component parts and deciding what
matters within them.
This legal logic relies on the assumption that environments can be divided into component
parts which can be considered abstractly and in principle, isolated from their local settings, and
capable of being transferred and owned. What the case of Bears Ears illustrates is how quickly
massive changes can be made in how we constitute an environment with comparatively little
justification since legal discourse is concerned with the social world, and therefore it primarily
considers human needs and motivations, and takes human values at face value, as an adequate
justification for action. We are bound to anthropocentrism by centuries old legal texts because of
the chain of authority which new texts must establish. Through these intertextual references, texts
continue to act, so much so that, though we have transformed environments beyond recognition,
our possibilities for relating to land have not changed substantially in centuries.
The Obama proclamation has some interesting moments which resist this
anthropocentrism, but ultimately it, too, is constrained by legal practice — especially the formality
of the enacting clause which necessitates the explicit authority justifying and taking the action.
Because the authority to designate national monuments is provided by the Antiquities Act under
particular conditions and for particular purposes, proclamations utilizing this authority must
demonstrate that the actions they take meet these conditions and purposes. The clearest way to do
this is to use the same language as the Act. Both Proclamation 9558 (Obama’s) and 9681 (Trump’s)
do this, letting the Act continue to speak through them. Eighteenth century ideals continue to shape
our present-day actions through the continued quoting of legal language and the legal register.
Legal discourse is an important factor in, and probably the most formal means of carrying out, the
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communicative constitution of environment, but it is not the only way we constitute our
environment through communication. The Antiquities Act and both proclamations reference
science, scientific discoveries, and scientific knowledge — topics which I address in the following
chapters on weather and climate.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
WEATHER: OBSERVING, ENTEXTUALIZING, AND RECONTEXTUALIZING
HURRICAN DORIAN

In this chapter, I turn to that topic of conversation which Oscar Wilde called “the last refuge
of the unimaginative”: the weather. While often disparaged as banal small talk, talk about the
weather does more than represent immediate or impending material conditions — it makes
atmospheric phenomena matter in relation to human lives and infrastructure. In other words, the
weather is sociomaterial. Further, the weather is a hybrid accomplishment, meaning a multiplicity
of agents and practices are involved in its constitution. Increasingly, scholars have argued for an
understanding of environment as the weather world — a dynamic intermingling of land, sea, sky,
and social practice (Ingold, 2008; see also, Hulme, 2017). As Bartesaghi (2014) argues, weather
is “a communicatively constituted problem that deserves a close look at how our very
communication practices construct it” (p. 536).
This chapter takes up the case of Hurricane Dorian as a specific example of practices of
mediation that make the hurricane present in discourse. These professional practices of
meteorology, themselves institutionalized in institutional registers of observation, are facilitated
by technology which allows the hurricane to be viewed as a cohesive entity, predicts the
hurricane’s movement based on atmospheric models and past storms, and generates depictions of
the storm which can be shared with those at risk through existing media channels such as television
or social networking sites (SNS). Because of the breach that occurred when former President
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Donald Trump and the National Weather Service in Birmingham, Alabama presented conflicting
accounts of Dorian’s predicted path, this case study provides a glimpse into how these practices
are accomplished. The ensuing controversy, commonly referred to as Sharpiegate because of a
forecast map with an added line in black marker presented by the president during an Oval Office
press conference, generated metadiscourse about the practices of hurricane prediction and response
among scientists, government officials, and the general public.
Constituting the Storm: An Analysis of Hurricane Dorian
Hurricane Dorian was heavily covered in the U.S. media because its forecast track had it
making landfall on the east coast of Florida. It is not surprising that the president added to the
public discourse on Dorian, since in the U.S. there is an expectation that the president will
acknowledge and respond to major hurricanes (see Arffman, 2019, for more detail). President
Trump’s tweets about Dorian are significant, though, because his account of Hurricane Dorian’s
path conflicted with that given by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
and the National Weather Service (NWS). While the discourse surrounding Hurricane Dorian and
the conflicting accounts offered by President Trump and U.S. weather agencies encompassed news
articles, television segments, light night talk monologues, and social media posts, I have chosen
five tweets for analysis which I believe comprise the core of the controversy28 we have come to
call Sharpiegate. The tweets were made by President Trump (@realDonaldTrump), the National
Weather Service office in Birmingham, AL (@NWSBirmingham), and the White House
(@WhiteHouse) between August 31 and September 4, 2019. Since Demuth et al. (2018) posit that
Twitter data about hurricanes is most useful when considered as a narrative which chronologically

28

I borrow Jassanoff’s (2004) explanation of controversy as “the practices and processes by which one set of ideas
gains supremacy over competing, possibly better established ones, or fails to do so” (p. 5).
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documents a Twitter user’s experience of hurricane risk and preparedness, I present the tweets
below in chronological order:

Figure 4: Trump’s August 31 Tweet

Figure 5: Trump’s September 1 Tweet
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Figure 6: National Weather Service Birmingham Tweet

Figure 7: The White House Tweet

110

Figure 8: Trump’s September 4 Tweet

Within these texts, I have identified two key strategies which contribute to the reification
and

mobilization

of

Hurricane

Dorian

as

a

discursive

entity:

observation

and

entextualization/recontextualization. Observation has to do with constituting Hurricane Dorian as
a visible, and therefore real, environmental phenomena. Entextualization is the translation of
observations into multimodal texts which can be reproduced or shared (recontextualization), and
which exercise their own agency and authority in discourse. Practices of observation and
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entextualization mediate our encounter with Hurricane Dorian by providing us with a means of
making it present in discourse as texts, transcending spatial and temporal location to facilitate
interaction before Dorian is in such physical proximity that it can be felt. For the purpose of
analysis, I have given each strategy its own subsection of analysis, but this is not to suggest that
they are discrete — they may be enacted simultaneously and in varying combinations, and each is
vital to the constitution of (and response to) a hurricane.
Observation
Observation has to do with who looks and what is seen, and therefore who has the right to
look, or the right to make claims about what is real (Jones, 2020; Mirzoeff, 2011). When we
observe an object or process we are looking for those cues which index its similarity to or
difference from what we have seen before (Szerszynski & Urry, 2006). Observing marks its object
of attention as significant, and its entanglement with scientific practices and histories of
surveillance helps in part to establish observers’ right to look, constituting the real within
hierarchies of evidence and existence. The real constituted through observation is ordered, rational,
explainable, predictable, and reproducible, and it implies a certain degree of control over what is
seen and how it is seen.
“Monitoring”
In President Trump’s (2019a) first tweet about Hurricane Dorian (Figure 4), he references
an even more particular form of observation: monitoring. For the purposes of analysis, I have
transcribed the relevant content in the tweet in Excerpt 4.1:
Excerpt 4.1:
1

I am monitoring Hurricane Dorian and receiving frequent briefings and updates. It

2

is important to heed the directions of your State and Local Officials.
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Monitoring identifies something as worth looking at because of its potential for transformation.
The account in line 1 is given in the present continuous form. As it is used here, “monitoring”
functions as a present participle to indicate ongoing activity. We are therefore to interpret Trump’s
— who self-identifies as the monitor — action as watching for changes. As Parks (2001) puts it,
monitoring is conducted from “a tense of latency” in which observations are made and collected,
but not yet used (p. 594). It implies the existence of a threshold which, once crossed, justifies
immediate and concentrated intervention to return circumstances to their pre-monitoring state.
This tense of latency is evident in line 1 when Trump reports the second action in which
he is engaged: “receiving frequent briefings and updates.” As actions go, “receiving” is fairly
passive — a person engaged in “receiving” does not exert much agency and is not accountable for
what it is they receive. In fact, no one is imbued with agency because it does not allow for a subject
which is initiating the act of receiving. If Trump had said “I am being given frequent briefings and
updates” we would at least have some indication that the briefings and updates are coming from
somewhere; “I am being given” implies the presence of something or someone doing the giving.
Trump’s use of “receiving” suggests that those updates are coming from no one and nowhere. We
are meant to interpret those briefings and updates as already existing, objective facts — for all we
know, he is receiving these updates from Hurricane Dorian itself.
Line 1 arranges Trump and Hurricane Dorian in relationship to each other — “monitoring”
casts Trump as an observer, and Dorian as the observed, and “receiving” casts what is observed as
a factual account, existing prior to and independently of Trump’s monitoring it. Trump strengthens
the factual quality of his account in the next sentence in lines 1-2, issuing a value statement
disguised as a declaration of fact. We know to interpret this evaluative statement as a fact because
it is so generic — we are not told to whom it is important, why it is important, or even how we
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decided it was important, only that it is. Trump constructs it as an imperative, and by doing so it
comes across as something we (should) already know. That he bothers to say such an obvious
statement suggests that it is not meant to be informative; rather it establishes accountability and
demonstrates Trump’s competency as president doing leadership.
The “it is important to x” construction Trump employs constitutes what follows as
mattering regardless of time, space, or cultural context. Trump is merely reporting an established
fact, and therefore, he is not accountable for it. That this well-known fact involves “the directions
of your State and Local Officials” transfers that particular leadership responsibility away from
Trump and onto others more appropriate for the task. Trump’s use of “your” implicates the reader
as the accountable actor responsible for heeding these directions; unlike Trump, the reader is not
allowed to simply “receive” the directions of their state and local officials.
Returning to the image of the tweet in Figure 4, we can consider some of the multimodal
affordances of SNS which Trump uses to further diminish his accountability. First, he uses
@mentions, a Twitter feature which “establishes addressivity for a tweet, triggers a notification to
the @mentioned user that they have been addressed, creates a link to that user’s profile, and
establishes the conditions for threading multiple tweets together as a ‘conversation’” (Squires,
2015, p. 242). Trump’s @mentions come across as directing (and directly linking) the reader to
the relevant state and local officials. Second, Trump’s tweet is itself a retweet of an earlier Ron
DeSantis tweet about Dorian. The inclusion of DeSantis’ tweet locates Trump’s as belonging to
an ongoing conversation. The retweet is reported speech which functions as evidence of Trump’s
claims, especially since it is attributed to a member of that authoritative category, “state official.”
The retweet, in essence, mediates Trump’s authority by positioning a prior speaker before him.
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“Looking Like”
Trump’s (2019b) second tweet (Figure 7) about Hurricane Dorian again employs
observation to make claims about the storm and its relationship to the U.S. Opening his tweet with
“In addition to Florida” places what follows as part of the ongoing narrative of Hurricane Dorian.
It is already well-known that Florida is bracing for an encounter with Dorian — Trump himself
established this in his August 31 tweet (Figure 4) — so there is no need to refer to the storm by
name. Trump therefore positions himself as the omniscient narrator of an unfolding factual
narrative. That this narrative is unfolding in a way which we have not anticipated introduces an
urgency suggestive of a crisis situation. Trump hedges his claim, however, by saying “most likely”
and setting “much” apart from the sentence in parentheses; these two choices reduce the certainty
of his claim and Trump’s accountability to it. This is significant because declaring a state of
emergency is an official presidential duty which triggers a sequence of institutionalized practices
and activates categories of relevant agents (e.g., distribution of federal resources, presence of
FEMA and the National Guard, etc.) to carry out those practices. Trump’s hedging here suggests
a crisis without fully declaring one, so we interpret this as an update, or perhaps as further evidence
of the “frequent briefings and updates” Trump previously told us he was “receiving” (Figure 4).
The observation takes place in the next sentence, “Looking like one of the largest
hurricanes ever.” Trump makes full use of the authority of observation as an objective means of
generating knowledge through the absence of a subject. “Looking like” constitutes the existence
of “a community of co-watchers” (Szerszynski & Urry, 2006, p. 118), of which Trump is a part
and from which the storm looks the same to everyone. The absence of a subject indicates a “selfabsenting” in which one leaves behind one’s individual identity and positioning in order to see
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“from a vantage point that transcends particular locations and narrow horizons” (Szerszynski &
Urry, 2006, p. 120).
“Looking like” constitutes a viewing experience which is omniscient and distanced.
However, the limitations of viewing the sky from the ground prevent observations about the
hurricane’s size; it is only by taking to the sky, or to space, that one can begin to observe the size
of a hurricane. So while Trump’s claim constitutes a community of co-watchers who are seeing
the same thing, that seeing is further mediated by a vantage point other than that of the grounded
human body, and what is more capable of transcending particular locations and narrow horizons
than the gaze of the satellite? The image of Dorian in Figure 9 was taken September 3 by NOAA’s
GOES-East satellite (Griggs, 2019), and illustrates the sort of view from above which Trump’s
claim “looking like one of the largest hurricanes ever” conjures. Analyzing the use of satellite
images in Cold War geopolitics, Parks (2011) notes that satellites are treated as omniscient
witnesses, and the images they produce are treated as factual evidence of the actual conditions of
some actual place at some actual time. Of course, the satellites do not truly produce images, but
rather enormous quantities of data which must be interpreted and assembled into images.

Figure 9: NOAA Satellite Image of Hurricane Dorian
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Nevertheless, we regard the satellite as having a more privileged view of a hurricane than we do,
since it is only by zooming out, so to speak, that Dorian becomes visible as an entity
distinguishable from the atmosphere as a whole.
The second half of this claim, “one of the largest hurricanes ever,” is an extreme case
formulation (ECF). According to Pomerantz (1986), ECFs are a resource for describing a situation
as an exceptional one of its type in order to legitimize the descriptive claim. “One of the largest
hurricanes ever” describes Dorian as both innately related to, and also distinct from, all other
hurricanes. An ECF (often indexed by the use of terms like “ever,” “forever,” “never,” “really,”
etc.) locates the significance of something as being within itself — in Pomerantz’ words, it
proposes “a phenomenon is ‘in the object’ or ‘objective’” (p. 220). This is very similar to Smith’s
(1978) explanation of factual accounts as being those which are presented as existing independent
of the account and the one giving it, so we can consider an ECF a resource for legitimizing factual
accounts.
Extreme cases require extreme responses, which Trump demonstrates by giving the next
directives, “BE CAREFUL!” and “GOD BLESS EVERYONE!” in all-capitals with exclamation
points. Ott (2017) notes that this is a rhetorical strategy often present in Trump’s tweets, but it is
significant here because the all-capitals visually index just how extreme of a case this is. If Trump’s
tweet had said something like “Looking like one of the smallest/weakest hurricanes ever,” the
forcefulness of all-capitals would seem entirely out of place, but because it is one of the largest
ever (and because we equate size with impact) such rhetorical force is warranted. “GOD BLESS
EVERYONE!” is itself another ECF, which taken together with the omniscient narration of
Trump’s tweet, seems to allow Trump to speak on God’s behalf.
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It is significant that it is the president of the U.S. who is speaking for God (or perhaps,
calling upon God to speak for the president) because of the tradition of American exceptionalism
and the incorporation of American civil religion into the Republican Party to which Trump
belongs. Though done ambiguously (the particular God being called upon is not specified), as
Americans we are meant to hear it as the God of Protestant Christians and of the founding fathers
(Sormunen, 2018). Domke and Coe (2008) call this the God strategy, and it has been a popular
political strategy since Ronald Reagan’s 1980 acceptance speech for the Republican Party’s
nomination29. Trump’s use of the God strategy reflects his larger strategy of American
exceptionalism, since it is a claim to the “singularity, superiority, or God-favored status” of the
United States (Gilmore & Rowling, 2019, p. 395). Through his extreme case formulation, Trump
warns America that it is facing an unprecedented threat, however, America is an exceptional
nation, morally superior to other nations and the environment alike.
“Will NOT See”
The National Weather Service office in Birmingham, Alabama (2019) tweeted a response
to Trump’s September 1 update on Dorian (Figure 6). The responsive nature is not evident from
the tweet itself, as it does not make use of Twitter’s hybridity (e.g., @mentions, retweets, etc.) to
link directly to Trump’s tweet, instead using the “hashtag” (#) feature to interdiscursively and
intertextually link the tweet to the larger conversation about Dorian, by which I mean the larger
repository of related utterances on Twitter. It is evident NWS Birmingham is responding to Trump
rather than to the larger conversation because of the sequential temporal posting (the NWS
Birmingham tweet was made just 20 minutes after Trump’s) and because, at the time the events of

29

Although more typically practiced by the Republican Party, Domke and Coe demonstrate that Democratic
politicians have also integrated the God strategy into their approaches ever since Bill Clinton assembled the first allSouthern Baptist presidential ticket in U.S. history and delivered his 1992 Democratic presidential nomination
acceptance speech on “The New Covenant.
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Dorian were unfolding, it was treated by the media and public as a response (Cullen, 2019). Given
the economic risks of unnecessary, or “shadow,” evacuations, NWS Birmingham’s tweet is also a
prudent response. Shadow evacuations are those evacuations made unnecessarily; they occur when
residents who are not in life-threatening danger from the storm’s path evacuate anyway, due to
fear and anxiety or a desire to “avoid non-life-threatening inconveniences,” such as power outages
(Senkbeil et al., 2019, p. 17). Shadow evacuations contribute to economic loss, traffic congestion,
and fuel shortages, and generally impede emergency response efforts. In this regard, NWS
Birmingham’s tweet was successful; Alabama did not institute a state of emergency, issue
evacuation orders, open shelters, or take any other actions which would have been justified by
Trump’s claim that Alabama would be severely impacted by Dorian.
NWS Birmingham legitimizes their claim through an ECF, but this time it is framed in the
negative, “will NOT see any.” Because it is countering a claim constructed as a factual account
and delivered by the president of the U.S., NWS Birmingham’s tweet enhances its credibility and
clarity by repeating the same claim in three different ways, each time drawing upon the authority
of different means of constituting experience. In addition to drawing on different mediational
means (e.g., “see,” “felt”), NWS Birmingham uses the phrase “We repeat” to index to the reader
that they are, in fact, expressing the same idea even though the words have changed. “We repeat”
is also recognizable as a structural feature of an emergency announcement; when the economy,
infrastructure, and lives are at stake, repetition is assumed to improve clarity, and therefore
increase the likelihood that the correct crisis response will be enacted.
The first claim is made in terms of viewing: “Alabama will NOT see any impacts from
#Dorian.” Presenting “NOT” in all-capitals enhances the forcefulness (i.e., certainty) of their
claim, and this in addition to the ECF strengthens their position as speaking for the state of
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Alabama as a unified whole; Alabama is capable of seeing and speaking for itself, and in this sense
it is a more specialized (or perhaps localized) community of co-watchers. In a way, Trump’s first
tweet with its declaration “It is important to heed the directions of your State and Local officials”
(Figure 4) authorizes NWS Birmingham to speak for Alabama as a member of the category “state
officials.” NWS Birmingham, as a representative voice of the state, is therefore more trustworthy
than Trump in these matters.
“See” is also a more definitive action than, say, “monitoring” which conveys a certain
latency. It is also in the present tense, “see” rather than “be seeing” which would echo Trump’s
phrasing; the act is not ongoing, and there is no chance the situation will transform in such a way
that the claim would be invalidated. The phrasing “will NOT see any” uses the language of vision
to determine what will not occur, deciding Alabama’s future by positioning Alabama and
Hurricane Dorian in a null relationship. The use of “see” here is a claim to the real, but it implies
what is real (i.e., existing, factual) through a claim which constitutes an absence; it relates Alabama
and Dorian by closing off the possibility of any future interactions.
The second claim, “We repeat, no impacts from Hurricane #Dorian will be felt across
Alabama,” is a claim to non-visual sensory experience through the use of “felt.” This constitutes
Dorian as an entity capable of exerting force upon other bodies. Within the context of a community
of co-watchers, this second claim seems to establish a community of co-feelers poised to share a
singular embodied experience. Not only will Dorian be seen the same way, but it will also be
encountered the same way (which, in the case of Alabama, is not at all). The final repetition of
NWS Birmingham’s claim, “The system will remain too far east” positions NWS Birmingham as
a speaker belonging to the field of meteorology, and draws upon the authoritative resources of that
field, such as specialized language (“system”), to authorize their claim.
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“Originally Projected” and “As You Can See”
The last observational claims I will discuss are made in Trump’s (2019c) September 4th
tweet of an ensemble (Figure 8), better known by the popular term spaghetti model. The spaghetti
model is itself an recontextualization of Hurricane Dorian, which I will discuss in the next section
of analysis. Trump’s first statement, “This was the originally projected path of the Hurricane in its
early stages” appropriates the language of “projection” which is often used in hurricane discourse
to reference Dorian’s anticipated movements according to scientific modeling. “Projection” might
be thought of as a synonym of “prediction,” which would not carry any explicitly visual
implications. However, “projection” can also refer to the display of an image on a surface, in this
case the display of Hurricane Dorian’s movements across the surface of the Earth. This twodimensional practice of observation invokes the discursive authority of cartography, which
constitutes a world of surfaces and boundaries out of the conventions of fixed scale and
commensurable data (Hsu, 2014; Parks, 2001). That Trump claims the spaghetti model illustrates
the “originally projected path” indicates that what we are seeing has not been revised or otherwise
tampered with — we read its originality as an index of its authenticity, and therefore its authority
to describe the situation. In effect, Trump calls upon the spaghetti model as the “originally
projected path” to speak for him; the spaghetti model’s authenticity bears witness to the soundness
of Trump’s actions, not only speaking for him, but in defense of him.
By beginning his next claim with “As you can see,” Trump does the work of seeing and
interpreting for his audience — we are meant to trust the authenticity and authority of the spaghetti
model so much so that we do not need to even see it. “As you can see” constitutes a collective
viewing experience in which there is one, observable version of the real. In fact, “As you can see”
instructs the tweet’s audience in what they are seeing so authoritatively that it is not so much an
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invitation to look, but a declaration of what is in existence. The authority of Trump’s “version —
or rather vision — of events” (Jones, 2020, p. 34) is tempered, however, by the very image he is
claiming as proof, since, as I will discuss in the next analysis section, the spaghetti model is selfnegating.
Entextualization/Recontextualization
I use the term entextualization to refer to the processes by which the experience of
observing is made into (and commodified as) an observation — a material product (text) that can
be recontextualized by practices of distribution and consumption. Computer models, satellite
images, maps, and spaghetti models are the common “technologies of entextualization” (Jones,
2015, p. 31) we use to mediate hurricanes in discourse — these visual modes of representation
feed into and maintain visuality as a primary mode of making claims to the real. Once materialized,
these iterations of Dorian exert their own agency as mediators of the situation, and as (fellow)
agents we cannot completely control what they do and how they come to do it.
Texts are portable — that is, they can exist across modalities and contexts (e.g., Smith,
2005; Cooren, 2004). A text can be recontextualized (carried into a new situation) or resemiotized
(mobilized in a new way); we often interpret recontextualization and resemiotization as replication,
and we assume the consumption and interpretation of those images will also be the same. Visual
texts offer no response and are indifferent to interactions with them, and this consistency is often
interpreted as objectivity or omniscience (Sontag, 2001). Unlike fickle humans, whose
observations may be unacceptably biased or flawed, visual texts are treated as more trustworthy
observations. This idea is expressed through colloquialisms such as “the camera never lies,” or “a
picture is worth a thousand words.” The trustworthiness of images relies on the assumption that
images are faithful representations of some scene, frozen in time. This assumption, however,
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obscures the way in which each materialization of Hurricane Dorian is, in fact, constituting it anew
according to the relational web in which it is positioned.
The “Original Chart”
On September 4, the White House (2019) Twitter account shared a clip of an Oval Office
press briefing in which Trump provides evidence to support his account of the storm given in his
September 1 tweet (Figure 5). Specifically, he attempts to prove that his inclusion of Alabama in
the September 1 tweet was justified by NOAA forecasts. In the video clip, Trump displays what
he claims to be the “original chart” (Figure 10), a NOAA-issued five-day forecast cone dated
August 29, 2019. By September 4th, the steering currents carrying Dorian toward a landfall over
southeast Florida had collapsed, causing Dorian to take a northwest turn and remain off the coast
of Florida (Avila et al., 2020). Since much of the preparedness enacted in Florida was rendered
unnecessary when Dorian did not make landfall there, Trump’s update must justify those actions.
The following is a transcription of the clip:
Excerpt 4.2:
1

We thought we’d give you a update on the hurricane. We got lucky in Florida,

2

very, very lucky indeed. We had actually our original chart was that it was going

3

to be hit, hitting Florida directly. ((turning around)) Maybe I could just see that,

4

Gavin? ((aid grabs chart from behind the President’s seat)) Uh, it was going to be

5

hitting directly, ((sits chart on desk among audible shutter sounds presumably

6

from press taking still photos)) and that would have affected a lot of other states,

7

uh, that was the original, uh, chart and you see it was going to hit, uh, not only
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8

Florida but Georgia, it could’ve uh, was going toward the Gulf that was what was,

9

what was originally projected. And, it took a right turn. And ultimately hopefully

10

we’re going to be lucky it depends on what happens with South Carolina, North

11

Carolina. But it’s heading up the coast and Florida was, uh, grazed. Mostly wind

12

and we’re going to have a report on that.

We can understand Trump’s use of the chart as an example of a text-reader conversation which
“makes it possible for us to see the text, activated by a reader, as participating and playing a part”
in the interactive sequence (Smith, 2005, p. 120). Trump activates the text, to borrow Smith’s
terminology, when he involves the chart in line 2, and then instructs his aid in line 4 to present the
material chart for viewing. Gavin seems unprepared to handle the chart, as he awkwardly attempts
to display it while holding on to his notepad, pen, and folio, but the chart’s presence behind
Trump’s desk betrays the preparation that went into its presentation. Trump does not mention
Alabama in the clip, but he does not need to do so once he activates the chart, since Alabama is
depicted on it. Trump’s speech pattern even seems to indicate a reliance on the chart to speak for
him, since his own speech is repetitive, ambiguous, and halting.
Trump addresses lines 8-10 to the chart, not to the camera or his press audience, and this
reminds me of an observation which Smith (2005) makes of the principal speaker in a group of
people sitting around a table with the text at the center:
Every now and again, he’d pause; his eyes would go down to the text in front of him. The
others would wait — it was as if the text had its turn…that displaced others. Then he’d
look up and speak again, as if he was reporting or responding to what the text said to him.
(p. 168)
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Trump’s interaction with the chart is similar to that of the man and the text in Smith’s observation;
he gives the appearance that he is, indeed, reading the chart as he presents it, as if it sets Dorian
out in prose. His use of “you see” does the work of interpreting the chart for his audience so that
the mere presence of the chart is enough to prove his account. However, despite his narration, by
directing his and his audience’s attention to the chart, Trump activates the text, giving it a turn in
the conversation. This imbues the chart with agency, creating the conditions for the chart to speak
for itself despite Trump’s attempt to control its interpretation.

Figure 10: The “Original Chart” from the White House Tweet

Trump exploits the internal temporal structure inherent to texts in order to constitute the
chart as relevant evidence (Smith, 2005). As Smith writes, “texts have their own internal temporal
structure, but it is not the temporality of the everyday living in which the work of reading is being
done” (p. 167). The chart claims to represent scientific knowledge at a particular time, August 29,
2019 at 11AM AST, and that time supposedly corresponds directly to the lived experiences of that
day. Trump enhances the claim to temporal representation by claiming the chart he is about to
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show is the “original chart” of “what was originally projected.” This positions the chart within the
temporal order, establishing it as a primary source, imbued with authority because it is the first.
However, the chart is constituting a particular arrangement of matter, time, and social relations —
it is not a representation of reality, and therefore not a representation of a particular time or space.
The chart’s ability to matter across temporal contexts suggests that the chart exists in its own
temporal narrative. How else to account for its presence in discourse long after Dorian’s
movements no longer related to those depicted on it? In other words, Trump utilizes the chart to
engage in “retrospective validation” (Smith, 2005, p. 116) of the enactment of preparedness, and
the chart’s properties as a text, such as its representational logic and internal temporal structure,
instruct us in its factuality and direct us to interpret it as relevant evidence.
In the clip, we are offered multimodal evidence of the chart’s importance in line 5 when
we can hear the shutter sounds as the press photographs the chart. If the chart is worth
photographing, then it must be significant (though Don DeLillo’s (1986) parable of the “MOST
PHOTOGRAPHED BARN IN AMERICA” reminds us that the act of photographing confers
significance: “We’re not here to capture an image, we’re here to maintain one. Every photograph
reinforces the aura” (p. 12)). The shutter sounds are even more portentous in light of the chart itself
(Figure 10), which is an abnormal one of its type.
The chart’s abnormality is obvious to us because it is recognizable as a NOAA forecast
cone, and as a member of that category it must conform to the rules of that category if it is to be
interpreted as legitimate. As an institutionally authored text, the NOAA forecast cone should lack
any traces of an identifiable, individual author; authentic NOAA forecast cones do this through
the application of a standardized format, key, agency logo, computer-generated images and word
processing, etc. The chart Trump displays violates our expectations of what a NOAA forecast cone
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should be because it carries traces of a past text-reader conversation — the black line, apparently
drawn in marker (i.e., “Sharpie”), extending the forecast cone over Alabama.
We can tell the line does not “belong” to an official NOAA forecast because the line is not
symmetrical or of an even thickness, and it is a different color than the other lines marking the
forecast cone, making it stand out in a surprisingly human way against the rest of the computergenerated image. In this sense, Trump’s claim to originality takes on a new meaning — this chart
is original in that it is one of a kind. While other replications of the chart may exist, only this chart
carries the traces of its past interaction, an interaction which resulted in the addition of a black line
over Alabama.
Close inspection of the chart reveals that no additional line was needed to make the forecast
apply to Alabama. In a black box at the top of the chart there is a “Note: The cone contains the
probable path of the storm center but does not show the size of the storm. Hazardous conditions
can occur outside of the cone.” Trump could have enacted a much different text-reader
conversation, in which he focused not on the path of the storm but the size, and the potential for
widespread effects which, though not as strong as those at the center, could cause significant
damage. In this way, Trump could have made the case that Alabama could still have experienced
“hazardous conditions” despite its being “outside of the cone,” since this very narrative is
authorized by the text. The chart’s own instructions about how to interpret it call attention to the
redundancy of the black line, so we interpret Trump’s presentation of the “original chart” as a
blunder which demonstrates Trump’s ineptitude instead of defending the soundness of his tweets.
Trump treats the chart “as a medium through which the reader can connect with what
actually happened or was there,” (Smith, 2005, p. 107). In other words, Trump employs the chart
as an objective representation of Dorian at a particular time; therefore, the chart does not require
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much elaboration. But once brought into the interaction, the chart exerts its own control over the
situation, initiating new text-text and text-reader conversations which create new arrangements of
authority and accountability.
Smith (2005) clarifies that “rather than view institutional discourses as prescribing actions,
we might see them as providing the terms under which what people do becomes institutionally
accountable” (p. 129). Introducing a NOAA forecast cone into the interaction recontextualizes the
institutional discourses of which that text is a part (Linell, 1998); in essence, the chart brings with
it other relevant voices and claims. The line drawn on the chart puts it in conversation with another
text, a provision in U.S. Code titled “False weather reports.” First implemented by Congress in
1894, the code was last amended in 1994 and states:
Whoever knowingly issues or publishes any counterfeit weather forecast or warning of
weather conditions falsely representing such forecast or warning to have been issued or
published by the Weather Bureau, United States Signal Service, or other branch of the
Government service, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ninety days,
or both. (18 U.S.C. § 2074)
The code is an important piece of the science-state relationship: it helped establish governmentfunded weather reports as the authoritative source of weather information for the nation (Pietruska,
2019). While it saw more action in the early 20th century when meteorology was still an emerging
field and advertising was less regulated, the code protects the science-state relationship by
protecting state-funded weather reports. The legitimacy of state decisions depends on the authority
of scientific weather reports. The “False weather reports” code, as a legal text imbued with its own
agency, makes it so that only state-generated (via state-funded scientific agencies) materializations
of a hurricane are the only materializations that matter.
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The code holds the chart institutionally accountable for its past interactions, but because
those interactions were not publicly observed — after all, Trump merely presents the chart, making
no reference to the additional line or Alabama — the human reader(s) who interacted with the
chart and drew the line cannot be held accountable. Institutional texts “displace and subdue the
presence of agents and subjects other than as institutional categories” (Smith, 2005, p. 113), so
while we may imagine that an actual human hand moved a marker across the chart’s surface, it is
impossible to identify the individual beyond his or her supposed role as aid staff to the president.
In this same way, Hurricane Dorian’s identity as a unique entity is subdued by the chart —
the chart positions Dorian not as an active, individual storm, but as belonging to an institutional
category: Atlantic hurricanes. Atlantic hurricanes occasion five-day forecast cones which are then
circulated briefly before being replaced by new five-day forecast cones, and this cycle of
generating forecast cones and replacing them with updated ones continues until the storm makes
landfall. At that point, forecast cones typically stop circulating and are replaced by images of the
storm itself — or rather, images which carry traces of the storm itself, since atmospheric forces
like wind are only visible when interacting with some other material object, such as rain, trees, or
on-location television newscasters. That this forecast cone has remained in circulation long after
it was considered a source of “current information” (as the chart itself claims it presents) indicates
that it is acting as an institutional witness of how hurricane preparedness was enacted, rather than
acting purely as a stand-in for Dorian, the material hurricane. In this way, the chart acts less as a
representation of Dorian — though this is how Trump treats it — and more as a re-presentation of
organizational knowledge about Dorian at a particular time.
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The Spaghetti Model
The second recontextualization of Dorian as a visual text I will discuss is the spaghetti
model in Trump’s (2019c) September 4 tweet (Figure 8). When it comes to modeling the
atmosphere, there are three types of models that weather agencies generate: dynamical, statistical,
and ensemble/consensus (Trammell & Jones, 2019). Dynamical models involve using computer
technology to solve highly complex physical equations of motion in order to produce a forecast.
Statistical models put variables into relation, such as the relationship between historical data of
storm behavior and storm-specific details such as location or date. The model Trump shared in his
tweet is an ensemble or consensus model since it overlays the projections of multiple models onto
one map. Each spaghetti line on the map corresponds to a particular model, but each line is not
equally useful. For example, the XTRP, the first model listed in the key at the top of the image,
“simply extends the storm’s recent motion out to five days and is always a straight line” (Belles,
2019).
An ensemble model like the spaghetti model in Trump’s tweet is most useful for depicting
how much confidence meteorologists have in their ability to forecast the storm (Bianchi, 2020). A
spaghetti model depicts whether the atmosphere is in such a configuration as to be easily modeled,
or if the atmosphere is in such a state that it cannot be confidently modeled. If the lines on the
spaghetti plot overlap considerably and there are few outlying lines, the spaghetti model indicates
that confidence in the models’ ability to predict the storm’s path is high; if the lines are all over
the place, this indicates low confidence in the models’ ability to predict the storm’s path. Most
importantly, the spaghetti model does not represent the storm’s actual path at any given time, and
the presence of a model on the spaghetti plot does not necessarily mean it is useful for predicting
a particular storm.
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“As you can see” actually ends up working against Trump, since, as anyone who is capable
of reading the image would see, this text exists within a hierarchy of materializations of Dorian,
and within that hierarchy it is superseded by “NHC Advisories and County Emergency
Management Statements.” In other words, the text tells us that it is not the most authoritative source
of Dorian information. It further directs the reader to use this graphic to “complement, not replace,
NHC discussions.” Trump does not put this model into conversation with other NHC data, so
presenting the spaghetti model isolated from other iterations of Dorian in discourse is something
of a misfire, according to the text. Lastly, a working understanding of spaghetti models would lead
one to interpret that what the image is materializing is not an actual storm out there, but an
illustration of how confident we are in our ability to predict, and therefore respond, to the storm;
and in this case, on the morning of August 28, there was little confidence in the long-term forecast
of Dorian’s path. Trump’s interpretation of the spaghetti model is not consistent with other
accounts, including the account the spaghetti model gives of itself, indicating Trump’s confusion
as to what the text is actually doing. Since the text itself directs, “If anything on this graphic causes
confusion, ignore the entire product,” Trump should have ignored the image.
Discussion
We mediate hurricanes through practices of observation which manifest primarily through
the visual mode. We entextualize a hurricane as visual texts — satellite images, forecast maps,
spaghetti models, etc. — which afford us the ability to recontextualize and resemiotize the
hurricane into both established and novel discursive occasions. Observation can initially be
thought of as emerging from interaction with Hurricane Dorian, the physical storm, though that
interaction is mediated by satellites, models, and other technologies which enable people to see
what is not in their immediate field of vision. However, because nothing lies outside of
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communication, Dorian must be materialized in discursive form if we are to interact with, or rather,
respond to it. One way this is done is by generating visual texts and inviting them to speak for us
and through us as we constitute our claims. In this way, we are able to make Dorian present as an
entity in discourse and facilitate interaction with the hurricane long before it makes itself known
through storm surge, winds, rain, and ominous clouds. We tend to treat these texts as
representations of the storm and its movements, and it is this logic which gives the appearance that
we are engaging directly with the storm.
Conclusion
Using the case of Hurricane Dorian, I have demonstrated the sociomaterial becoming of a
hurricane, or to put it another way, how a hurricane is constituted in communication. Using
multimodal Twitter data, I have argued that the communicative constitution of a hurricane is bound
up with cultural practices of looking and seeing. In the case of Dorian, practices of observation,
entextualization, and recontextualization facilitated translocal interaction with that storm. What I
mean by this is that, despite Dorian’s physical and temporal distance from the U.S., scientists were
able to see the storm with the help of technology and generate supposed representations of the
storm in the form of visual texts which made Dorian present as an agential entity in discourse.
Entextualization and recontextualization are the foundation of our interaction with a hurricane, an
interaction which I have called doing hurricane preparedness, and have described as being
characterized by a pattern of response, in which the hurricane is always the first to act.
Doing hurricane preparedness begins when the hurricane’s actions are observed and
materialized so they can be witnessed translocally by the public. We then craft a response to the
hurricane by responding to its discursive iterations, which we treat as equivalent to the
amalgamation of atmospheric forces which make up the physical storm. The sequence of actions
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that comprise doing hurricane preparedness are meant to keep humans in consistent and direct
contact with the storm, but my analysis shows that interactions with a hurricane are highly
mediated, abstract, and distant. Each time we observe and materialize the hurricane, we draw upon
the affordances and constraints made available through a given mode of mediation. For example,
a NOAA forecast cone uses the scientific logics of distance, abstraction, and prediction to mediate
a hurricane’s future path. In the next chapter, I consider how the scientific discourse of “climate”
and “climate change” mediates our experience of our environment over time.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CLIMATE: CLIMATE CHANGE AS A MORAL PRACTICE

Since the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the
United Nations and World Meteorological Organization in 1988, the construct of climate has
become a central concern for governments, researchers, the news media, businesses, and
individuals. However, the notion of climate has been important throughout human history as a
normalizing idea. As Hulme (2017) puts it, “Climate is the reassuring idea that there is regularity
and a normality to which ultimately the weather will conform, even if today it is not doing so” (p.
5). Climate is a sociomaterial practice, a discursive resource that mediates our everyday, historical,
and expected encounters with our surroundings; we use it to accomplish, organize, and make sense
of our situated interactions.
Though climate has historically functioned to provide stability, this is not to suggest that
its meaning has ever been static or that the notion of climate change is entirely new (Von Storch
& Stehr, 2006). Anthropogenic climate change, or climate change attributed to human activity, is
an ancient concern — even Aristotle worried that clearing too many forests caused the climate of
Philippi to warm (Hulme, 2017). In Aristotle’s time, climate was the domain of philosophy; since
the industrial revolution, and more recently the Cold War, climate has been the domain of science
(Baker, 2017; Doel, 2003; Miller, 2004). The Cold War led to the development of “an autonomous
climate science field…through the capacity for climate science to shape the national security state”
(Baker, 2017, p. 874). The relationship between climate and security is still relevant, as former
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President Barack Obama demonstrated when unveiling his Clean Power Plan in 2015, declaring
“no challenge poses a greater threat to our future and future generations than a change in climate”
(as cited in BBC News, 2015).
Extreme and erratic weather events are now “staggeringly” frequent (UN News, 2020),
leading Hulme (2017) to conclude “the ‘normal’ historical function of the idea of climate — to
stabilize relationships between weather and culture — is moot” (p. 152). Additionally, the 21st
century is arguably characterized by such rapid and persistent change in all areas of life that it has
become difficult to distinguish those changes which are climate changes from all the other changes
taking place at any given time. Taking a sociomaterial orientation makes this distinction even more
challenging, since the traditional understanding of climate change as observable changes in the
physical environment falls apart once physicality and sociality are united. As Margaret Atwood
commented, “I think calling it climate change is rather limiting, I would rather call it the everything
change” (as cited in Science & the Imagination, 2014). If climate change is the everything change,
it is worth asking what climate affords us when it no longer describes a particular phenomenon or
change, but rather seems to encompass infinite possible changes.
In this chapter I examine how speakers use “climate” and “climate change” to mediate their
environment, its inhabitants, and their actions. The data come from a one-day public conference
titled “Science, Strategies and Solutions: Addressing Climate Change in Tampa Bay,” hosted by
the University of South Florida STEM Collaborative and held in downtown Tampa on November
1, 2019. I argue that speakers identify themselves and others as belonging to recognizable
categories of people (i.e., scientist, elected official, practitioner), and they use the associated
characteristics of those categories to relate to “climate change,” their environment, and each other.
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In doing so, the conference participants constitute a moral universe in which certain identities and
actions are more or less valuable depending upon their relationship to climate change.
To begin, I describe the conference format and speakers. The analysis takes place in two
parts: first, I argue that climate change functions as a shell for the participants; second, I analyze
the discursive resources which participants use to provide the meaning of climate change. I focus
much of my discussion on the moral implications of the identity categories participants deploy and
consider how the immediacy of the participant’s characterization of climate change — what has
been called the “crisification” of climate change discourse (Paglia, 2018; p. 99) — intensifies the
moral quality of these identity categories, and thus raises the stakes for everyone involved. I
conclude with the hopeful notion of creativity and suggest that the shell aspect of “climate change”
might foster new possibilities for relating across boundaries and doing the work of the Terrestrial
project.
Data
The “Science, Strategies and Solutions: Addressing Climate Change in Tampa Bay”30
conference was an all-day public forum where local academics, policymakers, and practitioners
discussed various aspects of climate change as they relate to the Tampa Bay area and the greater
region of Florida. The regional focus on Tampa Bay is significant since, as Chakraborty and
Bosman (2010) point out, the region has been characterized by “aggressive and uneven
commercial and residential growth” (p. 4) since the 1990s, and this has led to the proliferation of
“urbicidal practices” (p. 10) (Chakraborty and Bosman give the example of the region’s obsession
with maintaining lush, green lawns through the use of chemicals and fossil-fuel powered
equipment) which contribute dramatically to local air and water pollution and in doing so,

30

From this point on, I refer to the conference as the ACCTB (“Addressing Climate Change in Tampa Bay”)
conference.
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eventually contribute to the ecological death of the city. Like other cities in the Southern U.S.,
Tampa Bay has a legacy of environmental decisions which have disproportionately benefited
White, affluent residents through zoning laws, the inequitable distribution of resources —
including tree cover along streets, sidewalks, street crossings, parks, and air-conditioned public
spaces (Hirvela, 2011) — to predominantly White neighborhoods, and more recently, a preference
for luxury development over quality affordable housing (Chakraborty & Bosman, 2010). As such,
environmental justice is a particular concern for the region and the scholars who study it (e.g.,
Chakraborty, 2009; Chakraborty & Bosman, 2010; Lersch & Hart, 2014; Stretesky & Lynch,
2002).
The ACCTB conference was divided into seven sessions: an elected official’s report about
a regional “Resiliency Coalition,” an opening keynote address by a leading climate researcher in
Florida, the “Extreme Events Panel,” the “Transportation Panel,” “The Built Environment Panel,”
the “Public Health and Social Justice Panel,” and a closing keynote address given by a state
representative. Most panels consisted of three individual presentations given in succession,
followed by a period of question and answer. The “Extreme Events” panel was the exception to
this format, as it was entirely a moderated discussion. The audience was able to ask questions of
speakers using an application which allowed them to submit questions from their mobile device,
as well as “like” other’s questions to prioritize mutually important inquiries. The questions were
displayed on the large screen at the front of the hall, and the moderator of a given panel would
select which questions to ask the speakers. While these audience data would have added a
significant multimodal aspect to the analysis, questions were displayed as a constantly refreshing
feed, so they were regularly being replaced without being archived, and the application was not
accessible after the conference ended. As such, my analysis focuses on spoken discourse.
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I initially collected 345 minutes of audio recordings from the conference. Given the amount
of recorded data, I do not present a transcription of the conference, panels, or presentations in their
entirety. I used the free mobile application Otter to generate an initial rough transcript of the seven
presentations and panels. I then looked for instances in which participants explicitly mentioned
“climate” or “climate change” to manually transcribe speakers’ utterances verbatim, as my primary
interest is in how speakers use the terms to mediate their experiences of, encounters with, and
interventions in their local environment. After my initial analysis, I began to wonder if “climate
change” really meant anything to the participants — it was used sparingly, and though institutional
definitions were sometimes mentioned, the participants used it much more creatively than those
definitions described. I selected these more creative moments for close transcription and analysis
to better understand what “climate change” meant, or how it was functioning, for the speaker in
the immediate context of the utterance as well as the greater context of the conference. Though not
considered human subjects research by the USF Institutional Review Board since the data were
collected at a public forum, I have taken care to replace participants’ names with pseudonyms and
have avoided selecting excerpts which included personal information.
The Speakers
The majority of the excerpts I have selected for analysis come from individual
presentations, in which one person spoke for 12 to 15 minutes about their work on climate science,
policy, and practice. There are 12 speakers present in the excerpts I analyze:
Brenda: a county representative and local politician and advocate
Johnny: a geologist with a political career in municipal leadership and community
advocacy
Nicole: a toxicologist and university professor
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Theo: the director of research for the regional planning council
David: a state representative
Ellen: an anthropologist and university professor
Rick: a university professor and administrator
Diana: a local floodplain manager
Hank: a university professor and administrator, and active state climate advocate
Steve: a state representative living locally
Mark: a university professor and leading national climate researcher
Recontextualization at Work
It is important to note that the excerpts provided come from a particular discursive
situation: the professional conference. In addition to expressing ideas about climate which mediate
their actions in and toward their environment, the participants, those speaking as well as those in
the audience, are at all times demonstrating their competency in doing a conference. Superdiversity
complicates this, since each participant brings to the situation their many, often competing,
identities and related practices. This bringing over of identities, practices, assumptions, and other
things from one context to another is what Linell (1998), building off the work of Fairclough, calls
recontextualization. Linell goes on to explain:
We can observe a mixing, blending, or blurring of difference voices and interests
(professional and/or lay) in the discourse of particular categories of professionals, in
specific genres of discourse, or within particular texts. Elements from different discourses
and discourse types often partly merge, partly stay on to compete with each other. This is
the phenomenon which Bakhtin terms polyvocality. (p. 150)
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Recontextualization and “the blending of voices” in professional discourse is especially relevant
to the Addressing Climate Change in Tampa Bay conference since each panel involved an
academic, an elected official, and a practitioner, and speakers further identified themselves by their
area of expertise or occupation. In other words, among the conference speakers there were ample
professional boundaries to blur and vocabularies from which to borrow. The audience was
similarly varied, consisting of a range of experts and lay individuals including middle school
students. This promoted further recontextualization, since “professionals must accommodate their
expertise, knowledge, and messages to meet the needs and expectations of people with other
interests and backgrounds” (p. 151).
The conference closely resembled a scientific or academic conference and, as a
communication scholar, I found the format comfortably familiar; like our national and regional
communication conferences, the ACCTB conference consisted of panels with three speakers who
each spoke for 12 to 15 minutes followed by an audience question and answer period. For the most
part, participants followed the conventions associated with the genre of conferencing:
presentations were about their professional work and not their personal lives; speakers prepared
visual aids to accompany their talk, and many made use of graphs, charts, or other means of
visualizing data relationally; audience questions were focused on the content of a presentation or
about a person’s occupation or experience, and were done to elicit information rather than
challenge or attack a presenter’s credibility; speakers were introduced using their professional
titles; presentations were uninterrupted and language choices tended toward the formal register. It
is therefore important to remember that the genre of the professional conference is a mediating
factor in participant’s discursive choices. Even more importantly, as an individual who has already
been socialized into the performance of the professional conference, I must remember that my
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understanding, and thus analysis, is likewise mediated by the conventions of, as well as my
knowledge of, the genre.
Analysis: Constituting Climate in Tampa Bay
In the analysis below, I first argue that “climate change” functions as a shell for the
participants: a semantically empty term which is given substance (filled in) by descriptive clauses
“that usually follow directly or are part of the same text” (Smith, 2005, p. 112; see also, Bartesaghi,
2014; Schmid, 2018). Second, I analyze the discursive resources participants use to fill in the
meaning of climate change.
Climate Change as Shell Term
When I initially worked through the data, what I noticed first was how little participants
actually used the words “climate” or “climate change.” In those instances when participants did
explicitly say “climate change,” it was often as part of an array of terms which described some
observable phenomenon. The first three excerpts I consider are comments made by Brenda (the
county representative) in her presentation during “The Built Environment” panel, Johnny (the
geologist with a political career in municipal leadership) during the “Extreme Events” panel
discussion, and Nicole (the toxicologist and university professor) in her presentation during the
“Public Health and Social Justice” panel.
An extended transcript of Brenda’s comments is included in Appendix E as well as in a
later discussion as Excerpt 6.11. For convenience, I have included the relevant lines to the current
discussion below:
Excerpt 6.1:
31 B: And so, more and more we need to work with natural shorelines, natural wetlands,
32

and our county and our region and our coalition needs to work together to find
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33

solutions to live with the challenges of, of climate change, sea level rise, and

34

extreme weather, and other challenges.

Johnny’s comment is part of a larger exchange between speakers, so I have provided the complete
transcript in Appendix F. The “Extreme Events” panel was the only session conducted entirely as
a discussion, with Hank serving as the facilitator, and Johnny, Diana, and Mark as the panelists.
For convenience, I have included the excerpt I will discuss in this section below.
Excerpt 6.2:
38 J: I suspect that if we took a poll of the audience
39

here, we’d find, some people are concerned about flooding, some are

40

concerned about health, some are concerned about work days, which is

41

great because that’s what we need to address the whole issue of climate

42

change sea level rise.

Nicole’s comment comes from her presentation during the “Public Health and Social Justice”
panel.
Excerpt 6.3:
1

N: Um, hold up, if you have a plastic water bottle in front of you,

2

good, alright, so, um, aside from the fact that this is a, this is a conference on

3

resiliency and ((audience laughter)) um, climate change, and ((audience begins

4

slow clap)) you guys didn’t bring your own water bottles, using water bottles that

5

are made out of plastic and, and, petroleum, uh, so these are persisting compounds

6

that might bio-accumulate and all of the stuff that’s in that plastic actually

7

migrates out of plastic and into the water, not technically while you’re drinking it,

8

but you know, while it’s in the water. So, water is potentially toxic, not right now,
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9

but, you know, potentially. Uh, and so we look at persistent chemicals in action,

10

obviously persistent is a bad thing and we don’t tend to like things that are

11

persistent, and this is affected by climate change, we don’t tend to see a lot of it in

12

Florida, we might see some of it migrating in terms of benthic exposure, but, this

13

is something that would be more important in, um places that have a lot of ice, is

14

because, increasing climate change, increasing temperatures, it’s gonna melt a lot

15

of things that are going to release a lot of persistent chemicals that were

16

previously frozen. However, when that stuff gets released, it will be released into

17

the atmosphere and then technically become available to us, not necessarily a

18

great thing.

In the first two excerpts, “climate change” stands out as the proverbial one-thing-unlike-the-others.
In Brenda’s comment (Excerpt 6.1), both “sea level rise” and “extreme weather” function
descriptively — that is, they can be said to refer to observable environmental phenomena. Sea
level rise refers to one phenomenon in particular — that sea level is rising in relation to land.
Extreme weather describes a collection of atmospheric phenomena such as hurricanes, tornados,
derechos, droughts, flooding, and extreme temperatures. “Climate change” is functioning as what
Smith (2005) calls a shell — a term without a clear referent. Shells allow participants to adjust the
substance of an utterance to fit their specific and local positioning within a given interaction. In
this sense, a shell term’s semantic emptiness can also be understood as semantic flexibility. Here,
though “climate change” is placed among descriptive terms as if it is also descriptive, its meaning
is actually supplied by those terms with which it is listed. What appears to be a list, then, is
functioning to provide semantic content to “climate change.” The inclusion of “and other
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challenges” further opens “climate change” to new and creative arrangements of action and
meaning.
This catch-all phrase, however, simultaneously glosses over the many practices and
possibilities which do the work of climate change, suggesting that “climate change,” just like
“climate” as I discussed in Chapter 2, is a nominalization — a complex, relational process turned
into a noun. Line 11 of Nicole’s presentation, provided in Excerpt 6.3, is another instance where
“climate change” functions nominally. In the phrase “affected by climate change,” a verb process
is collapsed into a noun, in this case in order to constitute a convenient actor to attribute
responsibility. This is problematic, however, because climate change is not actually a thing capable
of bearing responsibility, let alone a thing which we can hold accountable through our conventional
justice system. That “climate change” is a nominalization in these two instances further contributes
to the emptiness of its meaning — when conceived as an object, we constrain our access to the
practices which brought about its existence. Given the diverse occupational and disciplinary
identities represented among the participants, this also potentially masks the polyvocalic character
of the conversation, so that participants may appear to be referencing the same phenomenon
without actually confirming that is the case.
In Brenda’s comment (Excerpt 6.1), the shell content directly follows the use of the shell
term, but in Johnny’s comment (Excerpt 6.2), the shell content is given both before and after the
use of “climate change.” In lines 39 and 40, three “concerns” are listed together as related parts of
a whole, the “whole issue,” of course, being “climate change.” This is what Schmid (2018) calls
the linking function of shells. It could also be thought of as a moment of interdiscursivity
(Fairclough, 2010), since by relating flooding, health, and workdays to climate change, Johnny is
relating the greater discourses of which those terms are a part.
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What I found most notable about Johnny’s comment (Excerpt 6.2), however, was the
phrasing in lines 41-42. Johnny does not refer to climate change and sea level rise as two distinct
phenomena, as other participants did, but rather collapses them into one: “climate change sea level
rise.” This is an odd formulation, as without even so much as a pause between them, there is little
way to tell what is functioning descriptively here. One interpretation is that “climate change” is
denoting a special type of “sea level rise.” Another reading is that “sea level rise” offers additional
meaning to the type of “climate change” which is being referenced. I find the latter interpretation
more probable; “sea level rise” is a less ambiguous phrase than “climate change” given that the
former is (supposedly) observable.
What counts as evidence of “sea level rise” is much less contested than what counts as
evidence of “climate change” — the submersion of what was previously land generally suffices
for evidence that the sea level has risen. Though all practices of observation and measurement are
done in discourse, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter on weather, we can say that providing
evidence of “sea level rise” requires less mediation. If I live near a shoreline, I might be able to
witness the rise in sea level by comparing the height of the water to nearby structures or geological
structures, or the distance of my house to the shoreline; in other words, I can reasonably claim the
sea level has risen through the mediational means of my body and my common sense
understanding of water. To gather evidence of “climate change,” however, I would need to access
complex statistical models, large quantities of data, and have an advanced understanding of science
and mathematics. Both by definition and by conventional practice31, I cannot witness “climate
change” with just my body and knowledge gained through common sense experiences.

31

As Krauss et al. (2018) point out, “climate” is often described as “an abstract scientific concept that is not accessible
to ordinary people, who are imagined as only having immediate access to the ‘weather’” (p. 11). This is similar to
Cox’s (1999) notion of the “indecorous voice”; in environmental discourses, claims mediated by the body’s senses
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The direct pairing of “climate change” and a descriptor was repeated by Nicole in line 14
of Excerpt 6.3, though this time with a distinct pause between “increasing climate change,” and
“increasing temperatures” which I have notated in the transcript with a comma. Once again,
“climate change” cannot stand on its own and is filled in immediately. Without a conjunction or
conjunctive adverb to specify how they are related, “increased temperatures” fills in the meaning
which is missing in “increased climate change,” so they appear to be one and the same. That
“climate change” is semantically empty becomes obvious if we try to actually use the two
interchangeably; “increased temperatures” is not given clarity when described as “increased
climate change.”
Filling in the Meaning of “Climate Change”
In this section I consider how participants use identity and membership categorization to
provide the meaning absent in the “climate change” shell. Membership categorization is a term
introduced by Harvey Sacks to account for the discursive resources and practices — membership
categorization devices (MCD) — speakers utilize to organize (mediate) their world into categories
of related (and unrelated) identities and activities (Sacks, 1995; see also, Baker, 2004; Schegloff,
2007). MCDs are “composed of two parts — first, one or more collection(s) of categories, and,
second, some rules of application” (Schegloff, 2007, p. 467). As Goffman (1965) reminds us,
identity performances are morally laden:
Society is organized on the principle that any individual who possesses certain social
characteristics has a moral right to expect that others will value and treat him in a

are often dismissed in favor of complicated scientific accounts. In the case of climate change this is compounded by
the dominance of global mean temperature as a measurement of climate change, since technically, the mean is a
statistical summary of aggregate data, rather than a temperature which can be observed, and more importantly, felt.
What is more, to determine the global mean temperature, one must have access to enormous quantities of data. Tim,
the opening keynote speaker at the conference, spoke to the problem of global mean temperature, saying if “you’re
worried about your home and sea level rise, you could care less about global mean temperatures. It’s irrelevant.”
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correspondingly appropriate way. Connected with this principle is a second, namely that
an individual who implicitly or explicitly signifies that he has certain social characteristics
ought to have this claim honored by others and ought in fact to be what he claims he is. In
consequence, when an individual…makes an implicit or explicit claim to be a person of a
particular kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon the others, obliging them to
value and treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect. (p. 6)
When a person incorporates some feature of an identity category into their interactions, others
form expectations about how that person will, or should, act based on the normative behaviors
associated with that category. In this way, MCDs mediate our encounter with an individual as with
a particular type of person, therefore mediating my interpretation of that individual’s behaviors
depending on how well they fit my expectation of appropriate category bound activities.
In the welcome address which began the conference, Rick outlined the importance of three
membership categories — scientists, practitioners, and elected officials — to the purpose and
structure of the conference:
Excerpt 6.4:
1 R: The structure of the panels is also unique. Rather than have scientists deliver their
2

latest research, each panel consists of a, of a scientist or conte-, content expert,

3

and a government practitioner who needs to put the science into practice, and an

4

elected official who needs to develop consensus necessary to enable action. So the

5

idea here is to have a discussion about what works and what doesn’t work, and

6

explore ideas on what each of these groups needs from the others.

In the first panel of the day, the “Extreme Events” discussion panel (Appendix F), Hank’s
comments in lines 61-65 (Excerpt 6.5) reiterate the importance of these three categories:
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Excerpt 6.5:
61 H: Thank you. Um, we’re gonna finish up with a, the exercise. One of the
62

themes of doing this is we want to get the three groups of elected officials,

63

scientist experts, the people who have to implement the science and the

64

policy, and we want to have this conversation start, and, what are we

65

doing well, what are we not doing so well.

The structure of the conference generated three collections of categories to which participants
could reasonably claim membership: “scientists,” “practitioners,” and “elected officials.” These
three categories, which another participant referred to as “all three legs of this problem,” are
collections of characterizations which participants can claim and assign, such as
[oceanographer/physician/toxicologist/etc.], [floodplain manager/engineer/director/etc.], and
[state representative/mayor/county commissioner/etc.]. Hank even tells us some of their categorybound activities in lines 63 and 64. Here, Hank asks the panel participants to engage in an
“exercise,” a specific type of practice which Merriam-Webster (n.d.-a) defines as “the act of
bringing into play or realizing in action.” By engaging in the “exercise,” the categories are reified
and fixed to the bodies of the participants, mediating their possible actions, moral worth, and
relationships.
Positioning the Climate Change Cast of Characters
Participants constitute what Roulston (2001) calls the “cast of characters” who can
reasonably be said to enact the discourse of climate change by claiming some identity, or by
assigning category membership to others. By “cast of characters” Roulston refers to the way in
which speakers’ accounts are described as dramatic scenes and heard as moral tales. Characters
“emerge as would roles from a script interpreted by actors” (p. 102); the “cast of characters”
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metaphor can be thought of as the stock characterizations which we expect to populate some
category of scene or activity. The attributes assigned to characters are morally laden and given that
they are assigned, the speaker has the moral high ground — others are characterized through
practices of labeling and reported speech, but the speaker is always characterized in their own
account.
In this exchange, we see how a claim to be some character is simultaneously a claim to
what matters (and by extension, what ought to matter, and how that mattering should come about).
During the “Extreme Events” panel discussion (Appendix F), Diana responds to Hank’s question
“Which climate change issues are the most urgent for Tampa Bay to address now?”:
Excerpt 6.6:
11 D: Well, I’m floodplain manager, so I’m gonna go flood. Flood, followed by
12

water quality, but they really do go hand-in-hand, and, and we really do

13

need to address this at, at statewide level. There needs to be that, you

14

know, that statewide stormwater rule. We need to reevaluate what these systems

15

are being designed, to using better data in the models just like I said

16

before, because when we have better rainfall, better flooding data, we can

17

design better for whatever the water quality parameters are that we’re

18

trying to meet.

When an MCD is activated, “its categories and the common-sense knowledge that can come with
them” are resources which participants can utilize to position themselves in relation to other
participants or the topic at hand (Schegloff, 2007, p. 471). Line 11 demonstrates both aspects of
an MCD: one or more categories and rules for their application. First, Diana claims membership
to a category, which makes relevant other categories assumed to be part of or related to that
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collection. Here, “floodplain manager” implies membership to the collection of categories that
comprise “practitioner,” as well as the related collections of climate actors acknowledged by
Rick and Hank in Excerpts 6.4 and 6.5, “scientist” and “elected official.” Diana demonstrates her
competency in claiming this particular identity by acknowledging, and following, the rules for
deploying that MCD: floodplain managers are first and foremost concerned about flooding.
Therefore, to credibly claim to be floodplain manager, Diana must, to borrow the cliché, “talk
the talk” and “walk the walk” of a floodplain manager. To put this another way, from our
common-sense knowledge about floodplain managers we can assert that the category-bound
activity minimally associated with being a floodplain manager is managing the floodplain.
There is a blatancy to Diana’s response which indexes the expectations we and Hank can
reasonably have of her; because the response so obviously fulfills our expectations of her, we
might wonder in hindsight whether the question even needed asking. This is evident in the order
of her response — she provides her occupational identity before supplying a climate change issue,
suggesting that one inevitably leads to the other. In this way, knowing that Diana is floodplain
manager should be enough to establish her orientation to climate change. It is not, however, enough
to demonstrate that Diana is an expert floodplain manager, so she goes on to provide a moral
accounting of a floodplain manager’s concerns, providing additional practices associated with
performing floodplain manager and explicitly providing what she understands as the
responsibilities associated with that category. Those responsibilities position Diana, as floodplain
manager, within a moral universe of climate actors.
Diana’s bureaucratic identity as floodplain manager lends her deontic status (Stevanovic,
2018); that is, making pronouncements about how the floodplain should be managed, and what is
needed to do so successfully, is consistent with the expectations of her position. Part of the work
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of creating community is materializing, by way of claiming a deontic stance32, possible futures for
that community, but first one must conjure a populace to inhabit said community. Diana
accomplishes this with the use of the pronoun “we” which indicates her own accountability as well
as the existence of others with comparable accountability. “We” can be thought of as a simple, yet
highly efficacious means of identifying with an audience through the use of collective language
(Burke, 1966; Cheney, 1983), or of bringing into being — interpellating (Althusser, 2014) — a
collective subject of which both the speaker and audience are a part.
When speakers give an account, “each ‘actual’ scene is selected from an array of ‘possible’
scenes recognizable as ways in which the world could (or should) be ordered” (Roulston, 2001, p.
103). Category descriptions are unstable in that they are deployed as “an occasioned corpus” rather
than a “fixed array” (p. 111). The “we” needed to support the moral agenda of a floodplain manager
is described in several different ways just in this short utterance: in line 12-13, “we” are described
as being capable of functioning “at statewide level,” perhaps referring to Florida state
policymakers and practitioners, or even more broadly as all Florida citizens and/or constituents; in
lines 14-16, “we” is described in relation to those actions most often associated with scientists, the
generation of data and models; in lines 16-18, “we” shifts to refer to those closer to Diana’s own
characterization, local practitioners like floodplain managers who develop and meet everyday
parameters of acceptable practice. The roles and responsibilities of the “we” mentioned in lines
13-17 lead up to the “we’re” in line 18 which indicates the responsibility of the practitioner in this
deontic account. Each time, this “we” is positioned in relation to Diana, the speaker; when we
32

Building from Stevanovic (2018), but orienting to the concepts from a constitutive rather than cognitive
understanding, I define deontic status as the degree to which claiming a deontic stance is considered consistent with
the social expectations of a person’s identity or positioning within the social order. When a speaker, regardless of
deontic status, expresses a claim about how something ought to be, this is what I consider taking a deontic stance.
Deontic authority, the degree to which a participant in discourse may author how the world ought to be, involves the
cooperation of other participants, and therefore should not be thought of as the sum of deontic status and stance, but
rather the unfolding of deontic status and stance in interaction.
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position ourselves, we necessarily position others in relation to us, placing ourselves at the center
of the moral narrative.
Diana makes her deontic stance clear through her use of the deontic modality “we need to
x.” As Zinken & Ogiermann (2011) demonstrate, in English, “we need to x” is a strategy used “by
speakers who are in the process of initiating an action that has to be, or should be, carried out
collectively by more than one person” (p. 277). In other words, the “we need to x” modality is less
about commencing some particular action now, but about recruiting others to support and enact
particular values moving forward. In this sense, we may surmise that Diana is not so much
advocating for action, but rather attempting to communicate her deontic stance and recruit her
audience to adopt both the values she lays out, as well as her hierarchical ordering of them. In
short, she is a character with a warrant to constitute a preferred moral universe.
Establishing Enoughness
In his work on identity, Blommaert (2013; see also, Blommaert & Rampton, 2011;
Blommaert & Varis, 2013), uses the notion of superdiversity33 to bring attention to the ways in
which social life in the 21st century is variable, mobile, complex, and unpredictable. In other
words, superdiversity acknowledges that a person may be many things, in varying combinations,
simultaneously or situationally, and points to a logic that individuals use to determine which
performances are the most reasonable or appropriate for a given interaction; that logic can be called
enoughness. Enoughness is a continuum of more or less “authentic” (authoritative) performances
of some category; it is a moral evaluation which either corroborates somebody’s performance of a

33

First used by Vertovec (2007) to account for the rapid demographic changes in 21st century London, superdiversity
refers to the seemingly endless possibilities for identifying oneself and others. Blommaert (2013) describes
superdiversity as arising out of “new and more complex forms of migration, and new and more complex forms of
communication and knowledge circulation” which make it increasingly difficult to determine who is “the Other” and
who are “We” by using the tidy binaries which characterized identity politics before the Cold War (p. 5).
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character or invalidates it. A person may be labeled a “novice,” “enthusiast,” “professional,” or
“expert” depending on how many of the associated features of a category they incorporate into
their performance and how competently they are incorporated. The stakes are high should the
person be found out to be a “wannabe” or “fake,” and avoiding such dismissive judgments about
one’s identity is a primary motivating factor in social interaction (Blommaert & Varis, 2013;
Goffman, 1956).
In Excerpt 6.6, Diana accounts for what is expected of a floodplain manager in order to
occupy the moral identity of the character. In Excerpt 6.7 below, Nicole indexes her credibility as
a toxicologist by referencing the complexities associated with performing that identity, especially
those which stem from superdiversity and contradicting roles. I will analyze the portion of this
excerpt concerning “vulnerable populations” in the next section on relating to others. For now, I
am concerned with lines 6-14, in which Nicole refers to an earlier presentation and discussion from
“The Built Environment” panel about carbon emissions due to air conditioning use, and the
recommended guidelines for indoor temperatures in order to minimize emissions without
compromising human well-being.
Excerpt 6.7:
1. N: Vulnerable populations, generally speaking, they’re the same vulnerable
2

populations that you might imagine for everything else. If you are in a lower

3

socioeconomic group, chances are you are more vulnerable to climate change

4

and the effects of everything that you might expect, so you can see here some of

5

the climate drivers, exposure pathways, and various sensitivities. Um, air

6

pollutants and cardio-respiratory diseases, uh, increased temperatures, we talked

7

about air conditioning in some of the earlier discussions. And, yes, Florida is a

153

8

wonderful state, it has gorgeous environmental settings, you’ve got lovely

9

waterfront, lots and lots of things to do outside, and yeah, a lot of mosquitos. And

10

I am not going to say that my air conditioning is set at, uh, 78. I will admit that it

11

is probably lower than that, maybe a lot lower than that ((audience laughter)), not

12

meat locker low, but you know, it’s, it’s lower than that, and so maybe I’ll go

13

home and raise it out of guilt after this, but I’m just gonna say that I may be

14

contributing a little bit to this. Just a little tad…

In lines 6-14 Nicole admits that she “may be contributing a little bit” to climate change with her
everyday practices. This excerpt points to an important aspect of establishing enoughness when
claiming to be a climate actor — the most advanced, most qualified, and most trustworthy climate
change experts are those who can acknowledge that they are complicit in the practices which drive
anthropogenic climate change. As Garrard (2012) notes, casual environmentalists often selfaggrandize and overestimate the impact of their conventional environmentalist behaviors such as
recycling, using reusable shopping bags, straws, and water bottles, avoiding meat and especially
beef, etc. In essence, an environmentalist is someone who is able to maintain the appearance of
caring about and protecting the environment without substantially interrogating the fundamental
assumptions (namely capitalism, consumerism, and anthropocentrism) which underlie their
worldview and do the work of maintaining the status quo.
An authentic environmental expert cannot indulge in such a luxury; an expert in climate
change must confront the ways in which s/he is, at any and all times, contributing to the problem.
Accepting that climate change is happening on a global scale affecting everyone everywhere
necessarily requires me to accept that I, too, am part of that everyone everywhere. Further,
accepting that climate change is, at least in part, caused by the emissions which result from the
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burning of fossil fuels to generate energy to power our everyday practices requires me to
acknowledge that my own everyday practices are implicated as well. A true climate expert, then,
is one who is capable of grasping and wrestling with the tensions that arise from contributing to
climate change with the very practices used to understand and address it. In Nicole’s case, she
demonstrates her expertise by acknowledging how her own practices of cooling her home are
related to the increasing temperatures which are contributing to the spread of diseases which she
studies as a toxicologist.
Compared with the other speakers at the ACCTB conference, Nicole had more moments
that acknowledged contradiction and complexity in her own and other’s identity performances.
For example, in lines 5-7 of Excerpt 6.3, she calls out the people in the room who did not bring
their own reusable water bottles while discussing how toxins can leach out of plastic and into
water34. In this particular moment of the conference, I remember the audience glancing around
nervously to see how many disposable water bottles were sitting on the tables in front of each row
of audience members; I also remember feeling relieved that my own stainless-steel bottle was
perched on the corner of the table in front of me. This was a significant moment, since as many of
the experts in the room presumably knew, reusable personal items have enjoyed a boom over the
last decade as consumers have taken on the burden of responding to climate change. In recent
years, however, critics have warned that replacing or banning single-use plastic products like
drinking straws and plastic bags give us the sense that we are doing more to curb emissions,
toxicity, and pollution than we really are (Stafford & Jones, 2019). Though often criticized as the
proverbial “low-hanging fruit,” in Excerpt 6.3 Nicole uses the ease of carrying a reusable water

34

Given the current pandemic state in which I am writing this dissertation, I feel compelled to reiterate that this
conference happened in October 2019, before the global spread of the Covid-19 virus and the subsequent
discouragement of refilling personal water bottles in public spaces.
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bottle to question participants’ enoughness. It seems, then, that experts do not only interrogate the
ways in which they themselves are complicit, but also the ways in which those they interact with
are also complicit.
It is worth noting that the “Public Health and Social Justice” panel stretched the format of
the conference — panels consisting of a scientist expert, an elected policymaker, and a local
practitioner — more than any of the other panels. All three speakers on the “Public Health and
Social Justice” panel were university professors, though one had served as a state health
commissioner in a different Eastern state before moving to Tampa. Public health and social justice
are not as normatively associated with climate change as, say, a floodplain manager or someone
who can claim another scientific discipline such as meteorology, climatology, or geology. Because
of this, participants had to do more positioning to establish themselves as climate change content
experts. Ellen, the final speaker of the “Public Health and Social Justice” panel, accounted for her
role in the conference since she belongs to a disciplinary field not normatively associated with
climate change:
Excerpt 6.8:
1 E: Um, one of the, the sort of key insights that I feel like uh, my field of
2

anthropology um, as well as social science, brings to this discussion is, um,

3

acknowledging that climate change is at its core, a fundamentally social problem.

4

And it requires restructuring of economies and ecologies in more equitable and

5

sustainable ways. And, um, this is really the, the social justice aspect of what, uh,

6

the, the focus, I think our, a recurring theme in this panel is. Um, and so I think

7

for that reason social sciences and also humanities really needs to be an integral

8

part of the conversation about, um, not just thinking about impacts, but how do
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9

people experience, uh, cli-, climate change now in their everyday lives, what are

10

the stories that they wanna tell, and also thinking about uh, the sorts of futures we

11

want to envision. So, uh, I, I think one of the things we’ve learned today is that

12

there are many possible futures that we, um, and our children and grandchildren

13

may experience as a result of the changes that are already taking place. Uh, so

14

what can we do about that?

The first thing which immediately strikes me is how Ellen does not explicitly claim a category as
an identity; that is, she does not say “I’m an anthropologist” in the same way that Diana says “I’m
floodplain manager.” Instead, she refers to her “field of anthropology,” which implies she is an
anthropologist but with somewhat less accountability. Given the predominance of the so-called
“natural sciences” in the discourse of climate change (Hulme, 2017), “anthropologist” is perhaps
not an immediately recognizable category of climate scientist, so in line 2 Ellen positions her field
of anthropology as related to “social science.” In the second half of line 2 she reinforces her moral
worth by claiming she is contributing to “this discussion.”
In line 3, the meaning of “climate change” is filled in according to anthropology and social
science. Here, climate change is “a fundamentally social problem,” which stands in contrast to
many of the other meanings (i.e., “flood,” “sea level rise,” “extreme heat,” etc.) assigned to climate
change throughout the conference. Ellen seems aware that her characterization of herself and of
climate change stands in contrast to her fellow scientists, which is evident in her choice of words
in line 3. She does not say “climate change is a fundamentally social problem,” which would have
been consistent with the MCD she implies in line 2. Instead, she says “climate change is at its core,
a fundamentally social problem,” doubling the importance of the social aspect of climate change
while simultaneously leaving room for other resulting or peripheral climate change concerns.
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Climate change involves things like flooding and extreme heat, but these phenomena are not what
climate change is.
The rest of her comment sets out to prove that climate change is, first and foremost, a social
problem, and that she and her fellow experts in the social sciences and humanities are not only
relevant but “integral” to the climate change discourse. One way she demonstrates that she is
enough of a climate change expert is by using professional language in lines 4-5: “restructuring,”
“economies,” “ecologies,” “equitable,” “sustainable.” Aside from lending a certain prosody to the
statement since each of these terms is heard in four syllables, these terms are buzz words, jargon
which index Ellen’s education and professionalism. In other words, this sentence tells the audience
how to interpret the credibility of Ellen’s claims, rather than how to interpret the meaning of her
claims. The audience does not need much help interpreting the meaning of her claims, as her
argument is quite simple — people experience climate change, therefore climate change is a social
problem.
Of course, Ellen’s positioning of herself as a climate change expert is more about
acknowledging the departure of her presentation from the norm in order to ease the audience’s
tension over not being able to place her within the provided format of the conference, rather than
actually convincing her audience that she belongs. Just as the conference format compels her to
account for her presence, it also establishes her credibility since she was invited by the conference
organizers to participate in it. While to my memory she was the only speaker to explicitly call for
the integration of social sciences and humanities in climate change research, the fact that the
conference was structured to include a “Public Health and Social Justice” panel that featured a
social scientist suggests that, at a minimum, the members of the USF STEM Collaborative who
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hosted the conference already agree that climate change is (at least to some extent) a social
problem.
Relating to Others
So far, I have provided examples of how participants categorized themselves as climate
actors in order to relate themselves and their work to climate change and demonstrate their moral
value. However, the moral universe cannot solely be populated by climate actors — if this were
the case there would be no need for identification as such. Therefore, there must be other
collections of categories which the presence of climate actors makes relevant. Though not
explicitly named at the conference, a few participants alluded to a category which we might call
climate dissenters — those that provide an obstacle for the morally superior climate actors. Take,
for instance, this excerpt from David’s closing keynote address:
Excerpt 6.9:
1

D: And, um, there was a, a moment there where I thought, wow there’s going to be

2

some real political leadership at the state level! And then of course, um, there was

3

a change in the administration, uh, Rick Scott got in as part of the Tea Party wave,

4

and um, there was just this dramatic shift, I mean we really felt it, away from any

5

type of leadership or public discussion on this issue.

This excerpt constitutes a sort of us-against-them moral universe. Rick Scott is assigned as
belonging to the “Tea Party wave,” and with this categorization comes common-sense knowledge
about the membership category “Tea Party.” David establishes Rick Scott and the Tea Party as
oppositional to him and his fellow climate actors through a linear sequence of events which allows
the audience to infer causality. In line 4, the us-against-them arrangement is reinforced with the
statement “we really felt it.” Here, “we” is used to generate affiliation and interpellate a group of
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sympathetic colleagues, many of whom were even present at the conference, as was evident from
the many anecdotes shared throughout the day’s presentations and discussions. Like characters in
a drama, the climate actors are given a proper nemesis with whom they can engage in heroic
struggle.
An obstacle or nemesis is not all that is needed to populate the moral universe of climate
actors — some group(s) must be established who will benefit from the climate actors’ heroic
actions. For the participants at the conference, this group is “vulnerable populations.” Let us return
to Nicole’s comments in lines 1-5 of Excerpt 6.7. Lines 1 and 2 reify the “vulnerable populations”
category as relevant both to and beyond climate change. “Vulnerable populations” are routinely
on the receiving end of concern and assistance, since vulnerability, as a relational concept (Turner,
2016), places people and things on a spectrum of risk. What is more, this spectrum is morally laden
— those least at risk and most well-positioned to act (i.e., climate actors) have an obligation to
help those who are most at risk and are not well-positioned to act on their own behalf (i.e.,
vulnerable populations). The rules of applying the “vulnerable population” membership category
are given in line 3 — to be considered part of the vulnerable population, one must be a member of
a “lower socioeconomic group.” The risks to which their lack of socioeconomic capital makes
them vulnerable are given in lines 6 and 7.
Importantly, the relationship between climate actors and vulnerable populations is highly
imbalanced — vulnerable populations do not speak, but rather are spoken for. They are the
“indecorous voices” which Cox (1999) identifies as being silenced in environmental discourses by
those with greater institutional status and access. In this way, vulnerable populations are not so
much collections of people as they are objects — objects of study, of governance, of concern. This
becomes more obvious once we consider that humans are not the only groups that can be
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vulnerable — spaces can also be vulnerable, as Steve, the university professor and landscape
architect, demonstrated in his presentation during “The Built Environment” panel:
Excerpt 6.10:
1 S: We’ve made fixed systems in vulnerable areas, and we’re not, you can’t just lift
2

those out of the zone, right? So we are vulnerable in certain spots. So, I think

3

what we need to do is, uh, think about the system overall and how we can adapt,

4

uh, that as a system.

From this we can infer that vulnerable populations are not only those “in a lower socioeconomic
group” as Nicole told us in Excerpt 6.7, but those who occupy vulnerable areas. This is significant
because it lays the foundation for actions which would seek to control “vulnerable areas” and the
bodies which occupy them. As Steve says in lines 1-2, “fixed systems” are those aspects of the
built environment which we rely on for day-to-day functioning, and which are materially bound to
their location — they cannot simply be lifted out of the “vulnerable areas.” Actions which would
control the vulnerability of an area, then, might instead be directed to the bodies which occupy that
space since bodies are much more mobile than power grids, bridges, and floodplains. Actions, such
as that described by Brenda in her presentation on the regional “Resiliency Coalition”:
Excerpt 6.11:
1 B: And finally, in Pasco County, a community on the Anclote River has experienced
2

extensive repetitive flooding. The County obtained a HUD grant to support a

3

voluntary buy-out program for the low and mod-, moderate income homeowners.

4

And they are converting the land to green space.

Here, we can infer that the “community on the Anclote River” occupies a vulnerable area, since
flooding is a description of climate change given by the participants, and that the flooding has been
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“extensive” and “repetitive” indicates that the area is especially at risk. We are given additional
characterizing details in line 3 that the occupants of this community are “low and moderate income
homeowners,” which would seem to fit the description of vulnerable populations given by Nicole.
In Brenda’s account, qualifying as a vulnerable area and a vulnerable population justifies control
of that area and population: a “buy-out program” which has led to the converting of what was
previously an inhabited community to “green space.” We are told this buy-out program was
“voluntary,” but the implied vulnerability of the community and the space suggests that being
bought-out is the only reasonable course of action. To put this another way, that we are told it was
“voluntary” does not negate the way in which vulnerability was used to justify control. Rather, it
suggests that vulnerability is so accepted as a justification for government control that there are
even grants available from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for doing so.
The top-down, compulsory aspect of this program becomes more obvious if we imagine
the choice behind the voluntary participation; as a homeowner in an area that experiences extreme
and repetitive flooding, you are putting both yourself and the county at risk; the county, aware of
this flooding, has deemed the community to be vulnerable, and is both obligated to provide
assistance to the vulnerable population and compelled to reduce the vulnerability which is a drain
on its resources; in labeling the area as vulnerable, they render the area as being of minimal value,
and great potential cost, to the county, and therefore will no longer support residential occupation
of the area; faced with either a loss of county resources or a county buy-out of established
vulnerable property, residents have more to gain from a financial buy-out than they do from
continued occupation. The choice is not so “voluntary,” then, when identification as “vulnerable”
paradoxically positions bodies as needing assistance, yet as only minimally worthy of that
assistance and completely incapable of helping (let alone speaking for) themselves. Just as climate
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actors are morally obligated to provide assistance to vulnerable populations, vulnerable
populations, by virtue of their dearth of socioeconomic capital, cannot be overly choosy and must
take what they get.
The (in)voluntary nature of the buy-out program is further evidenced by the assertion in
line 4, “And they are converting the land to green space.” We can assume the “they” taking this
action are the heroes of our moral universe, the climate actors. Their action is ongoing, given that
it is stated in the present continuous tense (“are converting”). That is, regardless of what voluntary
decisions were made, the land is being converted. Additionally, they are converting it to “green
space,” which can only be temporarily occupied by human bodies and not permanently inhabited.
Green space is described by the Environmental Protection Agency (n.d.) as a category of open
space, which can be “any open piece of land that is undeveloped (has no buildings or other built
structures) and is accessible to the public.” Specifically, green space is “land that is partly or
completely covered with grass, trees shrubs, or other vegetation” such as “parks” and “community
gardens.” So, without knowing how many residents voluntarily participated in the buy-out
program, we are told that the space is already being transformed from a residential space to a green
space, a transformation which necessitates the elimination of all human inhabitants and any
indication of previous permanent residential occupation. Claiming the presence of “vulnerable
populations” and “vulnerable areas” not only justifies, but compels, acts of control by those who
are seen to possess greater socioeconomic capital, and therefore greater deontic status.
Relating to Environment
In addition to identifying their environment as “vulnerable areas,” participants drew on
normative categories of environmental characters, such as “nature” and “wildlife.” Returning to
Brenda’s comments in Appendix E and Excerpt 6.1, it is evident that the traditional human-nature
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dichotomy underlies her relationship to environment. I have included selections from the same
moment from Brenda’s presentation during “The Built Environment” panel in Excerpt 6.12 below:
Excerpt 6.12:
1 B: Filling wetlands is another sin of the past that we have to deal with now. Filling
2

wetlands, even when we mitigate that, the, uh, those, that filling, which in, in

3

Hillsborough County we’re, we’re lucky to have that Environmental Protection

4

Commission that looks over our wetlands very closely, but still, um, we have a

5

history of, of being allowed to mitigate wetland impacts, and that’s been

6

problematic because our fish, we’re learning more and more. Our official

7

wetlands and stormwater retention systems are just never as effective as natural

8

systems in natural wetland systems.

(data omitted)
21

Um, hardened shorelines, a lot of cor-, coasts of

22

course do not get the protection from flooding and wave damage that natural

23

shorelines give us, and so we’re now realizing that we need to work with nature as

24

much as possible, rather than fighting against it.

Though her comments do position “nature” as something apart from humans, drawing upon the
nature/culture binary I discussed in detail in Chapter 2, they represent a shift in how Floridians
interact with their environment. Up until the mid- to late-twentieth century, environmental
interventions were developed to control unwanted environmental impacts with human
engineering. As Brenda mentioned, filling wetlands was common, as was building canals, dams,
and sea walls, paving surfaces to prevent erosion, and using chemicals to eliminate pests.
Importantly, the primary motivation and concern was to improve human comfort — any harmful

164

effects on the environment were outweighed by the potential to improve human quality of life.
Since Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring brought awareness to chemical pollution and the adoption of
environmental protection laws in the 1970s, many of our past “solutions” are no longer an option,
as Nicole pointed out with a story about how Florida eliminated malaria in the past:
Excerpt 6.13:
1 Nicole:

At one point, we had malaria in Florida. It was, we were, uh,

2

building, railroads and it was sort of, you know, pre-air

3

conditioning days. How did we get rid of malaria in Florida? Does

4

anyone know?

5 Audience: Drain the swamps?
6

N: Well that was one way.

7

A: Vaccination?

8

N: No.

9

A: ((overlapping unintelligible suggestions))

10

N: Poured kerosene in the canals and then lit them on fire.

11

A:

12

N: We did-, and it was the, that was how they got rid of the mosquito

13

larvae. So it’s not something that’s gonna pass muster with the

14

EPA, you know, if malaria marches north into Florida again, it’s

15

not something that we’re gonna be able to do. But, I’m just sayin’,

16

it’s, you know, that’s how they dealt with it before…

((laughter, shocked gasps))

In the beginning of this excerpt, Nicole uses the pronoun “we” to collectively refer to the
inhabitants of Florida, past and present. It is not Nicole and the other conference goers who are
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building railroads, but rather the historic and hypothetical humans occupying Florida during the
mid- to late-nineteenth century. Later in the excerpt, in lines 12-16, she uses “they” to refer to
those historical actors not constrained by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and “we”
to refer to the actors in the present day who are very constrained by the EPA and other national,
state, and local regulations and regulating bodies. The “we” doing the action in line 15 includes
herself and presumably the other representatives of the three main categories of climate actors at
the conference.
Malaria, the disease caused by a parasite and spread by female mosquitos, is
anthropomorphized in line 14 with the militaristic phrase “marches north.” Nicole presents a
scenario where we are facing battle with our hands tied; we know of, and have even implemented,
a solution which will work to eradicate malaria, but through various institutionalized efforts, that
solution is no longer viable. Lines 15-16, however, suggest that Nicole’s orientation is a
contradictory one for a toxicologist to take — it seems she is suggesting that pouring a toxic
chemical into waterways is acceptable to her if it eliminates malaria.
This appears incommensurable with Brenda’s attempt to recruit us to “work with
nature…rather than fighting against it” (Excerpt 6.12, lines 23-24), unless we consider that
“nature” can further be categorized, and therefore, moralized. We could say, then, that living
shorelines represent good nature — environmental phenomena, ecologies, and lifeforms which
help human lives and interests — whereas malaria represents bad nature — environmental
phenomena, ecologies, and lifeforms which harm or threaten human lives and interests. In this
way, it is possible for Brenda and Nicole’s claims to exist coherently in the same moral universe
— the environment is something we can learn from, as well as something we must occasionally
battle.

166

A third way of positioning environment, also presented by Nicole during the “Public Health
and Social Justice” panel, is similar to the positioning of “vulnerable populations” I discussed in
the previous subsection of analysis. Though most speakers talked about the effects of climate
change primarily in terms of those felt by humans, in Excerpt 6.14 below, Nicole considers the
effects of climate change on “wildlife”:
Excerpt 6.14:
1 N: ((sighs)) Everything that affects people, affects wildlife. Uh, the only difference is
2

wildlife doesn’t get to go inside and close their door and turn on the air

3

conditioning and say, “okay, so, that was, you know I had a really bad day today,

4

but now I can sit inside in the air conditioning.” They don’t get to get away from

5

anything, their ecosystems are altered, and they’re stuck with it.

In this moment, Nicole attempts to relate the problems faced by humans to the problems faced by
wildlife, perhaps in an attempt to make the plight of wildlife matter to a human audience. Doing
so blurs the division between humans and wildlife, and points toward the central assumption of
the Terrestrial project — that species, beings, and materials of all sorts must find ways of inhabiting
the habitable areas of the planet together. The audible sigh with which Nicole transitions from the
topic of allergenicity to the topic of wildlife betrays their dismal circumstances, and the weariness
with which she approaches the topic suggests that the future for wildlife is bleak.
In lines 3-4, she speaks for wildlife in a moment of ventriloquism, making wildlife speak
to us so that we can speak in response (Cooren, 2014). Of course, this moment of hypothetical
reported speech is an illustration of what is not said; the implication being that this statement is
one which would in fact be said by a human, not wildlife. I would argue that this hypothetical
speech is not one that would really be said by anyone — rather, it is a moral account of what is
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taken for granted. This moment of speaking for wildlife is reminiscent of the discussions about
“vulnerable populations.” Like the community along the Anclote River, wildlife does not
collaborate in developing the solutions to their problems; given cultural assumptions about the
value of human lives compared to that of wildlife, their needs are secondary to ours. Given the
many human needs expressed throughout the conference which would therefore take precedence,
it seems wildlife are indeed “stuck with it” since they lack the ability to speak or act on their own
behalf.
Discussion: Climate Change as a Moral Imperative
In this chapter I have demonstrated how the participants at the “Science, Strategies and
Solutions: Addressing Climate Change in Tampa Bay” conference used the semantic emptiness of
“climate change” to position themselves and others within a moral universe. Morality is tied to
expectations, as Goffman (1956) tells us, about how we should act and how others should respond
to our actions. As such, the characters at the climate conference have expectations they must fulfill
not only through their actions, but through their accounts of their actions. Characterizations, like
“policymaker,” “practitioner,” and “scientist,” are used to serve morality claims (Roulston, 2001).
That is, they position actors within a coherent narrative, one in which actions have reasons,
meanings, and consequences, characters have goals to achieve or fail at, and moral attributes can
be assigned to characters depending on how well they fulfill their purpose and drive the plot, so to
speak. It follows, then, that not all actions are equally valued or appropriate.
The urgency of climate change amplifies the need for speakers to account for their actions
in order to prove they are not wasting time that could be spent doing something better. Of course,
what is better is determined through communication, as I will show with a few additional excerpts
from the ACCTB conference. First, however, I need to make the argument that in the moral
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universe created by the participants, contributing meaningfully to the discourse of climate change
is a moral imperative. One way participants alluded to this moral imperative was by sharing
anecdotes which illustrated undesirable contributions, such as in Steve’s (the state legislator) story
about an alleged informal ban on using the term “climate change” in official state business:
Excerpt 6.15:
1

S: My suspicion is that there was some directive from the governor’s office to

2

state agencies not to even use the word climate change in public testimony or in

3

public documents. There was even this little snippet of a committee meeting in

4

Tallahassee where there was, I think was then secretary of the DEP almost said

5

the words climate change and then sort of stopped himself and it briefly went viral

6

in a really bad way. One of those ways that makes you feel bad about Florida, you

7

know, Flori-duh, you know, here we can’t even talk about an issue that is

8

obviously going to impact us in so many profound ways.

This anecdote is likely referencing a video of the Florida Emergency Management Chief Bryan
Koon testifying before the state Senate’s budget subcommittee in 2015, in which he is pressed by
senators to use the term “climate change” but repeatedly finds ways to respond without doing so
until the chamber dissolves into laughter (Krueger, 2015). However, it is more likely that Steve’s
anecdote is an amalgamation of moments, since around the same time of the video’s viral
circulation on social media and news outlets, there was a report from the Florida Center for
Investigative Reporting which quoted former employees of the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection who claimed internal state communications had instructed the agency
not to use the term “climate change” beginning in 2011 when Rick Scott took office as state
governor (Korten, 2015). What this suggests is that Steve is not giving this account for the purpose
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of informing us about the particular details of an event, but rather to provide a cautionary tale in
which Florida ought to be ashamed. Talking openly about climate change, then, is the minimum
we should expect of ourselves if we wish to be valuable members of the moral universe.
Talking, however, is not enough to be a valuable climate actor, as Brenda explained in her
presentation during “The Built Environment” panel:
Excerpt 6.16:
1

B: We need to plan, but we need to do. We need to keep start-, doing as we’re

2

planning. We can’t wait for the plan to be all done. Um, because, at, at the end

3

of the day, the, the plan we’re gonna keep learning as we go. We need to iterate

4

on what we do, and that will contribute to the plan, and then we keep planning

5

and then we keep doing. So, it’s, it’s planning and doing.

Here Brenda reifies two possible meta-categories for climate action: “planning” and “doing.” In
particular, she attempts to reorient to “planning” — usually talk about collective future action
which is a prerequisite of reasonable collective action — as not sequential to doing collective
action, but simultaneous and mutually reinforcing. “Planning” is presented as an epistemic activity,
and “doing” as an ontological one; the problem with this arrangement is that it rests on the
assumption that generating an idea has less material impact than implementing it in practice. Kuhn
et al. (2017) refute this assumption, however, demonstrating that even something as ephemeral as
an idea can be followed by attending to the ways in which it is materialized in discourse.
The division between planning and doing, then, is a moral creation of Brenda’s and the
other participants, many of whom expressed similar calls to action. In this way, it seems that
Brenda is explaining the relationship between “planning” and “doing” in order to make some other
point about the current situation, perhaps positioning climate change as an ongoing crisis. In line
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2 Brenda insists “we can’t wait,” lending an air of urgency to her attempt to recruit participants in
her moral project with the “we need to x” formula (Zinken & Ogiermann, 2011). Returning to my
argument that the climate change discourse functions as a moral imperative, the conclusion I draw
from Brenda’s remarks is that a climate actor’s work is never done.
Brenda’s comments in Excerpt 6.16 and Ellen’s question “what can we do about that?” at
the end of Excerpt 6.8 gave me the impression that for the participants, talk about climate change
is less productive than doing something about climate change. What I have shown in this analysis
is that this is absolutely untrue — talk about climate change allowed participants to build and
populate a moral universe, position themselves and others within that universe, and carry out
actions from their moral positioning. When considering that climate is a cultural abstraction
(Hulme, 2017), talk becomes even more consequential — climate does not objectively exist, it is
made to matter in communication and only exists in communication. The participant’s apparent
belief that talk is less valuable than action rests on the warrant talk is not doing, and this reasoning
crumbles when approached from a constitutive orientation in which talk is one of the mediational
means we have for constituting experience. After all, from a constitutive orientation, talk is doing,
and so their apparent difference collapses.
It is necessary to mention, however, that the format of the conference itself is a mediating
factor in how participants were able, and compelled, to constitute climate change. The conference
itself was set up to offer a loose regional agenda for addressing climate change. This is evident in
the many, many uses of the “we need to x” deontic modality as well as the subtitle of the conference
itself, “Addressing Climate Change in Tampa Bay.” In this way, participants are likely orienting
to climate change as a moral imperative because the conference itself compels them to do so.
Further, participants may have seemed to value doing over talking because they and the conference
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participants were participating/had just participated in an entire day full of talking. Clearly, the
conference participants are good at talking (and listening) about climate change, and therefore they
do not need to be persuaded to engage in such an activity. Applying what is talked about in other
settings, what Brenda calls doing and I have called resemiotizing, would require further action
outside of the spatiotemporal boundaries of the conference, and therefore participants might
require more encouragement or instruction.
Talk makes identities, actions, and relationships material, and as such will always be
consequential. As I have demonstrated, participants’ identities, as well as the identities they cast
upon others, have moral significance. This is especially evident in the “vulnerable populations”
identity group. Compared to other identity categories provided by the participants — “elected
official,” “scientist,” “practitioner” — which are all occupationally defined, “vulnerable
populations” constitutes members based upon their relationship to risk and gives the impression
that their positioning in relation to risk is foundational to their character, somehow inherent to their
being. Essentially, “vulnerable populations” constitutes a population along the morally coded
continuum of vulnerability/resiliency, where “vulnerability” is less desirable than “resiliency.”
Labeling an entire group as synonymous with the negative end of this moral continuum renders
their very existence problematic; as such, “vulnerable populations” must always be a target of
change when designing a “resilient” environment. Therefore, “vulnerable populations” are
inherently undesirable. A better practice would be to refer to these groups based on their role (e.g.,
“residents”) or their specific positioning (i.e., neighborhood names) in an environment, so that the
identity categories are both more equivalent and more morally just.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined how speakers use practices of membership categorization to
mediate their relationship to their environment. Next, I consider the implications of the means of
mediating environment I have discussed in this chapter as well as the previous analytical chapters
on land and weather. I have shown that environment is communicatively constituted —
environmental phenomena are sociomaterial and emerge from a relational ontology. The most
pragmatic contribution of this chapter is the notion of the shell as a creative resource. As Byers
(2011) aptly observes, “The unknown is the matrix out of which creativity is born” (p. 15). Because
“climate change” is semantically empty, speakers must supply the substance of the term in the
context of their claims, either by offering descriptions or using other discursive resources, such as
membership categorization.
While it may seem that calling “climate change” a shell is a cynical stance, I find it rather
hopeful — if “climate change” really is semantically empty, then to align with it speakers need
only make the case, like Ellen (the anthropologist) does in Excerpt 6.8. It may once have seemed
out of place to consult an anthropologist about climate change, but she is able to both establish
herself as a climate actor and substantiate climate change with the common-sense knowledges of
her field because climate change no longer has a consistent referent. The shell function of “climate
change” makes it possible to create novel arrangements of actors and actions related to climate
change, especially those which may seem entirely disparate due to organizational and bureaucratic
boundaries. In Chapter 6, I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of what it means (to the
communication discipline and beyond) to say that environment is communicatively constituted.
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CHAPTER SIX:
CONLUSION

Looking back, I cannot think of a more fitting dissertation to write during 2020, the year
in which the pandemic laid bare our interdependencies, bringing to light just how entangled and
sociomaterial our worlds really are. In many ways, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the
public’s awakening to what the literature has been saying for nearly two decades — we can no
longer ignore the relational ontology which is the nature of being, what Moore (2015) calls the
web of life. Consider the following headlines from the beginning of the pandemic last spring:
•

“The pandemic is exposing the vulnerabilities of the U.S. service economy” – The
Washington Post (Kucik & Leister, 2020)

•

“Will the coronavirus end globalization as we know it?” – Foreign Affairs (Farrell
& Newman, 2020)

•

“COVID-19 pandemic exposes global ‘frailties and inequalities’” – UN News
(Kaizer, 2020)

The year 2021 has already provided its own wakeup call: a major cold snap and snowfall across
Texas and the southern Midwest states led to deadly blackouts, demonstrating how fragile our
infrastructure is to the extreme weather brought about by climate change35 (Freedman, 2021).

35

Even more disturbing, in 2011 Texas experienced a cold snap that caused issues with the electrical grid that led to
an investigation and the subsequent recommendation for improvements to “weatherize” the grid; those
recommendations were deemed too expensive and were abandoned (Freedman, 2021). Despite initial media coverage
asserting the “unprecedented” winter weather, others were quick to point out that the cold snap, while uncommon,
was actually well within the boundaries of what we might consider “normal” for the climate (Titley, 2021).
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The boundaries we have worked for centuries to maintain are crumbling, and we can no longer
afford to turn away from the tangled mess in which we find ourselves.
Much of this document was written while the world was on lockdown. In between bursts
of writing or seemingly endless hours of reading and notetaking, I went walking, usually along the
Tampa Riverwalk which runs along the Hillsborough River. I have been walking along the
Hillsborough River for a couple of years now, but this year was the first time I saw manatees,
dolphins, spotted eagle rays, alligators, and other aquatic life in the river so close to downtown
Tampa and Port Tampa Bay, Florida’s largest port in both size and cargo freight processed. The
normal day-to-day river traffic had stopped (especially in the early days of the pandemic when fear
was high and lockdowns strict) and in the absence of river taxis, recreational boaters, and other
traffic, aquatic life flourished.
Once, I was so excited about seeing a pair of spotted eagle rays that I pointed them out to
a passerby. I said something about how it was amazing seeing all the wildlife come out during the
lockdown, and he replied, “They’re always there, we just don’t always look for them.” Reflecting
on this, I think we are both a little right. They are always there, if by “there” we mean existence,
but our practices push out those who might use the space for other purposes beyond our own; so
yes, the rays and manatees and gators are always in the Hillsborough River somewhere, but it was
not until we got out of the way that they could be there, between the Fortune Taylor and Cass
Street bridges, just beyond the massive Interstate 275 bridges, and right by tourist destinations that
would normally keep the area so busy.
What impresses me about this experience is that we did not have to tear down our
infrastructure and “re-wild” the river — we only had to change our practices and make room for
other forms of life and existence. There were still cars on the roads and bridges, people on the
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sidewalks and multiuse paths, boats on the river and in the channel, planes and helicopters in the
sky, and so forth, just in much less quantity than before. Sure enough, as the lockdowns lifted the
people of Tampa returned to their lives, or increasingly took to the outdoors to escape the boredom
of quarantine living, and as my sightings of boats, cars, and people increased, my sightings of
aquatic life became less and less frequent. While I do not offer this anecdote to try and establish
causation36, I cannot help but find it informative and perhaps even a bit hopeful. The anthropause
happened “almost overnight, with barely a whimper of political opposition,” and, while the
primary goal was to stop the transmission of the COVID-19 virus, Jasanoff (2020) points out that
“nation states enacted many of the recommendations that climate change activists had been
proposing for years” (p. 340). Given enough motivation, we are capable of creating rapid global
transformation of our practices.
Our practices have indeed rapidly changed since Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th
president of the United States. Within a matter of months, U.S. environmental policy reverted to
an orientation reminiscent of that which characterized the Obama administration. On November
4, 2019, the U.S. formally left the Paris Agreement; on February 19, 2021, under the leadership of
the Biden administration, the U.S. formally rejoined the international agreement (Chemnick,
2021). At the beginning of January of this year, Trump’s Environmental Protection Agency passed
a rule which limited the types of human-subjects research data the agency could use to develop its
policies (Timmer, 2021); less than a month later, after the Biden administration requested a review
of the rule, a federal judge vacated it (Eilperin, 2021). Under the Trump administration in 2019
alone “the BLM sold over 480,000 acres of land for oil and gas leasing…the most sold in one year

36

Rutz et al. (2020) note that research on the anthropause is mostly anecdotal, as it will take some time for researchers
to sift through and analyze the data collected during the months of lockdown in order to make claims about the
relationship between human practices and the practices and health of those other Terrestrial beings trying to inhabit
the same spaces.
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since 2006” (Will, 2021); on January 27, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 14008 on
“Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad” (86 FR 7619), halting the sale of oil and gas
leasing on public lands and offshore waters. Each of these changes has mediated our orientation
to and interaction with environment in particular ways, allowing the possibility of some actions
while constraining others, and the consequences each time are enormous and far-reaching. In this
chapter, I reflect on my analyses and the implications of this project for the communication
discipline and related transdisciplinary literature.
Materiality
My initial reflections on whether I have accounted for the agency of the Earth in our
constitution of environment were that I have not done so significantly. My next reaction was to
realize that I was making this judgment along the human/nature binary by privileging the
materiality of “natural” agents over “human-made” materiality. Taking a relational ontology
seriously means this dividing line cannot matter — that is, the nature of entanglement is such that
the doings of beings cannot be distinguished, let alone morally evaluated, on the basis of
humanness. Something I struggled with in analysis was how, over and over, I searched for Earthly
agents, and over and over, I found our discursive materializations of those Earthly agents.
Still, entextualized and recontextualized iterations of environment are themselves matter
that matters. As Shove (2017) tells us, “things which are mobilized in practice are not merely
‘used.’ Rather, such things are implicated in defining the practice itself” (p. 159). Maps, satellite
images, computer models, legal statute, and other agents of mediation enable us to interact in some
ways and not others, shaping what we know and how we come to know it. Schatzki (2002)
summarizes this by saying “human coexistence thus transpires as and amid an elaborate, constantly
evolving nexus of arranged things and organized activities” (p. xi). Materials acquire and enact
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agency in interaction, and the consequences of how this agency is mobilized are no less real
whether that action is attributed to a map or a mountain.
Perhaps there is a limit to the discursive participation of Earthly agents since, after all,
discourse is primarily conducted for the benefit of humans. As a consequence of our globalized
lives and distanced worldviews, we can now be co-present with geological formations thousands
of miles away, our interaction mediated through photographs or videos. I can mourn the loss of
Cedar Mesa from Bears Ears National Monument without leaving Florida or ever having been to
Southern Utah because I have interacted with its multimodal incarnations. The possibilities for
relating and interacting across boundaries seem endless when we abandon our moral preference
for idealized “authentic” encounters; after all, the continuum of enoughness by which we assign
authenticity is slippery, subjective, and highly moralized (Blommaert & Varis, 2013). Perhaps this
is the paradigm shift we need in the digital age, to abandon the moral hierarchy of material
encounters, taking a multimodal orientation which acknowledges that various modes and means
of mediating material encounters offer varying affordances and constraints. While I think paying
attention to Earthly agents is important, I think that noticing their absence from our discursive
practices is as important as finding it. This tells us something about how we do anthropocentrism
— we do it by reducing Earthly agents to objects we can manipulate and materialize how we like,
and this happens in discourse. If we know certain practices are indicative of an anthropocentric
orientation, then we have somewhere to start.
Transdisciplinary Contribution
One of the most rewarding and generative, as well as frustrating and difficult, aspects of
this project was the transdisciplinary scope of the research. As I attempted to fill the gaps in
communication literature, I discovered handfuls of scholars in various other disciplines and
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subdisciplines working toward the same goal and arriving at the same conclusion. Working from
a starting premise of relationality and sociomateriality, they attempt to account for ideas of
materiality and agency in the subject matter of their discipline and end up with similar conclusions
that a paradigm shift is needed because our current one will surely implode imminently. Of course,
this is a generalized narration of a diverse body of work, much of which I suspect I have not yet
encountered personally.
Each time I was stuck during writing or analysis, I would stumble upon a thread of research
from another discipline: critical legal geography, science and technology studies, ecolinguistics,
etc. These other disciplines asked similar questions but from a slightly different position,
something I found to be incredibly generative and creativity inducing. On the other hand, doing
transdisciplinary research can be incredibly slow and especially tedious. I often went days or weeks
where I found very little research until I was able to find an entrance into the literature through a
key figure or publication — I often felt I only stumbled upon other disciplinary work, since I did
not know they existed, not to mention knowing their search terms. Though I found plenty of
researchers with similar goals and work, they often call it something different, use the language
and practices associated with their discipline, publish in discipline-specific journals, and differ in
ways just significant enough as to prevent their being selected by the algorithms which regulate
our searches. I say this not to aggrandize my accomplishments, but to comment on how, unless
one expressly sets out to be transdisciplinary, it is very possible these materialist clusters of
research will remain disciplinarily bound. Not every doctoral candidate has a committee willing
to let them stray from the disciplinary literature, and not everyone has the time or resources needed
to meaningfully engage across disciplines. The learning curve for transdisciplinary research is
enormous — not only does one have to adjust to the jargon, but also at least have a rudimentary
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understanding of the assumptions of that position which requires at least a rudimentary
understanding of how that discipline, or more commonly subdiscipline, developed. It means taking
oneself through the process of getting to know the literature at a level I have not experienced since
I was an undergraduate student, and it took time.
This is why I find the transdisciplinary component of this dissertation so valuable — it
brings together scholars who might not even know about each other, and puts them in conversation,
making them relevant to Communication. By drawing upon the transdisciplinary literatures of
performance studies, discourse studies, rhetoric, and practice theory, scholars of Communication
can access a rich vocabulary for describing social life; from this rich vocabulary we can define
communication as the site-bound performance of social (dis)order. I wonder if Communication
should not become a home for this transdisciplinary research — many of the articles in the
literature I have reviewed in these pages take a discursive approach, and Communication could
benefit the critical disciplines by offering rich literature reviews and empirical exemplars to aid
transdisciplinary scholars as they apply a constitutive approach to their own subject matter.
I want to consider the value of practice theory to such an endeavor, particular in light of
what Schatzki (2002) calls “site ontologies” (p. xiii). Site ontologies are similar to relational
ontologies, in that experience emerges from and is mediated by connections among
entities/phenomena, but the phrase strikes me as being more open to unexpected arrangements and
interactions, since “relationships” are haunted in a Derridean, interdiscursive sense by their heavy
theorizing in interpersonal and psychoanalytic spaces as a cognitive, mostly human experience.
Site ontologies reminds me of Scollon’s (1998, 1999, 2001) phrase “sites of engagement,” which
Jones (2005) so aptly applies to our multimodal, computer mediated communicative practices. A
site ontology is one which understands sociomaterial life as emergent from and bound to the site
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of its becoming — what counts as the “site” (and how we determine this) is therefore a matter for
theoretical consideration and analytical interrogation, and a fruitful direction for future research
since as Schatzki (2002) points out, the description and critique of what counts as a site “can be
extended almost indefinitely” (p. xii).
To be clear, I am not advocating for site ontologies to replace relational ontologies —
ultimately, they both seek to call attention to the enmeshment of being and becoming — but rather
I am suggesting that it affords a connection to valuable literature while also avoiding confusion
with other existing interpersonal communication theories. A site ontology draws attention to
practices which order and arrange entities in ways which impart meaning and identity — this is
closely related to performance theories and organizational theories which have long portrayed
social life as a doing.
In the final post on his research blog, Ctrl+Alt+Dem, the late sociolinguist and linguistic
anthropologist Jan Blommaert said of academia in its current state, “Little truly valuable
intellectual work is going on there.” The neoliberal university prizes the enterprising self, valuing
the single-authored journal article and fostering competition at the expense of discussion and the
exchange and sharing of ideas. Ideas are intellectual property, and they are guarded until they are
developed, rather than sharing that process of unfolding and widening the possibilities for
creativity to emerge. As Blommaert goes on to say, “Frankly, all this is in its simplest and most
elementary form anti-academic and anti-intellectual.”
The reason I bring this up is that, in my transdisciplinary wanderings through the literature,
despite various differences in theories, vocabulary, disciplinary grounding, etc., scholars around
the world and across disciplines are arriving at a similar conclusion: we need a paradigm change.
Now, it is worth mentioning that, across disciplines, scholars are citing the same academic “rock
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stars,” as Blommaert calls them, and those rock stars have declared we need a paradigm change,
and so the conclusion is also supplied to transdisciplinary wanderers. But here is the thing, saying
we need a paradigm change is an initial step — we cannot allow ourselves to dwell there. It is a
risky conclusion to draw, too, since a “paradigm change” implies an enormous shift, some radical
transformation that, 50 years from now, we can neatly mark on a timeline of human development.
It sounds impossible.
But when I hear we need a new paradigm, I interpret this in two ways: (1) we need some
new, creative ideas, and (2) we need to change our practices. Ideas materialize in discourse (Kuhn
et al., 2017), and creativity is often described as making connections between two positions and
using those connections to generate a new position — a robust transdisciplinary literature would
facilitate this. A paradigm is a constellation of practices, made and maintained in interaction.
Calling it a paradigm homogenizes it into one huge abstraction that, frankly, is a bit beyond our
human faculty to comprehend. Calling it our normative (or some other, more accurate descriptor)
practices is not only more correct, but it is also more approachable. Practices are empirical — we
can study them, analyze them, critique them, and most importantly, change them. What the rock
stars mean when they call for a paradigm shift is that we need to stop doing things the way we are
and start doing them in a way we haven’t imagined yet. If we truly value their guidance, then we
better start imagining.
The last thought I will develop here about transdisciplinarity is to acknowledge the
conditions which made this transdisciplinary dissertation possible. As an undergraduate, I was
taught keep my research within the Communication discipline, and I frequently lost points for
citing too much work from outside of the discipline. While it was infuriating at the time, I
appreciate that my early training taught me to get to know one discipline first and make it my
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home. In my master’s program, I worked closely with faculty members who did their own
transdisciplinary work; I was fortunate to have a thesis advisor who got as excited about roads as
I did and encouraged me to read the work of other disciplines and talk through my ideas with
faculty in other departments. For this dissertation, I am fortunate to have a committee who are
excited by my transdisciplinary approach, an advisor who has demonstrated through her own
scholarship and scholarly relationships the value of discourse analysis across disciplines as well
as the importance of interdisciplinarity to “hold our analyses accountable” (Bartesaghi &
Pantelides, 2018, p. 173), and to have the financial support of the Office of Graduate Studies at
my university. I do not offer my experience as a model, but rather to illustrate how transdisciplinary
research is only possible if there are faculty and administrators who support it. Something
interesting I noticed while researching was how often I found truly creative transdisciplinary work
in master’s theses — in this case, supporting transdisciplinary work does not even necessitate
organized effort across boundaries, but rather can be fostered from within a department. So, while
it takes support, that support does not have to include radical structural change to make a
difference.
The Terrestrial Project
I cannot recall the number of times I have deleted “the Terrestrial project” from this
manuscript and the myriad drafts which preceded it. The literature is already a jungle of jargon
and debates over “-cenes” and “-isms” proliferate. As a communication scholar, this causes me
deep discomfort. On the one hand, I truly believe language matters and that terminology reveals
and conceals possibilities for relating; on the other hand, I find these debates over terminology
rather uninteresting since they rarely offer insight into how to change our practices beyond
swapping one term for another, and this often is not enough to generate significant social change
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since merely swapping terms allows other practices to continue on relatively unaltered.
Admittedly, I like the way it sounds, and it makes me feel like I am contributing something to the
literature because trendy terms are commodities in the market of academic publishing — but this
is probably the least of my contributions in this dissertation. This is because it is the nature of the
work and the ideas the Terrestrial project develops — relationality, sociomateriality,
communicative constitution — that matters, not the nickname I have given it. Still, I have found it
a helpful orienting point throughout my research. To me, it is a reminder to check my dichotomous
tendencies, and to orient to Terrestrials instead of humans and nature. I have decided to leave it in
the project because others may find it useful for similar or other reasons, and that possibility makes
it worth sharing.
Practical Applications
Having earned a master’s degree in communication and advocacy, it is important to me
that my work be practically applicable in the discipline and beyond. This is one reason why I take
a discourse analytic approach — I used to joke that I wanted to write a dissertation that my mom
could enjoy, and discourse analysis is accessible without compromising theory. One does not need
an understanding of complex statistical models, research design protocol, or theory to read and get
the point of a discourse analysis. Though having those resources at one’s disposal may open a level
of nuanced understanding not available to others without them, discourse analysis shows people
what they are doing with their language and this makes it relatable. In some ways, discourse
analysis offers people a glimpse at how accomplished they are at interaction — in comparison to
popular press claims about poor communication skills in the digital age, discourse analysis affirms
the work we are constantly doing to matter and make things matter together.
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This is a beautiful place to begin advocating for a change to our environmental practices.
Once we know all that we are already doing, the future seems wide open for all we might do instead
(or in addition to). It is incredible, this way we have constituted a thing I have been calling
“environment.” It is incredible, the way we interact with other beings and materials to continually
become, resemiotizing practices and ideas across contexts and constantly adapting to the varying
affordances and constraints of modes. It is incredible, the way we institutionalize practices and
entextualize ideas, so that their mattering is not entirely dependent on us and our everyday
encounters need not reinvent the wheel. We do it all in communication, and we will continue to
transform it in communication; discourse analysis provides us a means to make claims about what
we have done, how we did it, and how we might do better.
Of course, we do not do all this communicating solely with other humans or through
language. Discourse analysis, at least the multimodal mediated approach I have adopted here,
provides a means for accounting for the hybridity of communication. By attending to action and
relationships, it becomes apparent that there are many things doing many things in any given
interaction (and I am being purposefully vague here). The more of these things we can notice and
interrogate, the less fixed our reality becomes. It turns out that materials are doing much of the
hard work of making our world appear stable and perpetuating the status quo — legal texts impose
a property relationship on our relationship to land, maps and spaghetti models mediate a hurricane
to make it knowable, membership categories supply semantic meaning and position actors as
characters in a moral drama with the changing climate. If we want to change the status quo, then,
we must attend to those materials and beings.
When it comes to legal texts, a central question for researchers moving forward should be
how to reconcile the reality of a system of practice which necessitates an enacting clause with the
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very real need to create a world in new legal texts that is different from the one(s) those same texts
must call upon to legitimate them. This is similar to the existing conversations about making legal
language more accessible, but it goes a bit further. It is not just a matter of making legal texts
understandable or otherwise more transparent; rather, it is a problem of needing to call upon a text
to speak without simultaneously recontextualizing the world from which it is speaking. I admit, I
do not have enough legal knowledge or experience to make suggestions of how to do this with
much certainty, but I wonder if we might need to develop a new clause to accompany the enacting
clause, one which specifies the relational context (and perhaps, contradictions) in which the
conference of authority takes place.
Sharpiegate demonstrates the way in which some ways of mediating and constituting
environment are given institutional authority at the expense of others and provides us an
opportunity to reflect on why this is (and probably ought to be) the case in a crisis situation.
Efficient, organized action is critical when responding to a hurricane in order to minimize damage
to and loss of property, infrastructure, and lives. However, it is important that we not mistake the
authoritative account for the objective account. A NOAA forecast map may be the authoritative
view of a hurricane, but it is not an objective view, and neither is it representational of the actual
storm. Every time we observe, entextualize, and recontextualize a hurricane in discursive practice
we are re-mediating our relationship to the hurricane, and by extension what that hurricane is and
comes to be. Rather than pretending to uphold some boundary between politics and science, let us
own to the ways in which these pursuits are entangled.
I will make a final suggestion, this time with a bit more feeling. We should use caution
when categorizing people as “vulnerable populations,” especially when it comes to environmental
matters. When it comes to environmental changes, we are all vulnerable (if unevenly), so the
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category “vulnerable populations” is not only misleading, but also not useful or necessary. As
carbon-based lifeforms, we are only capable of existing in a very specific set of conditions.
Institutionalizing vulnerability with vulnerability indices, coalitions, or studies fixes a moral worth
onto bodies with very real consequences and covers over the way in which that moral worth was
decided upon and assigned (see also, Bartesaghi & Pantelides, 2018). Who benefits from being a
vulnerable population? Certainly not the vulnerable themselves, as their autonomy is entirely lost
in the labeling.
Instead of assigning membership to a category which foregrounds moral worth as its
primary characteristic, let us instead use the descriptive terms which already exist and apply to
these populations. It is not better to refer to “vulnerable populations” instead of persons who are
“poor,” “Black,” “Native,” “immigrant,” “uneducated,” “old,” “disabled,” “women,” “gender nonbinary,” etc. Descriptive identity terms account for the systemic and institutionalized ways by
which we constitute vulnerability — we create vulnerability through the asymmetries of authority
we make and maintain in discursive practice. “Poor” people are made vulnerable by the economic
systems which leave them with fewer resources for adapting to their environments. “Black” people
and other persons of color are made vulnerable by the historical and continued practices of racial
oppression which have repeatedly forced them to bear the burdens of environmental change and
destruction. Let us be honest about the ways we determine people’s moral worth based on their
classed, gendered, and racialized identities and let us not skip the critical step of accounting for
how vulnerability is done.
We must be made to reckon with the asymmetries we have materialized and maintained
through our discursive practices. I have shown that how we communicate about environment is
really a communicating with environment — a relational, hybrid unfolding of social and material
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mattering that we experience as discursive practice. There is no unmediated access to environment
— it only exists in communication, and therefore environmental research must not only
acknowledge its communicative constitution but work to demonstrate in empirical analysis how
an environment is realized in discursive practice. If we can account for the many beings and
materials interacting in the realization of one world out of many possible worlds, then we can begin
to seek a just way of reconfiguring what matters for the benefit of all Terrestrials.
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APPENDIX C:
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING BEARS EARS
NATIONAL MONUMENT

Federal Register
Vol. 82, No. 3
Thursday, January 5, 2017
Title 3— The President
Proclamation 9558 of December 28, 2016
Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
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Rising from the center of the southeastern Utah landscape and visible from every
direction are twin buttes so distinctive that in each of the native languages of the
region their name is the same: Hoon’Naqvut, Shash Jáa, Kwiyagatu Nukavachi,
Ansh An Lashokdiwe, or “Bears Ears.” For hundreds of generations, native
peoples lived in the surrounding deep Sandstone canyons, desert mesas, and
meadow mountaintops, which constitute one of the densest and most significant
cultural landscapes in the United States. Abundant rock art, ancient cliff
dwellings, ceremonial sites, and countless other artifacts provide an extraordinary
archaeological and cultural record that is important to us all, but most notably the
land is profoundly sacred to many Native American tribes, including the Ute
Mountain Ute Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray, Hopi
Nation, and Zuni Tribe.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

The area's human history is as vibrant and diverse as the ruggedly beautiful
landscape. From the earliest occupation, native peoples left traces of their
presence. Clovis people hunted among the cliffs and canyons of Cedar Mesa as
early as 13,000 years ago, leaving behind tools and projectile points in places like
the Lime Ridge Clovis Site, one of the oldest known archaeological sites in Utah.
Archaeologists believe that these early people hunted mammoths, ground sloths,
and other now-extinct megafauna, a narrative echoed by native creation stories.
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Hunters and gatherers continued to live in this region in the Archaic Period, with
sites dating as far back as 8,500 years ago.
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Ancestral Puebloans followed, beginning to occupy the area at least 2,500 years
ago, leaving behind items from their daily life such as baskets, pottery, and
weapons. These early farmers of Basketmaker II, and III and builders of Pueblo I,
II and III left their marks on the land. The remains of single family dwellings,
granaries, kivas, towers, and large villages and roads linking them together reveal
a complex cultural history. "Moki steps," hand and toe holds carved into steep
canyon walls by the Ancestral Puebloans, illustrate the early people's ingenuity
and perseverance and are still used today to access dwellings along cliff walls.
Other, distinct cultures have thrived here as well -- the Fremont People, Numicand Athabaskan-speaking hunter-gatherers, and Utes and Navajos. Resources
such as the Doll House Ruin in Dark Canyon Wilderness Area and the Moon
House Ruin on Cedar Mesa allow visitors to marvel at artistry and architecture
that have withstood thousands of seasons in this harsh climate.
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The landscape is a milieu of the accessible and observable together with the
inaccessible and hidden. The area's petroglyphs and pictographs capture the
imagination with images dating back at least 5,000 years and spanning a range of
styles and traditions. From life-size ghostlike figures that defy categorization, to
the more literal depictions of bighorn sheep, birds, and lizards, these drawings
enable us to feel the humanity of these ancient artists. The Indian Creek area
contains spectacular rock art, including hundreds of petroglyphs at Newspaper
Rock. Visitors to Bears Ears can also discover more recent rock art left by the
Ute, Navajo, and Paiute peoples. It is also the less visible sites, however -- those
that supported the food gathering, subsistence and ceremony of daily life -- that
tell the story of the people who lived here. Historic remnants of Native American
sheep-herding and farming are scattered throughout the area, and pottery and
Navajo hogans record the lifeways of native peoples in the 19th and 20th
centuries.
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For thousands of years, humans have occupied and stewarded this land. With
respect to most of these people, their contribution to the historical record is
unknown, but some have played a more public role. Famed Navajo headman
K'aayélii was born around 1800 near the twin Bears Ears buttes. His band used
the area's remote canyons to elude capture by the U.S. Army and avoid the fate
that befell many other Navajo bands: surrender, the Long Walk, and forced
relocation to Bosque Redondo. Another renowned 19th century Navajo leader,
"Hastiin Ch'ihaajin" Manuelito, was also born near the Bears Ears.
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The area's cultural importance to Native American tribes continues to this day. As
they have for generations, these tribes and their members come here for
ceremonies and to visit sacred sites. Throughout the region, many landscape
features, such as Comb Ridge, the San Juan River, and Cedar Mesa, are closely
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tied to native stories of creation, danger, protection, and healing. The towering
spires in the Valley of the Gods are sacred to the Navajo, representing ancient
Navajo warriors frozen in stone. Traditions of hunting, fishing, gathering, and
wood cutting are still practiced by tribal members, as is collection of medicinal
and ceremonial plants, edible herbs, and materials for crafting items like baskets
and footwear. The traditional ecological knowledge amassed by the Native
Americans whose ancestors inhabited this region, passed down from generation to
generation, offers critical insight into the historic and scientific significance of the
area. Such knowledge is, itself, a resource to be protected and used in
understanding and managing this landscape sustainably for generations to come.
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Euro-Americans first explored the Bears Ears area during the 18th century, and
Mormon settlers followed in the late 19th century. The San Juan Mission
expedition traversed this rugged country in 1880 on their journey to establish a
new settlement in what is now Bluff, Utah. To ease the passage of wagons over
the slick rock slopes and through the canyonlands, the settlers smoothed sections
of the rock surface and constructed dugways and other features still visible along
their route, known as the Hole-in-the-Rock Trail. Cabins, corrals, trails, and
carved inscriptions in the rock reveal the lives of ranchers, prospectors, and early
archaeologists. Cattle rustlers and other outlaws created a convoluted trail
network known as the Outlaw Trail, said to be used by Butch Cassidy and the
Sundance Kid. These outlaws took advantage of the area's network of canyons,
including the aptly-named Hideout Canyon, to avoid detection.
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The area's stunning geology, from sharp pinnacles to broad mesas, labyrinthine
canyons to solitary hoodoos, and verdant hanging gardens to bare stone arches
and natural bridges, provides vital insights to geologists. In the east, the Abajo
Mountains tower, reaching elevations of more than 11,000 feet. A long geologic
history is documented in the colorful rock layers visible in the area's canyons.
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For long periods over 300 million years ago, these lands were inundated by
tropical seas and hosted thriving coral reefs. These seas infused the area's black
rock shale with salts as they receded. Later, the lands were bucked upwards
multiple times by the Monument Upwarp, and near-volcanoes punched up
through the rock, leaving their marks on the landscape without reaching the
surface. In the sandstone of Cedar Mesa, fossil evidence has revealed large,
mammal-like reptiles that burrowed into the sand to survive the blistering heat of
the end of the Permian Period, when the region was dominated by a seaside
desert. Later, in the Late Triassic Period more than 200 million years ago,
seasonal monsoons flooded an ancient river system that fed a vast desert here.
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The paleontological resources in the Bears Ears area are among the richest and
most significant in the United States, and protection of this area will provide
important opportunities for further archaeological and paleontological study.
Many sites, such as Arch Canyon, are teeming with fossils, and research
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conducted in the Bears Ears area is revealing new insights into the transition of
vertebrate life from reptiles to mammals and from sea to land. Numerous rayfinned fish fossils from the Permian Period have been discovered, along with
other late Paleozoic Era fossils, including giant amphibians, synapsid reptiles, and
important plant fossils. Fossilized traces of marine and aquatic creatures such as
clams, crayfish, fish, and aquatic reptiles have been found in Indian Creek's
Chinle Formation, dating to the Triassic Period, and phytosaur and dinosaur
fossils from the same period have been found along Comb Ridge. Paleontologists
have identified new species of plant-eating crocodile-like reptiles and mass graves
of lumbering sauropods, along with metoposaurus, crocodiles, and other dinosaur
fossils. Fossilized trackways of early tetrapods can be seen in the Valley of the
Gods and in Indian Creek, where paleontologists have also discovered exceptional
examples of fossilized ferns, horsetails, and cycads. The Chinle Formation and the
Wingate, Kayenta, and Navajo Formations above it provide one of the best
continuous rock records of the Triassic-Jurassic transition in the world, crucial to
understanding how dinosaurs dominated terrestrial ecosystems and how our
mammalian ancestors evolved. In Pleistocene Epoch sediments, scientists have
found traces of mammoths, short-faced bears, ground sloths, primates, and
camels.
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From earth to sky, the region is unsurpassed in wonders. The star-filled nights and
natural quiet of the Bears Ears area transport visitors to an earlier eon. Against an
absolutely black night sky, our galaxy and others more distant leap into view. As
one of the most intact and least roaded areas in the contiguous United States,
Bears Ears has that rare and arresting quality of deafening silence.
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Communities have depended on the resources of the region for hundreds of
generations. Understanding the important role of the green highlands in providing
habitat for subsistence plants and animals, as well as capturing and filtering water
from passing storms, the Navajo refer to such places as "Nahodishgish," or places
to be left alone. Local communities seeking to protect the mountains for their
watershed values have long recognized the importance of the Bears Ears'
headwaters. Wildfires, both natural and human-set, have shaped and maintained
forests and grasslands of this area for millennia. Ranchers have relied on the
forests and grasslands of the region for ages, and hunters come from across the
globe for a chance at a bull elk or other big game. Today, ecological restoration
through the careful use of wildfire and management of grazing and timber is
working to restore and maintain the health of these vital watersheds and
grasslands.
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The diversity of the soils and microenvironments in the Bears Ears area provide
habitat for a wide variety of vegetation. The highest elevations, in the Elk Ridge
area of the Manti-La Sal National Forest, contain pockets of ancient Engelmann
spruce, ponderosa pine, aspen, and subalpine fir. Mesa tops include pinyonjuniper woodlands along with big sagebrush, low sage, blackbrush, rabbitbrush,
225

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

bitterbrush, four-wing saltbush, shadscale, winterfat, Utah serviceberry, western
chokecherry, hackberry, barberry, cliff rose, and greasewood. Canyons contain
diverse vegetation ranging from yucca and cacti such as prickly pear, claret cup,
and Whipple's fishhook to mountain mahogany, ponderosa pine, alder, sagebrush,
birch, dogwood, and Gambel's oak, along with occasional stands of aspen.
Grasses and herbaceous species such as bluegrass, bluestem, giant ryegrass,
ricegrass, needle and thread, yarrow, common mallow, balsamroot, low larkspur,
horsetail, and peppergrass also grow here, as well as pinnate spring parsley,
Navajo penstemon, Canyonlands lomatium, and the Abajo daisy.
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Tucked into winding canyons are vibrant riparian communities characterized by
Fremont cottonwood, western sandbar willow, yellow willow, and box elder.
Numerous seeps provide year-round water and support delicate hanging gardens,
moisture-loving plants, and relict species such as Douglas fir. A few populations
of the rare Kachina daisy, endemic to the Colorado Plateau, hide in shaded seeps
and alcoves of the area's canyons. A genetically distinct population of Kachina
daisy was also found on Elk Ridge. The alcove columbine and cave primrose, also
regionally endemic, grow in seeps and hanging gardens in the Bears Ears
landscape. Wildflowers such as beardtongue, evening primrose, aster, Indian
paintbrush, yellow and purple beeflower, straight bladderpod, Durango tumble
mustard, scarlet gilia, globe mallow, sand verbena, sego lily, cliffrose, sacred
datura, monkey flower, sunflower, prince's plume, hedgehog cactus, and
columbine, bring bursts of color to the landscape.
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The diverse vegetation and topography of the Bears Ears area, in turn, support a
variety of wildlife species. Mule deer and elk range on the mesas and near canyon
heads, which provide crucial habitat for both species. The Cedar Mesa landscape
is home to bighorn sheep which were once abundant but still live in Indian Creek,
and in the canyons north of the San Juan River. Small mammals such as desert
cottontail, black-tailed jackrabbit, prairie dog, Botta's pocket gopher, white-tailed
antelope squirrel, Colorado chipmunk, canyon mouse, deer mouse, pinyon mouse,
and desert woodrat, as well as Utah's only population of Abert's tassel-eared
squirrels, find shelter and sustenance in the landscape's canyons and uplands. Rare
shrews, including a variant of Merriam's shrew and the dwarf shrew can be found
in this area.
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Carnivores, including badger, coyote, striped skunk, ringtail, gray fox, bobcat,
and the occasional mountain lion, all hunt here, while porcupines use their sharp
quills and climbing abilities to escape these predators. Oral histories from the Ute
describe the historic presence of bison, antelope, and abundant bighorn sheep,
which are also depicted in ancient rock art. Black bear pass through the area but
are rarely seen, though they are common in the oral histories and legends of this
region, including those of the Navajo.
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Consistent sources of water in a dry landscape draw diverse wildlife species to the
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area's riparian habitats, including an array of amphibian species such as tiger
salamander, red-spotted toad, Woodhouse's toad, canyon tree frog, Great Basin
spadefoot, and northern leopard frog. Even the most sharp-eyed visitors probably
will not catch a glimpse of the secretive Utah night lizard. Other reptiles in the
area include the sagebrush lizard, eastern fence lizard, tree lizard, side-blotched
lizard, plateau striped whiptail, western rattlesnake, night snake, striped
whipsnake, and gopher snake.
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Raptors such as the golden eagle, peregrine falcon, bald eagle, northern harrier,
northern goshawk, red-tailed hawk, ferruginous hawk, American kestrel,
flammulated owl, and great horned owl hunt their prey on the mesa tops with
deadly speed and accuracy. The largest contiguous critical habitat for the
threatened Mexican spotted owl is on the Manti-La Sal National Forest. Other
bird species found in the area include Merriam's turkey, Williamson's sapsucker,
common nighthawk, white-throated swift, ash-throated flycatcher, violet-green
swallow, cliff swallow, mourning dove, pinyon jay, sagebrush sparrow, canyon
towhee, rock wren, sage thrasher, and the endangered southwestern willow
flycatcher.
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As the skies darken in the evenings, visitors may catch a glimpse of some the
area's at least 15 species of bats, including the big free-tailed bat, pallid bat,
Townsend's big-eared bat, spotted bat, and silver-haired bat. Tinajas, rock
depressions filled with rainwater, provide habitat for many specialized aquatic
species, including pothole beetles and freshwater shrimp. Eucosma navajoensis,
an endemic moth that has only been described near Valley of the Gods, is unique
to this area.
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Protection of the Bears Ears area will preserve its cultural, prehistoric, and
historic legacy and maintain its diverse array of natural and scientific resources,
ensuring that the prehistoric, historic, and scientific values of this area remain for
the benefit of all Americans. The Bears Ears area has been proposed for
protection by members of Congress, Secretaries of the Interior, State and tribal
leaders, and local conservationists for at least 80 years. The area contains
numerous objects of historic and of scientific interest, and it provides world class
outdoor recreation opportunities, including rock climbing, hunting, hiking,
backpacking, canyoneering, whitewater rafting, mountain biking, and horseback
riding. Because visitors travel from near and far, these lands support a growing
travel and tourism sector that is a source of economic opportunity for the region.
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WHEREAS, section 320301 of title 54, United States Code (known as the
"Antiquities Act"), authorizes the President, in his discretion, to declare by public
proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other
objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or
controlled by the Federal Government to be national monuments, and to reserve
as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which shall be confined to the
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smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to
be protected;
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WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to preserve the objects of scientific and
historic interest on the Bears Ears lands;
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NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of
America, by the authority vested in me by section 320301 of title 54, United
States Code, hereby proclaim the objects identified above that are situated upon
lands and interests in lands owned or controlled by the Federal Government to be
the Bears Ears National Monument (monument) and, for the purpose of protecting
those objects, reserve as part thereof all lands and interests in lands owned or
controlled by the Federal Government within the boundaries described on the
accompanying map, which is attached to and forms a part of this proclamation.
These reserved Federal lands and interests in lands encompass approximately 1.35
million acres. The boundaries described on the accompanying map are confined to
the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected.
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All Federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries of the monument
are hereby appropriated and withdrawn from all forms of entry, location,
selection, sale, or other disposition under the public land laws or laws applicable
to the U.S. Forest Service, from location, entry, and patent under the mining laws,
and from disposition under all laws relating to mineral and geothermal leasing,
other than by exchange that furthers the protective purposes of the monument.
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The establishment of the monument is subject to valid existing rights, including
valid existing water rights. If the Federal Government acquires ownership or
control of any lands or interests in lands that it did not previously own or control
within the boundaries described on the accompanying map, such lands and
interests in lands shall be reserved as a part of the monument, and objects
identified above that are situated upon those lands and interests in lands shall be
part of the monument, upon acquisition of ownership or control by the Federal
Government.
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The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior (Secretaries) shall
manage the monument through the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), pursuant to their respective applicable legal
authorities, to implement the purposes of this proclamation. The USFS shall
manage that portion of the monument within the boundaries of the National Forest
System (NFS), and the BLM shall manage the remainder of the monument. The
lands administered by the USFS shall be managed as part of the Manti-La Sal
National Forest. The lands administered by the BLM shall be managed as a unit
of the National Landscape Conservation System, pursuant to applicable legal
authorities.
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For purposes of protecting and restoring the objects identified above, the
Secretaries shall jointly prepare a management plan for the monument and shall
promulgate such regulations for its management as they deem appropriate. The
Secretaries, through the USFS and the BLM, shall consult with other Federal land
management agencies in the local area, including the National Park Service, in
developing the management plan. In promulgating any management rules and
regulations governing the NFS lands within the monument and developing the
management plan, the Secretary of Agriculture, through the USFS, shall consult
with the Secretary of the Interior through the BLM. The Secretaries shall provide
for maximum public involvement in the development of that plan including, but
not limited to, consultation with federally recognized tribes and State and local
governments. In the development and implementation of the management plan,
the Secretaries shall maximize opportunities, pursuant to applicable legal
authorities, for shared resources, operational efficiency, and cooperation.
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The Secretaries, through the BLM and USFS, shall establish an advisory
committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) to provide
information and advice regarding the development of the management plan and,
as appropriate, management of the monument. This advisory committee shall
consist of a fair and balanced representation of interested stakeholders, including
State and local governments, tribes, recreational users, local business owners, and
private landowners.
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In recognition of the importance of tribal participation to the care and
management of the objects identified above, and to ensure that management
decisions affecting the monument reflect tribal expertise and traditional and
historical knowledge, a Bears Ears Commission (Commission) is hereby
established to provide guidance and recommendations on the development and
implementation of management plans and on management of the monument. The
Commission shall consist of one elected officer each from the Hopi Nation,
Navajo Nation, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray,
and Zuni Tribe, designated by the officers' respective tribes. The Commission
may adopt such procedures as it deems necessary to govern its activities, so that it
may effectively partner with the Federal agencies by making continuing
contributions to inform decisions regarding the management of the monument.

299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306

The Secretaries shall meaningfully engage the Commission or, should the
Commission no longer exist, the tribal governments through some other entity
composed of elected tribal government officers (comparable entity), in the
development of the management plan and to inform subsequent management of
the monument. To that end, in developing or revising the management plan, the
Secretaries shall carefully and fully consider integrating the traditional and
historical knowledge and special expertise of the Commission or comparable
entity. If the Secretaries decide not to incorporate specific recommendations
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submitted to them in writing by the Commission or comparable entity, they will
provide the Commission or comparable entity with a written explanation of their
reasoning. The management plan shall also set forth parameters for continued
meaningful engagement with the Commission or comparable entity in
implementation of the management plan.
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To further the protective purposes of the monument, the Secretary of the Interior
shall explore entering into a memorandum of understanding with the State that
would set forth terms, pursuant to applicable laws and regulations, for an
exchange of land currently owned by the State of Utah and administered by the
Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration within the boundary of
the monument for land of approximately equal value managed by the BLM
outside the boundary of the monument. The Secretary of the Interior shall report
to the President by January 19, 2017, regarding the potential for such an
exchange.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to interfere with the operation or
maintenance, or the replacement or modification within the current authorization
boundary, of existing utility, pipeline, or telecommunications facilities located
within the monument in a manner consistent with the care and management of the
objects identified above.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to enlarge or diminish the rights or
jurisdiction of any Indian tribe. The Secretaries shall, to the maximum extent
permitted by law and in consultation with Indian tribes, ensure the protection of
Indian sacred sites and traditional cultural properties in the monument and
provide access by members of Indian tribes for traditional cultural and customary
uses, consistent with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C.
1996) and Executive Order 13007 of May 24, 1996 (Indian Sacred Sites),
including collection of medicines, berries and other vegetation, forest products,
and firewood for personal noncommercial use in a manner consistent with the
care and management of the objects identified above.
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For purposes of protecting and restoring the objects identified above, the
Secretaries shall prepare a transportation plan that designates the roads and trails
where motorized and non-motorized mechanized vehicle use will be allowed.
Except for emergency or authorized administrative purposes, motorized and nonmotorized mechanized vehicle use shall be allowed only on roads and trails
designated for such use, consistent with the care and management of such objects.
Any additional roads or trails designated for motorized vehicle use must be for the
purposes of public safety or protection of such objects.

344
345
346

Laws, regulations, and policies followed by USFS or BLM in issuing and
administering grazing permits or leases on lands under their jurisdiction shall
continue to apply with regard to the lands in the monument to ensure the ongoing
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consistency with the care and management of the objects identified above.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to enlarge or diminish the
jurisdiction of the State of Utah, including its jurisdiction and authority with
respect to fish and wildlife management.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall preclude low-level overflights of military
aircraft, the designation of new units of special use airspace, or the use or
establishment of military flight training routes over the lands reserved by this
proclamation consistent with the care and management of the objects identified
above.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to alter the authority or
responsibility of any party with respect to emergency response activities within
the monument, including wildland fire response.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to revoke any existing withdrawal,
reservation, or appropriation; however, the monument shall be the dominant
reservation.
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Warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure,
destroy, or remove any feature of the monument and not to locate or settle upon
any of the lands thereof.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of
December, in the year of our Lord two thousand sixteen, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-first.
BARACK OBAMA
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APPENDIX D:
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S PROCLAMATION MODIFYING BEARS EARS NATIONAL
MONUMENT

Federal Register
Vol. 82, No. 235
Friday, December 8, 2017
Title 3— The President
Proclamation 9681 of December 4, 2017
Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
1
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In Proclamation 9558 of December 28, 2016, and exercising his authority under
section 320301 of title 54, United States Code (the “Antiquities Act”), President
Barack Obama established the Bears Ears National Monument in the State of
Utah, reserving approximately 1.35 million acres of Federal lands for the care and
management of objects of historic and scientific interest identified therein. The
monument is managed jointly by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and the Department of Agriculture’s United States Forest
Service (USFS). This proclamation makes certain modifications to the
monument.
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Proclamation 9558 identifies a long list of objects of historic or scientific interest.
It describes cultural resources such as ancient cliff dwellings (including the Moon
House and Doll House Ruins), Moki Steps, Native American ceremonial sites,
tools and projectile points, remains of single-family dwellings, granaries, kivas,
towers, large villages, rock shelters, caves, and a prehistoric road system, as well
as petroglyphs, pictographs, and recent rock art left by the Ute, Navajo, and
Paiute peoples. It also identifies other types of historic objects, such as remnants
of Native American sheep-herding and farming operations and early engineering
by pioneers and settlers, including smoothed sections of rock, dugways, historic
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cabins, corrals, trails, and inscriptions carved into rock, and the Hole-in-the-Rock
and Outlaw Trails. It also describes landscape features such as the Bears Ears,
Comb Ridge, Cedar Mesa, the Valley of the Gods, the Abajo Mountains, and the
San Juan River, and paleontological resources such as the fossil remains of fishes,
amphibians, reptiles, and mammals, as well as dinosaur trackways and traces of
other terrestrial animals. Finally, it identifies several species, including animals
like the porcupine, badger, and coyote; birds like the red-tailed hawk, Mexican
spotted owl, American kestrel, and turkey vulture; and plants such as the Fremont
cottonwood, Abajo daisy, western sandbar willow, and boxelder.
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The Antiquities Act requires that any reservation of land as part of a monument be
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of
the objects of historic or scientific interest to be protected. Determining the
appropriate protective area involves examination of a number of factors, including
the uniqueness and nature of the objects, the nature of the needed protection, and
the protection provided by other laws.
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Some of the objects Proclamation 9558 identifies are not unique to the monument,
and some of the particular examples of these objects within the monument are not
of significant scientific or historic interest. Moreover, many of the objects
Proclamation 9558 identifies were not under threat of damage or destruction
before designation such that they required a reservation of land to protect them.
In fact, objects described in Proclamation 9558 were then — and still are —
subject to Federal protections under existing laws and agency management
designations. For example, more than 500,000 acres were already being managed
to maintain, enhance, or protect their roadless character before they were
designated as part of a national monument. Specifically, the BLM manages
approximately 380,759 acres of lands within the existing monument as
Wilderness Study Areas, which the BLM is required by law to manage so as not
to impair their suitability for future congressional designation as Wilderness. On
lands managed by the USFS, 46,348 acres are part of the congressionally
designated Dark Canyon Wilderness Area, which, under the 1964 Wilderness Act,
16 U.S.C. 1131-1136, and the Utah Wilderness Act of 1984, Public Law 98-428,
the USFS must manage so as to maintain or enhance its wilderness character.
Approximately 89,396 acres of the USFS lands are also included in 8 inventoried
roadless areas, which are managed under the USFS’s 2001 Roadless Rule so as to
protect their wilderness character.
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A host of laws enacted after the Antiquities Act provide specific protection for
archaeological, historic, cultural, paleontological, and plant and animal resources
and give authority to the BLM and USFS to condition permitted activities on
Federal lands, whether within or outside a monument. These laws include the
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. 470aa-470mm,
National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. 300101 et seq., Bald and Golden
Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 668-668d, Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. 1531 et seq., Federal Cave Resources Protection Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C.
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4301 et seq., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1701
et seq., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. 703-712, National Forest
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., and Paleontological Resources
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470aaa-470aaa-11. Of particular note, the
Archaeological Resources Protection Act specifically protects archaeological
resources from looting or other desecration and imposes criminal penalties for
unauthorized excavation, removal, damage, alteration, or defacement of
archaeological resources. Federal land management agencies can grant a permit
authorizing excavation or removal, but only when undertaken for the purpose of
furthering archaeological knowledge. The Paleontological Resources
Preservation Act contains very similar provisions protecting paleontological
resources. And the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Endangered Species Act
protect migratory birds and listed endangered and threatened species and their
habitats. Moreover, the BLM and the USFS were already addressing many of the
threats to objects identified in Proclamation 9558 in their governing land-use
plans before designation of the monument.
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Given the nature of the objects identified on the lands reserved by Proclamation
9558, the lack of a threat of damage or destruction to many of those objects, and
the protection for those objects already provided by existing law and governing
land-use plans, I find that the area of Federal land reserved in the Bears Ears
National Monument established by Proclamation 9558 is not confined to the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of those objects.
The important objects of scientific or historic interest can instead be protected by
a smaller and more appropriate reservation of 2 areas: Shash Jáa and Indian
Creek. Revising the boundaries of the monument to cover these 2 areas will
ensure that, in accordance with the Antiquities Act, it is no larger than necessary
for the proper care and management of the objects to be protected within the
monument.
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The Shash Jáa area contains the heart of the national monument: the iconic twin
buttes known as the Bears Ears that tower 2,000 feet above the surrounding
landscape and are considered sacred to the Native American tribes that call this
area their ancestral home. Many of the significant objects described by
Proclamation 9558 can be found throughout the Shash Jáa area. Ancestral
Puebloan occupation of the area began during the Basketmaker II period at least
2,500 years ago, and it left behind objects such as pit houses, storage pits, lithic
scatters, campsites, rock shelters, pictographs, and baskets, as well as manos and
metates for grinding corn. Occupation dating to the Basketmaker III period, from
approximately 500 to 750 C.E., left additional evidence of maize- and bean-based
agriculture, along with pottery, bows and arrows, pit houses, kivas, storage rooms,
and dispersed villages.
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New waves of human settlement occurred around 900 C.E., when the Pueblo I
period gave rise to large villages near Comb Wash, and 1050 C.E., when
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inhabitants from the Pueblo II period built expansive and complex multi-family
dwellings. Around 1150 C.E., the dawn of the Pueblo III period, the area’s
inhabitants increasingly sought shelter in cliff dwellings and left behind evidence
of an era of unrest. Several centuries later, the Ute, Paiute, and Navajo came to
occupy the area.

110
111
112
113
114

East of the Bears Ears is Arch Canyon, within which paleontologists have found
numerous fossils from the Permian and Upper Permian eras. Cliff dwellings are
hidden throughout the canyon, and the mouth of the canyon holds the fabled Arch
Canyon ruin, which spans the Pueblo II and III periods and contains pictographs
and petroglyphs ranging from the Archaic to the historic periods.
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Just south of Arch Canyon are the north and south forks of Mule Canyon. Fivehundred feet deep, 5 miles long, and decorated with alternating layers of red and
white sandstone, these 2 striking canyons contain shelter-cliff dwellings and other
archaeological sites, including the scenic and accessible House on Fire Ruin,
which includes differing masonry styles that indicate several episodes of
construction and use.
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Perched high on the open tablelands above the south fork of Mule Canyon are the
Mule Canyon ruins, where visitors can see exposed masonry walls of ancient
living quarters and a partially restored kiva. The deep canyons and towering
mesas of the Shash Jáa area are full of similar sites, including rock art, remains of
single-family dwellings, granaries, kivas, towers (including the Cave Towers),
and large villages primarily from the Pueblo II and III periods, along with sites
from the Basketmaker and Archaic periods.
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The Shash Jáa area also includes Comb Ridge, a north-south trending monocline
that originates near the boundary of the Manti-La Sal National Forest, ends near
the San Juan River, and contains remnants from the region’s thousands of years of
human habitation, including cliff dwellings, granaries, kivas, ceremonial sites, and
the Butler Wash ruin, a world-famous Ancestral Puebloan ruin with multiple
rooms and kivas. Comb Ridge also includes world-class examples of ancient rock
art, such as the Butler Wash Kachina Panel, a wall-sized mural of San Juan
Anthropomorph figures that dates to the Basketmaker period and is considered to
be one of the Southwest’s most important petroglyph panels for understanding the
daily life and rituals of the Basketmaker people. Significant fossil sites have also
been discovered in Butler Wash.
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Just north of upper Butler Wash, the aspen-filled Whiskers Draw contains a series
of alcoves that have sheltered evidence of human habitation for thousands of
years, including Cave 7, the site where Richard Wetherill, as part of the Hyde
Expedition in 1893, first identified what we know today as the Basketmaker
people. The nearby Milk Ranch Point is home to a rich concentration of kivas,
granaries, dwellings, and other evidence that Pueblo I farmers used this area to
cultivate corn, beans, and squash.
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The Shash Jáa area also contains the Comb Ridge Fossil site, which includes a
trackway created by a giant arthropod (Diplichnites cuithensis), the first recorded
instance of such a trackway in Utah. Also, the diverse landscape of the Shash Jáa
area provides habitat for the vast majority of plant and animal species described
by Proclamation 9558.
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Finally, the Shash Jáa area as described on the accompanying map includes 2 noncontiguous parcels of land that encompass the Moon House Ruin, an example of
iconic Pueblo‑decorated architecture, which was likely the last occupied site on
Cedar Mesa, as well as Doll House Ruin, a fully intact and well-preserved single
room granary that is associated with an extensive agricultural area on the mesa
top. These significant ruins are important examples of cultural resource objects
that should remain within the monument’s boundaries.
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The Indian Creek area likewise contains objects of significance described in
Proclamation 9558. At its center is the broad Indian Creek Canyon, which is
characterized by sheer red cliffs and spires of exposed and eroded layers of
Navajo, Kayenta, Wingate, and Cedar Mesa sandstone, including the iconic North
and South Six-Shooter Peaks.
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Also located within the Indian Creek area is the Canyonlands Research Center.
Spanning lands managed by the National Park Service, BLM, USFS, and private
landowners, this unique partnership works to increase our understanding of the
complex natural systems on the landscape, providing their custodians with
information they need to adapt to the challenges of a changing Colorado Plateau.
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Newspaper Rock, a popular attraction in the Indian Creek area, is a roadside rock
art panel that has been listed on the National Register of Historic Places since
1976. This site displays a significant concentration of rock art from multiple
periods, etched into Wingate sandstone. The older art is attributed to the
Ancestral Puebloan people who inhabited this region for 2,000 years, while the
more recent rock art is attributed to the Ute people who still live in the Four
Corners area.
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In addition to Newspaper Rock, the Indian Creek area contains numerous other
significant rock art sites, including the distinctive and well-preserved petroglyphs
in Shay Canyon. The area also provides opportunities for cultural and scientific
research and paleontological study. Dinosaur tracks in the bottom of the Shay
Canyon stream bed are a unique visual reminder of the area’s distant past.
Additional paleontological resources can be found throughout the Indian Creek
area, including vertebrate and invertebrate fossils, primarily in the Chinle
Formation. The Indian Creek area also includes 2 prominent mesas, Bridger Jack
Mesa and Lavender Mesa, which are home to relict plant communities,
predominantly composed of pinyon-juniper woodland, with small, interspersed
sagebrush parks, that exist only on these isolated islands in the desert sea and are,
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generally, unaltered by humans. These mesas provide the opportunity for
comparative studies of pinyon‑juniper woodland and sagebrush communities in
other parts of the Colorado Plateau. Additionally, the Indian Creek area includes
the exposed Chinle Formation, known for abundant fossilized flora and fauna,
including pelecypods, gastropods, arthropods, fishes, amphibians, and reptiles
(including dinosaurs). Finally, the area is well known for vertebrate trackways,
including tetrapod footprints.
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Some of the existing monument’s objects, or certain examples of those objects,
are not within the monument’s revised boundaries because they are adequately
protected by existing law, designation, agency policy, or governing land-use
plans. For example, although the modified boundaries do not include the San
Juan River or the Valley of the Gods, both of those areas are protected by existing
administratively designated Areas of Critical Environmental Concern. Plant and
animal species such as the bighorn sheep, the Kachina daisy, the Utah night
lizard, and the Eucosma navojoensis moth are protected by the Endangered
Species Act and existing land-use plans and policies protecting special‑status
species. Additionally, some of the range of these species falls within existing
Wilderness Areas and Wilderness Study Areas. Finally, although Hideout
Canyon is likewise not included within the modified boundaries, it is generally
not threatened and is partially within a Wilderness Study Area.
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The areas described above are the smallest compatible with the protection of the
important objects identified in Proclamation 9558. The modification of the Bears
Ears National Monument will maintain and protect those objects and preserve the
area’s cultural, scientific, and historic legacy.
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WHEREAS, Proclamation 9558 of December 28, 2016, designated the Bears Ears
National Monument in the State of Utah and reserved approximately 1.35 million
acres of Federal lands for the care and management of the Bears Ears buttes and
other objects of historic and scientific interest identified therein; and
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WHEREAS, many of the objects identified by Proclamation 9558 are otherwise
protected by Federal law; and
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WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to modify the boundaries of the monument
to exclude from its designation and reservation approximately 1,150,860 acres of
land that I find are unnecessary for the care and management of the objects to be
protected within the monument; and
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WHEREAS, the boundaries of the monument reservation should therefore be
reduced to the smallest area compatible with the protection of the objects of
scientific or historic interest as described above in this proclamation;

223
224

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of
America, by the authority vested in me by section 320301 of title 54, United
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States Code, hereby proclaim that the boundaries of the Bears Ears National
Monument are hereby modified and reduced to those lands and interests in land
owned or controlled by the Federal Government within the boundaries described
on the accompanying map, which is attached to and forms a part of this
proclamation. I hereby further proclaim that the modified monument areas
identified on the accompanying map shall be known as the Indian Creek and
Shash Jáa units of the monument, the latter of which shall include the Moon
House and Doll House Ruins. These reserved Federal lands and interests in lands
cumulatively encompass approximately 201,876 acres. The boundaries described
on the accompanying map are confined to the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected. Any lands reserved
by Proclamation 9558 not within the boundaries identified on the accompanying
map are hereby excluded from the monument.
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At 9:00 a.m., eastern standard time, on the date that is 60 days after the date of
this proclamation, subject to valid existing rights, the provisions of existing
withdrawals, and the requirements of applicable law, the public and National
Forest System lands excluded from the monument reservation shall be open to:

242

(1) entry, location, selection, sale, or other disposition under the public land laws and
laws applicable to the U.S. Forest Service;
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(2) disposition under all laws relating to mineral and geothermal leasing; and
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(3) location, entry, and patent under the mining laws.
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Appropriation of lands under the mining laws before the date and time of
restoration is unauthorized. Any such attempted appropriation, including
attempted adverse possession under 30 U.S.C. 38, shall vest no rights against the
United States. Acts required to establish a location and to initiate a right of
possession are governed by State law where not in conflict with Federal law.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to remove any lands from the
Manti-La Sal National Forest or to otherwise revoke, modify, or affect any
withdrawal, reservation, or appropriation, other than the one created by
Proclamation 9558.
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Nothing in this proclamation shall change the management of the areas designated
and reserved by Proclamation 9558 that remain part of the monument in
accordance with the terms of this proclamation, except as provided by the
following 4 paragraphs:
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In recognition of the importance of tribal participation to the care and
management of the objects identified above, and to ensure that management
decisions affecting the monument reflect tribal expertise and traditional and
historical knowledge, Proclamation 9558 established a Commission to provide
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guidance and recommendations on the development and implementation of
management plans and on management of the monument, and to partner with
Federal agencies by making continuing contributions to inform decisions
regarding the management of the monument. In order to ensure that the full range
of tribal expertise and traditional historical knowledge is included in such
guidance and recommendations, paragraph 29 of Proclamation 9558 is hereby
revised to provide that the Bears Ears Commission shall be known as the Shash
Jáa Commission, shall apply only to the Shash Jáa unit as described herein, and
shall also include the elected officer of the San Juan County Commission
representing District 3 acting in that officer’s official capacity.
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Proclamation 9558 is hereby revised to clarify that, pending preparation of the
transportation plan required by paragraph 34 thereof, the Secretaries of the
Interior and Agriculture may allow motorized and non-mechanized vehicle use on
roads and trails designated for such use immediately before the issuance of
Proclamation 9558 and maintain roads and trails for such use.

277
278
279
280
281
282

Paragraph 35 of Proclamation 9558 governing livestock grazing in the monument
is hereby revised to read as follows: “Nothing in this proclamation shall be
deemed to affect authorizations for livestock grazing, or administration thereof,
on Federal lands within the monument. Livestock grazing within the monument
shall continue to be governed by laws and regulations other than this
proclamation.”
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Proclamation 9558 is amended to clarify that, consistent with the care and
management of the objects identified above, the Secretaries of the Interior and
Agriculture may authorize ecological restoration and active vegetation
management activities in the monument.

287
288
289

If any provision of this proclamation, including its application to a particular
parcel of land, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and its
application to other parcels of land shall not be affected thereby.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of
December, in the year of our Lord two thousand seventeen, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-second
DONALD J. TRUMP
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APPENDIX E:
EXCERPT FROM BRENDA’S PRESENTATION ON “THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
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Filling wetlands is another sin of the past that we have to deal with now. Filling
wetlands, even when we mitigate that, the, uh, those, that filling, which in, in
Hillsborough County we’re, we’re lucky to have that Environmental Protection
Commission that looks over our wetlands very closely, but still, um, we have a
history of, of being allowed to mitigate wetland impacts, and that’s been
problematic because our fish, we’re learning more and more. Our official
wetlands and stormwater retention systems are just never as effective as natural
systems in natural wetland systems.
We’ve also done an awful lot, we’re still doing it, and you see it a lot, uh, raising
development up out of the floodplain, um, is also going to create problems for the
development that’s not raised up out of the floodplain. And every time new
development starts doing this, we have uh, this push-pull politically, between the,
you know, the new development is required to come up out of the floodplain, and
the neighborhoods are saying, we’re gonna, the lower ones that are there already,
are saying we’re gonna be flooded! The, the rain is gonna come off of them and
flood our areas. Um, the new development brings in engineers that say, don’t you
worry we’re going to be, uh, capturing all the rainwater on site. The residents say,
we don’t believe it, and in a lot of cases, they’re right because of what we were
hearing earlier today about um, some of the standards are simply outdated. Some
of the measurements that need to be taken, um, are, are, uh, be taken into
consideration are outdated. Um, hardened shorelines, a lot of cor-, coasts of
course do not get the protection from flooding and wave damage that natural
shorelines give us, and so we’re now realizing that we need to work with nature as
much as possible, rather than fighting against it. And that we saw, an interesting,
uh, uh, example, I think it was at MOSI37 we were shown, um, this uh, uh,
aquarium, a big aquarium uh, that, a huge aquarium, that was made with, as a
little model, and um, they made waves over on this end going through a little
mangroves, and at the other end, you wouldn’t have any waves at all. And if they,
if the, once the waves were going to, through the mangroves, because of the, um,
natural attenuation, wave attenuation of the mangroves.
And so, more and more we need to work with natural shorelines, natural wetlands,
and our county and our region and our coalition needs to work together to find
solutions to live with the challenges of, of climate change, sea level rise, and
extreme weather, and other challenges.

Museum of Science and Industry
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EXTENDED EXCERPT FROM THE “EXTREME EVENTS” PANEL
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HANK:

DIANA:

HANK:
JOHNNY:

Um, I’m gonna have one more question and then we’re going to have a
little exercise that I just made up in my head. So the, uh, the next question
is a good way to, um, wrap up this panel and also kind of feed into the
other panels, is — the thing we’re talking about here, this is one aspect of
climate change. And the question was, um, which climate change issues
are the most urgent for Tampa Bay to address now. Uh, how does this fit
into the overall picture, I think is another way of saying that, and how can
we prioritize these to um, start taking action now. We need a, not only a
list of what’s the most important, but a prioritized list. Uh, so we’ll hear
your thoughts on that, from the different perspectives.
Well, I’m floodplain manager, so I’m gonna go flood. Flood, followed by
water quality, but they really do go hand in hand, and, and we really do
need to address this at, at statewide level there needs to be that, you know,
that statewide stormwater rule. We need to reevaluate what these systems
are being designed, to using better data in the models just like I said
before, because when we have better rainfall, better flooding data, we can
design better for whatever the water quality parameters are that we’re
trying to meet. Um, you know we’re only, we’re only right now looking at
a 25-year event unless you’re in a closed basement. And with these,
increases in frequency and extreme rainfalls and things like this, I think
we need to be looking more at, you know, a critical duration storm, or, or
something else that we need to reevaluate how we’re looking at things so
that we can address the flooding and the water quality. Because without
water quality, we don’t have the tourism for the beaches, and the
kayaking, and all the great things about Tampa Bay, and with flooding
people aren’t gonna wanna live, you know, where they know that their
car’s going to be inundated, or somebody’s gonna drive down and splash,
you know, water at their house from wake on a roadway, so we need to
look at both of those hand in hand.
And the water quality will tie in nicely with our public health panel later in
the day. So, that’s what I’m looking for, is cross-cutting things.
Um, yeah, I would add to that, although not part of our extreme panel
here, um, the heat index, and the, the heat days. You heard Tim38 talk this
morning about, some of the slides showing how the increase in uh, in hot,

Tim gave the keynote address and is an atmospheric scientist currently working at a large research university.

241

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

MARK:

HANK:

JOHNNY:
HANK:
JOHNNY:

heat, um, is gonna increase in the future, and how that’s gonna impact us. I
don’t think we can isolate any of those, and certainly what is more
important I think they’re all intertwined. And I think it’s fortunate that we
have a group of people. I suspect that if we took a poll of the audience
here, we’d find, some people are concerned about flooding, some are
concerned about health, some are concerned about work days, which is
great because that’s what we need to address the whole issue of climate
change sea level rise.
Yeah, and I think we need a new paradigm for resiliency because I think,
you know, we, we have this situation where our seas are rising, ground
water is also rising, and the rainfall might be increasing. So I call it three
whammies coming together. So we need a new paradigm for planning and
design, which are not in the, in the books of any of the (company)
standards, so, I think, they need to be developing. Now you have the
CSAP39 has created this, uh the, the sea level projection, but, we need
rainfall data updated, I mean what is in the building code is like 40-years
old in terms of rainfall rates. So we need that science, and I think that’s
what Tim talked about, how to bring that science so that we can produce
those rainfall maps that are useful for, and, come up with new
groundwater level that they need to, you know, look at for the future
conditions. And the second aspect is that new paradigm, you need to
rethink what is resilience, how do you define resilience, and, like two or
three principles. One is that you need to think beyond your design events,
and also you need to think that you’re going to remain functioning even if
it is affected by an extreme event, you know, so you need to, that’s a new
concept for planning and design.
Thank you. Um, we’re gonna finish up with a, the exercise. One of the
themes of doing this is we want to get the three groups of elected officials,
scientist experts, the people who have to implement the science and the
policy, and we want to have this conversation start, and, what are we
doing well, what are we not doing so well. So I’m going to end this up
with, Johnny, what could Mark do better that would help the elected
officials? As Tim said earlier in his talk, you don’t just take your papers
and throw them over the fence. What could the scientist do that would
help you the most?
Um, (when we’re)=
=And, we’re coming up on the end, soYeah, what would be to be definitive about, uh, sea level rise projections,
the amount of rainfall we’re going to receive. I know that’s pie in the sky,
but if you want to ask the question I’ll answer it in that fashion because, if
we could lock in on the number of sea level rise and say it’s going to be
two-and-a-half feet in the year 2100, I mean, all our jobs would be a heck
of a lot easier. If we do that we could design for a 24-hour rainfall event
that’s going to occur once every month, um we can incorporate all of that

39

The Tampa Bay Climate Science Advisory Panel, likely referencing the 2015 report titled “Recommended
Projection of Sea Level Rise in the Tampa Bay Region.”
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HANK:
JOHNNY:
HANK:
DIANA:

HANK:

MARK:
HANK:
MARK:

HANK:

into, into policy.
So, um, smaller error bars.
Yes- ((audience laughter))
Um, Diana, as somebody who has to put the policy and the science into
action, what is an elected official, a policy maker like Johnny, what could
he do to help you the most?
I would say whoever is bringing a proposed policy to him, he would look
at it not just from that person’s perspective, but send it out to all the other
departments, all the other entities that could possibly be impacted by it,
um, and even ask them if there are other entities that could be impacted by
it, because, it’s, it’s not just that one organization pus-, pushing for a
policy, um, that should be looking at that policy and providing input to the
elected official to make an educated decision.
Like you said earlier a holistic view, don’t compartmentalize. Very good.
Um, Mark, the people that you talk to that need advice and the best
science input to make a specific thing happen, what can they do to help
you do your job the best?
Yeah, I think, there are two or three things. One is, um, we’re not going to
have small error bars for a while. So, th- the decision makers need to
under=
=The implementers. [What[The implementers, ok. So they need to
understand this is not your standard design tool, we’re gonna have to learn
how to deal with this uncertainty, better. And also, put some practices in
your codes and, you know, in your general practice. Incorporating that into
your planning and design. And also understand that this is a continuous
process of science and (inaudible). And I think incorporate that into your
planning and thinking.
Thank you. Diana, I’ll answer if it were me. Uh, I’d say the simplest thing
is, um, we just, we’d have to meet together, and you have to tell me what
you need. Because that’s where the disconnect comes in my-, and in, we, I
work with the, working with the city of St. Petersburg now, and when I
met with (name omitted) to talk about sunny day flooding, he listened very
carefully for twenty minutes and then switched the topic to, “what’s
killing me is extreme rainfall. Can you help me with that?” Sure! But I
didn’t know that’s what he wanted. So that communication I think is what
I would ask for more of.
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